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Summary
This thesis addressed two issues within the performance anxiety literature. The first half of 
this thesis examined the use of holistic process goals relative to part process goals. The 
second half of the thesis examined issues associated with the measurement of performance 
anxiety. The aims of the thesis were to: (a) establish further support for the efficacy of 
holistic process goals over part process goals, (b) investigate athletes' cognitive anxiety 
responses to a stressful event, and (c) develop and test a measure of performance anxiety. The 
thesis comprised of four empirical studies that utilised a range of quantitative and qualitative 
methodological approaches. Study 1 examined holistic process goals and part process goals 
in learning, retention and transfer test, whilst study 2 examined both process goals for skilled 
but anxious athletes. Study 2 also included two psychophysiological measures. The findings 
of study 1 and 2 provide support for the efficacy of holistic process goals, but provided no 
evidence that part process goal impaired performance. As such, the measurement of 
performance anxiety was highlighted as a potentially limiting factor in experimental designs. 
Therefore, the second half of the thesis focused on addressing this issue. Specifically, study 3 
used qualitative interviews to explore the cognitive dimension of the athletes' performance 
anxiety response. The study revealed that the cognitive dimension contained worry, private 
self-focus and public self-focus components. Subsequently, study 4 presents a re-examination 
of Cheng, Hardy, and Markland's (2009) model of performance anxiety using a hierarchical 
structure of three second order dimensions and six first order subcomponents. The results of 
partial least squares structural analysis supported a fully differentiated hierarchical model of 
performance anxiety. Therefore, the results of this thesis provide further support for the 




The demand to perform at optimal levels in competitive situations is a critical factor 
in elite level sport. However, sporting history is replete with examples of athletes who have 
performed below their optimal level in pressurized competitive situations. Greg Norman's 
performance at the 1996 US Masters is often cited as such an example. Norman went in to the 
last day of the Masters with an almost unbeatable lead, however, he lost the tournament in 
dramatic fashion and ended the day six over par. Afterwards, Norman said "Never in my 
career have I experienced anything like what happened...! was totally out of control. And I 
couldn't understand it" (Jackson & Beilock, 2008). The performance of the England football 
team in penalty shoot out situations has also been described as an example of poor 
performance in a critical situation. Specifically, England's spot-kick defeat to Italy in Euro 
2012 was their sixth shootout loss from seven in major international tournaments. It is 
therefore unsurprising that issues related to performing at competitive events contribute to a 
significant portion of applied sport psychologists' consultancy. In order to meet the demands 
of these athletes, it is crucial that there is a strong foundation of theory and research in sport 
psychology literature to inform applied practice.
Researchers have now published a number of literature reviews to contribute to our 
understanding of performance anxiety (e.g., Jones, 1995; Mellalieu, Hanton, & Fletcher, 
2006; Woodman & Hardy, 2001). In addition, research has been keen to explain less than 
optimal performance in competitive situations, colloquially referred to as "choking" (Hill, 
Hanton, Matthews, & Fleming, 2010; Masters, 1992). Recent research has also attempted to 
re-conceptualize the performance anxiety phenomenon with a model that represents the 
adaptive nature of the anxiety response (Cheng, Hardy, & Markland, 2009). Despite the 
abundance of literature in this area, mechanisms by which anxiety impairs performance 
remain poorly understood (Janelle, 2002). In addition, there is no agreed definition of anxiety
within the literature and the measurement of performance anxiety has continued to be an area 
of ongoing development.
Purpose of this Thesis
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the established performance anxiety 
literature. Specifically, the first half of this thesis examines the use of part and holistic 
process goals in competitive events (Mullen & Hardy, 2010). The second half of the thesis 
will examine issues associated with the measurement of performance anxiety, with a view to 
support recent developments proposed by Cheng, Hardy and Markland (2009). Therefore, the 
aims of this thesis were to: (a) establish further support for the efficacy of holistic process 
goals over part process goals, (b) investigate athletes' cognitive anxiety responses to a 
stressful event, and (c) develop and test a measure of performance anxiety. Due to the diverse 
nature of the investigations, both qualitative and quantitative methods were utilised to 
achieve the overall aims.
Structure of this Thesis
The thesis comprises of seven main chapters and consists of four empirical studies. 
This introduction is followed by chapter 2, which provides a review of the performance 
anxiety research in sport, focusing upon conceptual issues and the anxiety-performance 
relationship. The chapter concludes with an in-depth review of the conscious processing 
hypothesis (Masters, 1992) literature and the process goal paradox highlighted by Mullen and 
Hardy (2010).
Chapter 3 (Study 1 and 2) presents two experimental studies that set out to establish 
further support for the efficacy of holistic process goals. The studies are presented as a single 
paper rather than as separate chapters as the work is currently under review in this format.
The first study addressed Mullen and Hardy's (2010) suggestion that one way of 
strengthening their findings would be to use a learning paradigm to examine the effect of 
different types of process goals on skill acquisition. Study 2 replicated the design of the third 
experiment reported by Mullen and Hardy, in which novices acquired the skill of golf putting 
using discovery learning and subsequently performed the acquired skill in low and high 
anxiety conditions. The second purpose of study 2 was to extend previous process goal 
research by employing both heart rate variability (HRV) and salivary alpha amylase to 
explore the autonomic response of participants. The prediction regarding the utility of holistic 
process goals was supported, as the holistic process group outperformed the part process 
group in the competition condition in both studies.
Chapter 4 presents a second review that seeks to address the issues associated with 
measurement of performance anxiety, and how imprecise measurement methods may be 
hindering the development of experimental research. This chapter discusses the flaws 
inherent with the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & 
Smith, 1990) and critically examines the recent re-conceptualisation of performance anxiety 
proposed by Cheng, Hardy and Markland (2009).
Chapter 5 (Study 3) reports a qualitative investigation, which explored the cognitive 
anxiety response of athletes from a range of sports. The study predicted that the cognitive 
dimension would consist of worry, private self-focus and public self-focus, extending Cheng, 
Hardy and Markland's (2009) model, which consisted of worry and a unidimensional 
conceptualization of self-focus. Modified analytic induction supported worry, private self- 
focus and public self-focus as central features of the cognitive anxiety response. Crucially the 
results provide evidence that a differentiated approach to the measurement of the cognitive 
dimension of performance anxiety should be adopted in future research.
Chapter 6 (Study 4) presents a re-examination of Cheng et al.'s (2009) model of 
performance anxiety using a hierarchical structure. The proposed model consists of five first 
order subcomponents (worry, public self-focus, private self-focus, somatic tension, 
autonomic hyperactivity and perceived control) and three second order dimensions (cognitive 
anxiety, physiological anxiety and a regulatory dimension). The results of partial least 
squares structural equation modelling revealed support for this fully differentiated 
hierarchical model.
Chapter 7 summarizes the overall findings of the research programme and discusses 
the conceptual issues derived from it. The chapter also discusses the major practical 
implications emanating from the findings and discusses the strengths and limitations of the 
research programme. Finally, areas of future research are considered, with an emphasis on 
how the measurement model presented in Chapter 6 can be advanced.
Consideration in the Presentation of this Thesis
The thesis contains two separate reviews. The first outlines performance anxiety 
theories and provides a foundation for studies 1 and 2, which are presented together in 
chapter 3. The second review is presented after chapter 3 and examines issues associated with 
measurement of performance anxiety. Studies 3 and 4 are presented separately in chapters 5 
and 6, respectively.
In order to ensure a consistent approach throughout the thesis, the following format 
was adopted for all seven chapters: (1) American Psychological Association (APA) 
formatting (6th Edition), (2) Table and Figure numbering re-start with each new chapter, and 
(3) a single final reference list at the end of the general discussion (chapter 8). Appendices, 
including copies of the measures used in studies 1, 2 and 4, and the interview guide used in 
study 3 are provided following the reference list. The decision to use APA formatting was
made on the basis of the author's research training, which is within the discipline of sport 
psychology. The supervisory team recommended that APA be used in preference to the 
University of Glamorgan Harvard system to ensure that the research training best prepared 
the author for a career publishing in sport psychology journals.
Chapter 2
Literature Review 1
The aim of this chapter is to provide a review of the performance anxiety literature 
and offer a foundation for examining the key concepts and theories within the thesis. The 
review is presented in four sections, beginning with definitions of terms. The second section 
examines and discusses early performance anxiety theories, while section three focuses on 
mechanistic theories of the anxiety-performance relationship, with a specific focus on the 
conscious processing hypothesis (Masters, 1992). Finally, the fourth section examines the 
process goal literature.
Definition of Terms
The definition of terms has been a longstanding problem in the performance anxiety 
literature. Terms such as stress, arousal, activation and anxiety have often been used 
interchangeably (e.g., Gould, Petlichkoff, & Weinberg, 1987) even though they are 
conceptually distinct. In order to provide clarity for the current thesis, operational definitions 
are presented here.
Stress
McGrath (1970) defined stress as a "substantial imbalance between demand (physical 
and/or psychological) and response capability, under conditions where failure to meet that 
demand has important consequences" (p. 20). McGrath's process model of stress explains 
how physical or psychological demand can impact on an athlete in a number of ways. For 
instance, one gymnast may perceive a competitive situation as threatening, whereas another 
gymnast may look forward to competing against other skilled gymnasts. McGrath suggested 
that it is the individual's perception of whether they can cope with the demand placed on 
them that predicts this relationship with performance. The first gymnast may perceive the 
situation as threatening (i.e., negative) because of the high probability of failing, whereas the 
second gymnast may perceive the situation as a challenge (i.e., positive). The response of the
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first gymnast may manifest as self-defeating thoughts, which can lead to an increase in 
anxiety, and can impact on performance negatively. Although they may be faced with a 
similarly demanding situation, the second gymnast may instead thrive and produce a positive 
performance outcome, if they perceive they have the ability to cope with the demand.
In addition to the definition of stress as a process, a clear conceptual distinction 
between the terms "stressor" and "strain" has been made by Fletcher, Hanton and Mellalieu 
(2006). Stressors refer to the environmental demands that are associated with competitive 
performance, whilst strain refers to the individual's negative psychological, physical and 
behavioural response to a competitive stressor. Depending on the individual's perceived 
ability to cope with the demand of the stressor, stress may or may not impose a strain on the 
individual (Jick & Payne, 1980; Lazarus, 1966).
Arousal and activation
Traditionally, the terms arousal and activation have often been used synonymously to 
describe a single unitary construct which incorporates physiological and psychological 
aspects of behaviour. However, researchers have questioned this unidimensional approach 
and suggested that it is necessary to view arousal and activation as multidimensional 
responses (Lacey, 1967). Moreover, in Pribram and McGuiness's (1975) model of attention, 
three energetical components were identified to help distinguish between arousal and 
activation. Firstly, arousal was defined as the organism's immediate response to some new 
input, whereas activation was defined as the organism's readiness to respond, and effort was 
viewed as being responsible for the coordination of the arousal and activation resource pools. 
In view of Pribram and McGuiness's model, Hardy, Jones and Gould (1996) advocated a 
clearer distinction between arousal and activation and defined them as two separate 
constructs. Arousal was defined as the psychological and physiological activity that takes 
place in response to a new input, varying on a continuum from deep sleep to intense
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excitement. Whilst activation was defined as the cognitive and physiological activity linked 
to the preparation of a planned response to an anticipated situation. In the context of a 
sporting example, if a highly skilled basketball player is about to take a crucial free throw, we 
would assume that he would be in the appropriate activation state in which to shoot 
successfully. If at the same time of the shot a cheer from the crowd distracts him, the 
practised activation pattern might be disrupted by an involuntary startle response (arousal), 
which could potentially lead to an unsuccessful free throw. Crucially, activation refers to the 
activity geared towards the planned response, whilst arousal refers to the activity in response 
to some new input, i.e., the cheer from the crowd (Hardy et al., 1996).
Anxiety
Anxiety has traditionally been viewed as a negative emotion (Woodman & Hardy, 
2001), with the potential for a debilitating effect on performance (Eysenck, 1996). There has 
been a considerable debate regarding a favoured definition, particularly as research (Jones, 
1991) has challenged the traditional view of anxiety and has suggested that anxiety may not 
always be a negative or unpleasant emotion. The Oxford Dictionary (2013) defines anxiety as 
"a feeling of worry, apprehension, nervousness or unease about something with an uncertain 
outcome"; it also defines it as a "strong desire or concern to do something, or for something 
to happen". These two contrasting definitions reflect the complexity of anxiety, and, defining 
anxiety as a negative concept may risk an over-simplification of this complex response. 
Moreover, representing anxiety as a purely negative concept appears to be in conflict with an 
evolutionary perspective, which depicts anxiety as a functional defense mechanism that 
serves to protect and prepare the individual to a perceived threat (Ohman, 2000). A negative 
definition also neglects the potential positive effect anxiety can have on performance by 
mobilizing resources (Eysenck, 1992), or the energizing and focusing effects of anxiety 
(Carver & Scheier, 1986). Hence, Cheng, Hardy, and Markland (2009, p.271) defined anxiety
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as "an unpleasant psychological state in reaction to perceived threat concerning the 
performance of a task under pressure". For the purpose of this research, Cheng et al.'s 
definition will be adopted; in addition, a more balanced viewpoint is applied to account for 
the maladaptive and adaptive potential of the anxiety response.
The literature has also differentiated between state and trait properties of the anxiety 
response (Speilberger, 1966). State anxiety represents the moment to moment fluctuations 
and the "right now" tension or apprehension associated with being in a specific situation. 
Trait anxiety refers to the predisposition to view and interpret situations to be threatening in a 
more general way (Hardy et al., 1996). Researchers also identified anxiety as a 
multidimensional concept (Fazey & Hardy, 1988; Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990), made 
up of two subcomponents. The two specific components proposed to represent the anxiety 
response include; cognitive anxiety, to represent the mental component and, somatic anxiety 
to represent the physiological component. Morris, Davis, and Hutchings (1981) defined 
cognitive anxiety as "negative expectations and cognitive concerns about oneself, the 
situation at hand, and potential consequences" (p. 541). Whilst somatic anxiety was defined 
as "one's perception of the physiological-affective elements of the anxiety experience, that is, 
indications of autonomic arousal and unpleasant feeling states such as nervousness and 
tension" (Morris et al., p. 541). The performance anxiety literature also uses the term 
physiological arousal. Specifically, physiological arousal is regarded as part of the 
organism's natural physiological response to anxiety-inducing situations and physiological 
arousal is believed to have the potential to influence upon performance via two different 
mechanisms (Hardy, Parfitt, & Pates, 1994). Physiological arousal can have a direct effect by 
changing the performer's activation state and as such available resources. In an indirect form, 
physiological arousal can influence performance via the individual's positive or negative 
interpretation of their physiological symptoms such as increased heart rate and sweaty palms.
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Although this approach attempts to take into account the indirect and direct response 
associated with physiological arousal, the definition remains inherently unidimcnsional. 
Researchers should be sensitive to the multidimensional approach described earlier when 
explaining the physiological arousal response (Hardy et al., 1996 Lacey, 1967). Moreover, 
researchers have suggested adopting a "fine-grained" view of arousal, with all the different 
subsystems that support performance identified (Hockey & Hamilton, 1983). Neiss (1988) 
suggest that arousal should not be considered as a unitary construct, but as a patterning of 
different physiological patterns. If this multidimensional view was adopted, performance 
effectiveness would be affected by the appropriateness of this pattern with respect to the 
performance on the task at hand (Hardy et al., 1996).
Performance Anxiety Theories
The sport psychology literature has also generated a large amount of empirical 
research exploring the nature of the relationship between anxiety and performance. 
Traditionally, research had proposed that anxiety would negatively affect performance; 
however, researchers have been eager to explain the potential facilitative and positive effects 
that can be linked with performance anxiety (Jones, 1995). Early and more recent 
performance anxiety theories such as drive theory (Hull, 1943), the inverted-U theory 
theories (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), multidimensional anxiety theory (Martens, Vealey, & 
Burton, 1990) and the catastrophe model (Hardy & Fazey, 1987) have attempted to describe 
when athletes will suffer from the effects of performance anxiety. In the following section, 
these theories will be reviewed to provide the reader with a foundation for understanding how 
performance anxiety theories have developed.
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Unidimensional theories
Early theories attempted to explain the anxiety-performance relationship through 
arousal-based descriptions. Traditionally, these theories adopted a simplistic approach and 
suggested that performance levels could be predicted by arousal. Drive theory (Hull, 1943) 
suggested that there is a proportional linear relationship between arousal and performance. 
Increasing levels of drive (arousal) energise the performance of habitual (well learned) 
dominant response in a linear manner. However, if the task is complex or the dominant 
response is not correct, arousal will inhibit performance. Similarly, the Inverted-U theory 
(Yerkes & Dodson, 1908) also attempted to describe the performance-arousal relationship. 
Yerkes and Dodson suggested that heightened arousal enhanced performance to a certain 
point, after which continued increases in arousal would hinder performance. Despite the 
potential applications to sport, researchers became dissatisfied with the simplistic nature of 
these unidimensional approaches (Hardy, 1990). Specifically, these theories fail to take in to 
account the physical and mental responses associated with being in an anxious situation.
Due to the confusion that exists between the concepts of anxiety, arousal and 
activation, it is not surprising that that these descriptions have received extensive criticism. 
Central to this criticism is the suggestion that arousal is a unitary construct, which has a 
positive linear or curvilinear relationship with anxiety. Some researchers have attempted to 
address this by developing alternative anxiety theories, such as Hanin's (1980) individualised 
zones of optimal functioning (IZOF). The theory itself suggests that each performer has his or 
her own optimal pre-performance anxiety zone within which performance will be optimal. 
Despite the apparent practical significance, the IZOF remains theoretically barren (Gould & 
Tuffey, 1996) and it also fails to account for the mental and physiological responses 
associated with anxiety. Furthermore, researchers argued that these undimensional 
approaches under represent both the arousal and the anxiety response (Burton, 1988). Hence
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researchers suggested the need to adopt a multidimensional approach when describing the 
relationship between anxiety and performance. 
Multidimensional anxiety theory
Anxiety was recognised as a multidimensional concept by early clinical, 
psychophysiological, and test anxiety research (Davison & Schwartz, 1976; Lacey, 1967; 
Morris et al., 1981) and further multidimensional properties were revealed through the 
development of the Worry-Emotionality Inventory (WEI; Liebert & Morris, 1967). 
Specifically, Liebert and Morris proposed that the worry dimension represented the cognitive 
element associated with anxiety, whilst the emotionality dimension accounted for the 
physiological element. This approach was later adopted in the development of a sport specific 
theory of performance anxiety; multidimensional anxiety theory (MAT; Martens et al., 1990). 
The MAT is based on the assumptions proposed by Liebert and Morris, and suggests that 
anxiety is comprised of a cognitive and somatic component (see earlier definitions), which 
are predicted to have different relationships with performance. Firstly, somatic anxiety has 
an inverted-U relationship with performance, that is, individuals have an optimal somatic 
anxiety level, which will enable best performance (Gould, Petchlikoff, Simons, & Vevera, 
1987). Secondly, cognitive anxiety has a negative linear relationship with performance, that 
is, higher levels of cognitive anxiety result in poorer performance (Burton, 1988).
Despite some initial support for MAT, a number of researchers have criticized the 
model and its predictions. Burton's (1998) review revealed that out of the 16 papers 
examining the MAT predictions, only two provided strong support, and the remaining 14 
only provided moderate and/or weak support. In addition, a meta-analysis revealed a weak to 
moderate relationship between the subcomponents of multidimensional anxiety and 
performance (Woodman & Hardy, 2003). These equivocal findings may be attributed to 
MAT's prediction that elevated levels of cognitive anxiety will invariably lead to negative
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and detrimental effects on performance. In addition, MAT only explains the additive effects 
and not the interactive effects of the proposed dimensions (Hardy et al., 1996). The 
dissatisfaction with both unidimensional theories and MAT led researchers to develop more 
sophisticated models that explained the interactive effects of cognitive and somatic anxiety 
on performance (Hardy & Fazey, 1987). 
Catastrophe models
The cusp catastrophe model (Hardy & Fazey, 1987) describes the interactive effects 
of cognitive anxiety, and physiological arousal on performance. In contrast to MAT, the cusp 
catastrophe model recognises that high levels of cognitive anxiety can have positive 
performance consequences, depending on physiological arousal levels. The main predictions 
of the catastrophe model are: a) with low cognitive anxiety, variations in physiological 
arousal cause small performance effects characterized by a mild inverted-U effect; b) with 
high cognitive anxiety and increasing levels of physiological arousal (up to a certain point) 
there will be positive performance effects; c) high cognitive anxiety and high levels of 
physiological arousal will eventually result in a dramatic performance decrement, which is 
characterized by a "catastrophic" drop in performance levels.
There has been some empirical support for the catastrophe model (Edwards & Hardy, 
1996; Hardy & Parfitt, 1991); however; the interactions revealed in these studies have 
generally not been in precisely in the form predicted by the cusp catastrophe model originally 
proposed by Hardy and colleagues. Researchers have suggested more sophisticated 
catastrophe models that incorporate factors such as self-confidence and task difficulty, which 
may mediate the anxiety-performance relationship (Cohen, Pargman, & Tenenbaum, 2003). 
Consequently, a five-dimensional butterfly model (Hardy, 1990, 1996a) was developed that 
included a bias feature to account for the potential mediation effects of additional factors. 
This butterfly model allowed for the inclusion of self-confidence as a factor in the anxiety-
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performance relationship. Thus, the model predicts that under high levels of cognitive 
anxiety, highly self-confident performers might be able to withstand higher levels of 
physiological arousal before experiencing the sudden drop in performance predicted by the 
model, in comparison to a less self-confident athlete. In summary, the cusp and butterfly 
catastrophe models provide a more sophisticated approach to understanding the interactive 
dynamics of the anxiety-performance relationship, which can serve to examine potential 
interactions underlying performance disruption (Beattie & Davies, 2010). Despite this greater 
explanatory power, the catastrophe approach fails to provide a specific mechanistic 
explanation through which anxiety may affect performance.
Despite the appeal of the above theories, they are only limited in describing the 
relationship between performance and anxiety. Specifically, the unidimensional approaches 
discussed above failed to take in to account the different subsystems that affect this 
relationship. Whilst the multidimensional theory and the catastrophe model identified 
cognitive and somatic components, and described the separate and interactive effects on 
performance, they lack detail concerning the underlying mechanisms that predict this 
relationship. Therefore, the following section discusses theories and models that attempt to 
explain the mechanisms that underpin the performance impairment that plays a major part in 
the anxiety-performance relationship.
Mechanistic Theories
Mechanistic theories attempt to explain the underlying mechanisms associated with 
poor performance. These mechanistic theories have traditionally been associated with 
attentional explanations of the anxiety-performance relationship (Easterbrook, 1959; Wine, 
1980), and include the cognitive interference theory (Sarason, 1984; 1988), processing 
efficiency theory (PET; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), attentional control theory (ACT; Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), which will be reviewed first. Following this, an
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alternative mechanistic explanations grounded in self-focus mechanisms (Baumeister, 1984) 
will be presented, including, Wegner's theory of ironic processes of mental control (1989; 
1994), and a more detailed review of the conscious processing hypothesis (CPH; Masters, 
1992).
Cognitive interference theory
Cognitive interference theory (CIT; Sarason, 1984) suggests that the performance of 
highly anxious individuals is impaired due to the load placed on the information processing 
capacity by worry. This theory predicts that highly anxious individuals will experience "self 
pre-occupying worry, insecurity and self doubt" (p.936). These intrusive thoughts are task- 
irrelevant and divert attention from the execution of the task that is being performed. As such, 
the task-irrelevant thoughts consume resources ordinarily allocated for performance, resulting 
in poor performance.
Although CIT provides a plausible explanation of performance impairment, research 
has highlighted that high levels of anxiety are not always associated with such impairment; 
specifically, Eysenck (1992) suggested that other factors such as task difficulty and 
individual differences should be considered when predicting if anxious individuals will 
perform poorly or not. Research has also demonstrated the potentially facilitative nature of 
anxiety (Hardy et al., 1994; Jones, Hanton, & Swain, 1994), therefore, the suggestion that 
these intrusive thoughts only have a negative impact on performance seems questionable. In 
summary, this theory predicts that anxiety directs focus away from performance by focusing 
on task-irrelevant thoughts, but only provides a partial account for the effect of anxiety on 
performance. 
Processing efficiency theory
Processing efficiency theory (PET; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) explains how highly
anxious individuals may sometimes perform better than low anxious individuals. Eysenck
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(1992) suggested that cognitive anxiety serves two purposes. Firstly, cognitive anxiety 
consumes some of the attentional capacity ordinarily allocated for the execution of the task; 
thereby reducing available working memory capacity due to the task irrelevant thoughts 
associated with cognitive anxiety, which consequently reduces processing efficiency 
(Baddeley, 2001). Secondly, cognitive anxiety acts to highlight the importance of the task to 
the individual, which promotes increased motivation to minimise the potentially negative 
consequences associated with anxiety. This is achieved by promoting an increase in on-task 
effort. Therefore, potential performance impairment can be avoided by increasing effort, 
which typically involves the use of further working memory resources. Crucially, PET makes 
a distinction between performance efficiency and performance effectiveness. Performance 
efficiency relates to the relationship between effectiveness of performance and the effort or 
processing resource invested (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), whilst performance effectiveness 
relates to the quality of the task performance. Performance effectiveness is dependent on 
individual's perception of their personal performance expectations, and will dictate whether 
additional resources will be allocated to the task. For example, if the individual perceives that 
they are performing under par, the individual will invest further resources to compensate for 
poor performance. If the individual perceives that they are incapable of success in the task, 
then they are unlikely to invest further resources and will withdraw effort (Eysenck, 1982). 
Therefore, PET suggests that anxiety can have a negative cognitive effect via reduced 
attentional capacity, but can also serve a positive motivational function via increased effort.
There have been a number of studies that have supported the predictions of PET. 
Eysenck (1985) tested the predictions by using a letter transformation task to tax working 
memory. Crucially, the results demonstrated a significant interaction in performance between 
the two groups as a function of task difficulty, i.e., low and high working memory. The 
performance of the highly anxious individuals was increasingly worse than their low anxious
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counterparts as task difficulty increased. In line with PET, the results suggest that tasks that 
do not tax working memory will not be affected because individuals can maintain 
performance by increasing effort. When the cognitive demand reaches a certain threshold, 
performance will suffer due to the lack of confidence in achieving success and therefore the 
withdrawal of effort.
hi sport, a number of studies have lent support to the predictions of PET (Hardy & 
Jackson, 1996; Hatzigeorgiadis & Biddle, 1998). Wilson, Smith, Chattington, Ford, and 
Marple-Horvat (2006) revealed support for the predictions of PET in a simulated race driving 
experiment. Specifically, high anxious individuals reported higher levels of worry more than 
the low anxious individuals, and this negatively impacted on performance. However, Wilson 
et al. suggested that further research should attempt to fully support the predictions of PET by 
employing more sophisticated measures of performance, effort and performance efficiency. 
Subsequently, Wilson, Smith and Holmes (2007b) investigated the role of effort and the 
influence of anxiety on golf putting performance. The sample included eighteen golfers who 
were required to putt in low and high pressure conditions. The results revealed both groups 
reported significantly higher mental effort scores in the high anxiety condition, hi addition, 
all golfers took longer in a measure of "time to putt", and "glances to the target" were 
increased in the high anxiety condition. This would support a processing efficiency 
explanation as it suggests a reduction in visual search efficiency, through the increased 
glances at target and the reduction in time to putt. This lengthened processing time suggests 
that processing efficiency was impaired due to increased anxiety. In summary it would seem 
that the high trait anxious golfers were unable to maintain performance, reported higher 
levels of effort and less efficient pre-putt behaviour. Here, Wilson et al. suggested that the 
findings could be explained by either PET or the conscious processing hypothesis (CPH; 
Masters, 1992). The CPH explanation would propose that the increased effort exerted by
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these golfers focused inwards in an attempt to control their putting performance (Masters, 
Polman, & Hammond, 1993). It would therefore seem that the results of this investigation can 
be explained by both PET and CPH.
In summary, despite the equivocal findings presented by Wilson, Smith and Holmes 
(2007a), there is some evidence to support the predictions of PET and, more importantly, 
Eysenck and Calvo (1992) suggest that PET reveals a control system involved in the 
performance-anxiety relationship. This system responds to performance that does not meet 
the individual's expectations by allocating extra resources to the task. This theoretical 
argument again suggests that the anxiety-performance relationship is adaptive and may not 
always be detrimental to performance. Thus, the strength of PET is that it has the ability to 
account for occasions when performance is not significantly impaired despite increased levels 
of anxiety. Processing efficiency theory provided a platform for the development of a more 
advanced theory (Attentional control theory [ACT]; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 
2007), which has attempted to build on the strengths, and address some of the limitations 
inherent in PET.
Attentional control theory
Attentional control theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007) suggests that 
the effects of anxiety on attentional processes are central to understanding how anxiety 
affects performance. Specifically, ACT contains the same main predictions as PET, but also 
attempts to explain which functions of the central executive are affected by anxiety. The ACT 
is based on the assumption that anxiety impairs efficient functioning via two systems; the 
goal-directed attentional system and stimulus-driven attentional system (Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002). Increases in anxiety are suggested to influence the stimulus-driven attentional system 
at the cost of the goal-directed attentional system. Specifically, it is lower level functions of
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the central executive that are linked to the impairment of the goal-directed attentional system 
(Baddeley, 1986). Specifically, the goal directed system has two functions: Inhibition, which 
makes use of attentional control to resist disruption or interferences from task irrelevant 
stimuli (depicted as a negative control), and Shifting, which uses attentional control to shift 
individuals allocation of attention to remain focused on task relevant stimuli (positive 
control). Increases in anxiety cause impairment of these two functions and disrupts balance 
between the goal-directed and the stimulus-driven attentional systems (Eysenck et al., 2007).
Wilson, Vine, and Wood (2009) have attempted to test the predictions of ACT. They 
utilised the quiet eye period (Vickers, 1996) as an objective measure of attentional control in 
a sample of basketball players under conditions designed to manipulate anxiety. The quiet 
eye period was adopted as it was suggested to be sensitive to increases in anxiety and may be 
a useful index of attentional control. Specifically, free throws rely heavily on the goal- 
directed attentional system; therefore, impairment of inhibitory control should result in 
reductions in quiet eye periods of anxious athletes. The increase in stimulus-driven 
attentional system is reflected in anxious performers making more gazes of shorter duration 
at the basketball hoop. The results demonstrated that performance was worse when quiet eye 
period was significantly reduced in the high anxiety condition, thus, providing support for the 
ACT prediction that anxiety can negatively influence performance due to disruptions in 
attentional control.
Research conducted by Wilson, Wood and Vine (2009) also attempted to test the 
predictions of ACT, this time in penalty kicks. Wilson et al. hypothesized that high trait 
anxious footballers would fixate earlier and for longer on a goalkeeper before shooting, than 
low trait anxious players. Fourteen male football players executed penalty kicks under low 
and high threat counterbalanced conditions in a repeated measures design. The results
supported Wilson et al.'s predictions and the authors concluded that the earlier and longer
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fixations on the goalkeeper reflect the increase in the stimulus-driven attention system. 
Similar support for ACT predictions has been reported in individuals with high levels of trait 
anxiety (Coombes, Higgins, Gamble, Cauragh, & Janelle, 2009) in pre-planned motor tasks. 
hi view of the research examining the predictions of ACT, Eysenck and Derakshan (2011) set 
out to review these developments and highlighted how the research area could be 
strengthened. Specifically, Eysenck and Derakshan suggested that the behavioural evidence 
reported concerning performance effectiveness, only provides indirect evidence of the 
internal processes associated with ACT. Thus, Eysenck and Derakshan outline how research 
using neuroscience methods might be one way to further explore the predictions of ACT. 
The research reported above provides some support for ACT and its predictions. However 
this literature is in its infancy, especially in the sporting environment. The strength of ACT is 
that it highlights the specific functions of the central executive that are affected by anxiety, 
whilst also retaining the central prediction of PET concerning performance efficiency and 
effectiveness.
The aforementioned theories are predominantly based on the assumption that 
attentional processes mediate the anxiety-performance relationship; these are often referred to 
as distraction or attentional theories (Beilock & Carr, 2001). However, performance anxiety 
decrements can also be explained by self-focus theories. Self-focus theories are based on the 
assumption that pressure raises self-consciousness and anxiety about performing correctly, 
which increases the attention paid to skill processes and their step-by-step control 
(Baumeister, 1984; Lewis & Under, 1997). Most prominent in the sport psychology literature 
have been the theory of ironic processes (Wegner, 1989) and the conscious processing 
hypothesis (Masters, 1992), which will be reviewed in detail below.
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Theory of ironic processes of mental control
The theory of ironic processes of mental control (Wegner, 1989) was developed from 
the observation that the mind wanders because we try to control it. Wegner suggests that it is 
this control process that causes individuals to suffer performance impairment. Developed by 
Baudouin (1921) this theory suggests that individuals have two mental processes that work 
together in order to maintain task control; the intentional operating and the ironic monitoring 
processes. The operating process searches for mental contents that are aimed at creating the 
desired state or goal. This process is effortful, conscious, effective, and interruptible. 
Conversely, the monitoring process searches for mental contents that depict failure to achieve 
the desired state, or goal. The monitoring process is usually unconscious, autonomous, and 
therefore less demanding of effort; in addition, it attempts to identify lapses in control to 
ensure an individual enjoys mental control (Wegner, 1994). Both processes occur at the same 
time and are competing for mental capacity available to host them (Navon & Gopher, 1979). 
Crucially, under mental load, such as anxiety (Janelle, 1999), the operating process enjoys 
less cognitive space. The interference at the cognitive level by anxiety, consumes attentional 
space ordinarily used by the operating process. The result is the monitoring process becomes 
more dominant and supersedes the operating process, and consequently the focus shifts to the 
undesired state. In essence, by ensuring that we are aware of potential failure the monitoring 
system is actually ironically responsible for this failure. If we take the example of a golf putt, 
the operating process will be searching for factors that will enable the successful execution, 
such as, a focus on the distance to the hole. At the same time, the monitoring process is 
searching for factors that are counter-intuitive to the successful putt, such as, the incline of 
the green or wind strength. Under cognitive load the monitoring process supersedes the 
operating process, which results in the unintended performance outcome, such as missing the 
putt.
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In the context of the demands of sport, the theory of ironic effects would seem to fit 
the experiences that athletes report. In addition, Wegner, Ansfield, and Pilloff (1998) 
revealed strong support for the theory in a golf putting experiment. Novice golfers were 
asked "not to hit the ball past the glow spot (target)" in two conditions; under mental load and 
without mental load. The results revealed that participants overshot the ball significantly 
more when under mental load. In line with ironic process theory, it would seem that under 
increased cognitive load, the monitoring process of avoiding hitting the ball past the target, 
ironically caused the counter-intentional performance. Dugdalc and Eklund (2002) also 
reported ironic process effects when they asked participants not to focus on umpires. 
Participants were asked to watch clips of Australian Rules football under a low and a high 
cognitive load condition. The results revealed that the when participants were told to suppress 
thoughts of the umpire, they were in fact more aware of the umpire. However, the results 
were not significantly greater in the anxiety condition, and therefore did not support the 
prediction that ironic processes occur in high cognitive load.
More recently, de la Pena, Murray, and Janelle (2008) challenged the lack of support 
for Wegner's theory and suggest an alternative explanation, which they termed the implicit 
overcompensation theory. Whilst Wegner's model suggest that self-instructions not to 
perform in a certain manner will lead to the behaviour the individual seeks to avoid if the 
person is anxious, the implicit overcompensation theory predicts that avoidant instructions 
will produce the opposite outcome to that intended by the performer regardless of anxiety, de 
la Pena et al. report findings that support their alternative explanation and suggest that the 
instruction "not to leave a putt short" creates an implicit message that it is better to putt 
firmly than leave it short. Tonar, Moran, and Jackson (2013) examined predictions of the 
implicit overcompensation theory in highly skilled golfers and low skilled golfers. Tonar ct 
al. reported over compensatory behaviour was more apparent in low skilled than high skilled
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golfers. Although no predictions were made in terms of performance anxiety, this theory 
might prove a useful extension of Wegner's original theory. In summary, Wegner's theory of 
ironic processes (1989) includes an operational and a monitoring process to achieve mental 
control. When individuals are under conditions of high cognitive load, the operating process 
is superseded by the monitoring process, which causes individuals to focus on behaviours and 
actions they are ironically trying to avoid. Whilst the theory of ironic processes has received 
some attention in the sport psychology literature, the conscious processing hypothesis 
(Masters, 1992) has been extensively researched. The following section will discuss this 
research and outline why this theoretical approach was chosen as the conceptual basis for this 
thesis.
The conscious processing hypothesis
Masters' (1992) conscious processing hypothesis (CPH) suggests that under pressure 
experts attempt to ensure task success by using task relevant knowledge to guide their 
performance. The combination of high levels of state anxiety and a focus on task specific 
explicit knowledge can lead to conscious control over skill execution, and result in 
performance impairment. Masters' hypothesis is based upon the stages of learning proposed 
by Fitts and Posner (1967), who described learning in three stages. Firstly, the early cognitive 
stage relies on explicit or declarative knowledge and is characterized by a large number of 
errors, a high level of variability and slow effortful movements. Individuals then progress to 
the associative stage, in which they are able to associate certain environmental cues with the 
correct pattern of movement for performance success. Finally, individuals progress to the 
autonomous stage, where performance is smooth, unconscious and covertly controlled (i.e., 
procedural). Masters suggested that under stress, athletes attempt to control performance, by 
focusing on task relevant, explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is laden with facts and
rules regarding skill execution (Reber, 1993), thus is characteristic of the declarative
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knowledge that supports performance in the early cognitive stage of learning. By attending to 
this information individuals begin to control movement in a step-by step manner and interfere 
with the normal automatic processing associated with the autonomous stage of learning. 
Thus, the increase in levels of state anxiety that athletes might experience in competitive 
events causes "deautomatization" and task control reverts to that associated with the early 
stages of learning and consequently performance is impaired.
To test the predictions of the CPH, Masters (1992) used a sample of forty novice 
golfers. The experiment consisted of two phases; an acquisition stage consisting of 400 putts 
conducted over four days, and a test phase of 100 putts conducted on the fifth day. 
Participants were assigned to one of five experimental conditions; implicit learning, explicit 
learning, implicit learning control, stressed control and non-stressed control. Both the implicit 
learning and implicit learning control groups performed a random letter generation task 
(RLG; Baddley, 1966) during the acquisition phase. The RLG was used to prevent the use of 
explicit knowledge and to encourage athletes to learn using implicit knowledge. The explicit 
learning group were given instructions on technical knowledge related to putting. Following 
400 putts in the acquisition phase, participants performed the 100 putts under stress. The 
results revealed that those who learnt using explicit knowledge performed significantly worse 
than those who used implicit knowledge. However, the implicit learning group did not 
perform the secondary RLG task in the test phase, and therefore they may have improved 
performance as the test phase was easier (Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996). Therefore, it is 
unclear whether the performance results were due to the differential practice the groups 
received or the easier task demands during the test phase for the implicit group.
Consequently, Hardy, Mullen and Jones (1996) extended and replicated Masters' 
(1992) study, but included a new implicit learning group who performed the RLG task in the 
stress condition. Therefore, the study included four experimental conditions: implicit learning
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without RLG in the stress test, replicating Masters' implicit learning group, implicit learning 
with RLG in the stress test, explicit learning and a non-stressed control group. The inclusion 
of an implicit learning group with RLG in the stress condition was used to examine whether 
the implicit learning group in Masters' study improved their performance because of the 
easier task demands. The same task procedures as Masters' original research were adopted, 
that is, 400 putts in an acquisition phase over four days and a test phase of 100 putts on the 
fifth day. The results revealed that in the test phase the performance of both implicit learning 
groups improved, while the performance of the explicit group was impaired. These results 
supported the predictions of CPH; however, Hardy et al. suggested that participants might 
have become desensitized to the RLG task. During the 400 acquisition trials, participants may 
have become less sensitive to self generated verbal distractions, and become partially 
immune to the effects of performance anxiety in the stress condition.
Hardy, Mullen, and Martin (2001) attempted to correct for this desensitization in a 
performance paradigm study. Twelve expert trampolinists performed their competition 
routines in a shadowing condition. The shadowing condition was designed to invoke 
conscious processing and involved the coach calling out a coaching point from each move in 
the routine. The trampolinists were asked to concentrate on the coaching instruction and use 
the explicit knowledge to guide their performance. The low anxiety condition was conducted 
during a normal practice session, whilst the high anxiety condition was completed two hours 
before a competitive event. Results revealed that state anxiety increased from practice to the 
competition condition. The combination of the increased anxiety and task-relevant cues also 
led to performance impairments, supporting a conscious processing explanation. While this 
provides support for the CPH, Hardy et al. suggested that these effects could be attributed to 
an alternative explanation. Specifically, the reduction in attentional capacity associated with 
the combination of the task relevant cues and the increase in anxiety may have led to a
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decline in performance. Increases in anxiety are believed to lead to a reduction in working 
memory (Eysenck, 1992), thus the performance effects may be attributed to the relevant cues 
depleting attentional capacity sufficiently to impair performance.
To examine the attentional threshold explanation suggested by Hardy et al. (2001), 
Mullen and Hardy (2000) conducted a golf putting study using eighteen male golfers. The 
golfers were required to complete 10 putts in three experimental conditions; task relevant, 
task irrelevant and control, hi the task relevant condition, participants self-selected a coaching 
instruction, which was verbalized during putting to encourage conscious processing. The task 
irrelevant condition involved a RLG task to prevent conscious processing. Golfers were split 
into "better" and "poorer" groups based on putting performance in the low anxiety control 
condition. Results revealed that those in the poorer group were not adversely affected by 
increases in cognitive anxiety. In contrast, those in the better group suffered a disruption in 
performance due to the increase in cognitive anxiety. The better group also suffered 
performance impairment in the task relevant and task irrelevant conditions under low anxiety. 
The results suggest that the better performers may have been more adversely affected by 
increases in cognitive anxiety in both the task relevant and task irrelevant conditions because 
they possessed a higher level of automaticity than the poorer performers. Automaticity is a 
key characteristic of expert performers (Fitts & Posner, 1967), so the effects of conscious 
processing may be more prevalent in these better performers. Mullen and Hardy also included 
a self-report measure of effort in an attempt to explore the intensity of attentional processing. 
With regards to conscious processing, changes in effort should be evident when task control 
is transferred from automatic processes to more attention demanding processes; however, 
Mullen and Hardy failed to find any increase in effort associated with CPH. Nevertheless, 
they concluded that measurement of effort may provide a useful insight into the effects of
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conscious processing, and suggested that further research should adopt more sophisticated 
measurement methods of effort.
Mullen, Hardy, and Tattersall (2005) also examined the conscious processing 
hypothesis predictions. In addition, Mullen et al. included heart rate variability (HRV) as a 
measure of mental effort, which was included to demonstrate the hypothesized increase in 
attentional processing associated with lapses into conscious processing. Participants 
completed 60 golf putts, in three different conditions; a control condition, a task relevant 
shadowing condition and a task irrelevant tone counting condition. All three of the conditions 
were repeated in low and high anxiety conditions. The task relevant shadowing condition 
required participants to putt using three coaching points to encourage lapses in to conscious 
processing. In the task irrelevant condition, participants were required to listen to high and 
low pitch tones while putting, and to identify the number of high-pitched tones. Tone 
counting was used in preference to the RLG task used in earlier studies (e.g., Hardy, Mullen, 
& Jones, 1996; Masters, 1992) because verbalization would interfere with the measurement 
of HRV, thus, participants indicated the number of high pitched tones with their fingers. 
Performance declined in both the task relevant shadowing and task irrelevant conditions in 
the high anxiety condition. It would seem that the task relevant shadowing task did not induce 
conscious processing, as predicted. The combination of both secondary tasks and the worry 
caused by the increased cognitive anxiety (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) may have caused the 
performance decrements. Thus, an attentional threshold explanation would seem more 
appropriate as performance was impaired in both groups. The HRV spectral analysis revealed 
that anxiety-related performance impairment was associated with changes in the high 
frequency band. Mullen et al. suggested that these changes may indicate an increase in vagal 
activity, or a decrease in respiratory frequency, or both. Therefore, participants may have 
coped with the increased demands of the task by employing a breathing based relaxation
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strategy, which would be reflected in the observed changes in spectral power in the high 
frequency band. No significant effects were revealed for self-reported mental effort. In 
summary, Mullen et al. provided evidence to support the attentional capacity explanation; 
however, the authors suggest that conscious processing may be more evident in tasks that 
demand more discrete motor control. For instance, the motor control associated with 
trampolining may be more demanding than golf putting, which may explain the lack of 
conscious processing effects in this study.
Self-focus explanations have also been reported in research outside of the CPH 
literature. Beilock and Carr (2001) presented the term explicit monitoring and suggested that 
the term refers to the allocation of attention to skill execution. Furthermore, Beilock and Carr 
suggested that skills that are proceduralized might be more susceptible to the effects of 
explicit monitoring during performance. As such Beilock and Carr aimed to explore the 
cognitive mechanisms responsible for the disruption of a well-learned skill under pressure. 
Firstly, they established that skilled golf putting is encoded in procedural form, and thus 
would be susceptible to decrements in performance according to explicit monitoring 
explanations. Secondly, they examined choking effects in a golf putting task and were able to 
apply training to ameliorate the explicit monitoring effects. The findings support a self-focus 
explanation for the decrements in performance in a procedural skill based task. Furthermore, 
Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, and Starkes (2002) provided further evidence that high-level skill 
execution is harmed when attention is directed to the step-by-step monitoring of performance. 
Ford, Hodges, and Williams (2005) also reported performance effects associated with an 
explicit monitoring explanation. Specifically, they manipulated attentional focus of skilled 
and less skilled soccer players to explore step-by-step monitoring of procedural performance. 
The results revealed that the skilled soccer players suffered performance impairment under 
conditions that focused the attention on skill based features of performance. Explicit
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monitoring would seem to be one explanation for the mechanisms by which self-focus 
impairs performance. Crucially, Jackson, Ashford and Norsworthy (2006) made a conceptual 
distinction between explicit monitoring and reinvestment of conscious control. They argued 
that while explicit monitoring refers to the allocation of attention to skill execution, it does 
not necessarily imply that individuals attempt to consciously control performance. Therefore, 
whilst instructions to monitor and report a particular feature of performance encourage 
explicit monitoring they do not specifically encourage conscious control. Hence, it is possible 
that explicit monitoring may have a generally disruptive effect on performance, but additional 
disruption may occur when individuals apply these explicit rules to consciously control their 
movements. This distinction is crucial in understanding the mechanisms that underpin self- 
focus explanations of performance failure.
Process Goals
The ambiguous results reported in the literature do little to confirm the effects 
associated with conscious processing. In order to support the hypothesised effects of the 
CPH, research needs to establish methods that invoke the lapse in to conscious processing 
while also controlling for the alternative attentional explanations that were discussed above. 
One possible solution to this problem was suggested by Mullen (2000) and involves the use 
of process goals. Process goals specify the behaviours, skills and strategies that are essential 
for effective task execution (Kingston & Hardy, 1997). For example, a javelin thrower should 
ensure that the feet remain in line with the throwing direction. Alongside process goals the 
goal setting literature also identified two other types of goal (Hardy & Burton, 1994b). 
Outcome goals, which focus on the outcome of a particular event, for example, winning a 
gold medal at the Olympics. A performance goal focuses on personal performance standards 
and is independent of other performers, for example, setting a personal best time. While
outcome and performance goals direct the athletes' attention to the end product of
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performance, process goals act to direct the individual to the task specific aspects that will 
ensure successful execution.
From an applied perspective, process goals are recommended as a way of helping 
skilled performers in high anxiety situations as they provide the athlete with a means of 
focusing attention on important aspects of performance (Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996; 
Kingston & Hardy, 1997). Moreover, process goals provide the perfect solution to Beggs's 
(1990) "double-edged sword" problem. Beggs claimed that using performance or outcome 
goals to alleviate competitive state anxiety may intensify the problem. Beggs explained that a 
focus on outcome and performance goals might actually elicit negative effects as the goals 
themselves satisfy the criteria for generating stress, that is, they are important, require action, 
and may not always be achieved. Kingston and Hardy (1997) revealed preliminary evidence 
that process goals do enhance performance while also reducing a performer's susceptibility to 
the effects of anxiety. Moreover, using process oriented goals within pre-performance 
routines has been suggested as a means of enhancing attentional focus (Beggs, 1990; 
Boutcher, 1990). Kingston and Hardy (1994) also reported empirical support for the use of 
process oriented goals in pre-shot routines in a sample of golfers. Therefore, it would seem 
that process goals would serve a useful technique for combating the anxiety that might be 
present in competitive events. In addition, these process goals can differ in their content, for 
example, some process goals used in pre-performance routines might be emotion-focused, 
with the emphasis upon being relaxed (Hardy et al., 1996), whilst other process goals might 
focus on specific parts of skill execution. However, goals that focus on parts or processes are 
often laden with explicit information regarding the execution of the skill.
Despite the support for process goals, research has revealed the potentially negative 
effects associated with focusing on skill execution using explicit knowledge (Hardy, Mullen,
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& Jones, 1996; Kingston & Hardy, 1997). In line with the CPH, the focus on explicit 
knowledge inherent in process goals may disrupt the normal automatic task processing and 
cause a lapse in to conscious processing. This has created something of a paradox within the 
literature (Mullen & Hardy, 2010). Jackson, Ashford and Nosworthy (2006) used a soccer 
dibbling task to examine whether process goals impair performance under stress. A sample of 
25 male soccer players completed a set dribbling task under three conditions; single-task, 
skill-focused, which asked participants to focus on the side of the foot that made contact with 
the ball and movement-related process-goal, which involved a specific dribbling related goal, 
in conditions of low and high pressure. The results revealed that movement-related process 
goals had a negative effect on dribbling performance, regardless of pressure conditions. In 
addition, Gucciardi and Dimmock (2008) revealed that the performance of golfers who were 
attending to several explicit cues, deteriorated under increased cognitive state anxiety. 
Specifically, Gucciardi and Dimmock asked participants to putt golf balls using three part 
process goals (coaching points), three task irrelevant cues (colours) or a single globally 
focused cue in low and high anxiety conditions. Performance was better in the global swing 
thought condition, irrespective of the level of anxiety. These global swing thought goals are 
examples of holistic process goals. A holistic process goal encourages the performer to 
conceptualize the whole movement. This global representation encourages "chunking" and 
allows the appropriate sub-actions of movement to be generated automatically (MacMahon & 
Masters, 1998). For example, "smooth", or "easy" are examples of holistic process goals for 
golf putting (Mullen & Hardy, 2010). Therefore, whilst process goals that focus on part of the 
skill may impair performance, holistically focused goals may aid performance under 
pressure.
Mullen and Hardy (2010) attempted to compare part and holistic process goals in low 
and high anxiety conditions, across three experiments. In addition, Mullen and Hardy
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attempted to invoke the lapse in to conscious processing while also controlling for the 
alternative attentional explanations. In the high anxiety condition, part process goals were 
predicted to induce conscious processing effects. In contrast, holistic process goals, focused 
on the global nature of the movement, were hypothesised to provide a buffer for the effects of 
increased performance anxiety, helping participants maintain levels of performance 
demonstrated in the low anxiety condition. Mullen and Hardy conducted three studies that 
examined the effect of a single part process or holistic process goal on performance. 
Experiment 1, used a sample of 40 intermediate level long jumpers. Participants were 
randomly stratified in to either a holistic process group or a part process group; they 
completed 3 jumps in a warm up, a baseline and a test condition. The results revealed that the 
holistic process group outperformed the part process group in the test condition. However, no 
performance impairments were revealed in the part process group at test, as was predicted. 
Mullen and Hardy argued that the lack of performance impairment could be attributed to a 
number of reasons, including the nature of the serial task. The CPH effects may be more 
prevalent in more discrete tasks with a high degree of fine motor skill, for example, 
basketball free throws (Liao & Masters, 2002). Secondly, as participants were of an 
intermediate level, they may not have possessed the required level of automaticity to produce 
CPH effects. Finally, the amount of training and instructions participants received was brief, 
thus athletes may have reverted back to using their prefabricated mental set.
Mullen and Hardy's (2010) second experiment used a basketball free throw as the 
motor skill, with extended training in the use of the goals. Twenty female university 
basketball players were randomly stratified in to a holistic process or part process goal group 
and completed 5 basketball free throws in a baseline or test condition. The results revealed 
that goal setting training was effective in increasing participants' use of their assigned goals. 
In terms of the performance, the results replicated the findings of experiment 1, as the holistic
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process goal group outperformed the part process goal group at test. The consistency of 
results in experiment 1 and 2 support the reliability of the performance effect, however, 
Mullcn and Hardy suggested the need to look at the number of trials completed by 
participants in the experimental conditions. Specifically, 3 long jumps and 5 free throws may 
not have been sufficient to produce a significant conscious processing effect in the part 
process goal condition at test. To establish pairwisc effects between the low and high anxiety 
conditions, more trials may be necessary to demonstrate significant performance impairment.
The final experiment presented by Mullen and Hardy (2010) used the fine motor skill 
of golf putting and asked participants to complete a higher number of trials. On this occasion 
novice golfers were recruited to address some of the authors' concerns regarding the extent to 
which experienced athletes' existing mental sets may have predominated in the process goal 
conditions in the first two experiments. Novices were also recruited as more experienced 
athletes may become inoculated to the effects of pressure situations due to their competitive 
experience. Following an acquisition phase and a process goal training stage, participants 
performed in a baseline and test phase using either a part or holistic process goal. The results 
revealed that the holistic process group significantly improved from baseline to test and 
outperformed the part process group at test. In addition, on a measure of putt-to-putt 
adjustments, the holistic process group made significantly smaller adjustments than the part 
process group in the test phase compared with baseline.
Taken together, the three studies presented by Mullen and Hardy (2010) revealed that 
under high anxiety conditions, participants who used holistic process goals consistently 
performed significantly better than those using part process goals. Across the three 
experiments the part process goal groups maintained baseline performance levels in high 
anxiety conditions. These participants did not experience the hypothesized performance
decrements associated with CPH. These findings differ to previous research, which has
35
demonstrated performance impairment in athletes who have used process goals (Gucciardi & 
Dimmock, 2008; Jackson et al., 2006). Mullen and Hardy suggested that the lack of 
performance effects may be due to the number of goals participants are asked to use. Jackson 
and Wilson (1999) described how their study of one "swing thought" helped prevent 
performance impairment, however in their second study when participants used four explicit 
goals, the performance of anxious participants was disrupted.
Mullen and Hardy's (2010) research offers very strong support for the use of holistic 
process goals by skilled but anxious performers, as they consistently outperformed 
participants who used part process goals. In addition, the experiments offer some support for 
the CPH, in that none of the part process groups were able to improve performance in the 
same way as the holistic process goal groups. The strength of the work is that it demonstrates 
the potential benefits of using holistically focused goals in competitive situations. It would 
seem that the content of process goals is crucial. Process goals that are laden with explicit 
knowledge clearly create problems for skilled but anxious performers. Goals that focus on the 
holistic nature of the movement appear to aid performance and provide a buffer for the 
effects of performance anxiety. To strengthen these findings, Mullen and Hardy suggested 
using a learning paradigm, incorporating retention and transfer tests.
To summarise, research has demonstrated some support for the predictions of the 
CPH, but equivocal results have also been reported. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis was 
to explore the CPH as a mechanistic explanation for performance impairment. To do so, 
research that purposefully invokes the conscious processing effects hypothesised by the CPH 
is needed. Ideally, the interventions used to invoke conscious processing should also avoid 
confounding effects from other theoretical explanations, for example, much of the previous 
work in this area attempted to examine the competing hypotheses of the CPH and attentional
theories (e.g., Mullen & Hardy 2000; Mullen, Hardy, & Tattcrsall, 2005). In so doing, one of
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the limitations of this research was that the researchers were unable to equivocally support 
conscious processing as a causal mechanism for performance failure. Comparing the relative 
effectiveness of part and holistic process goals affords researchers the opportunity to isolate 
conscious processing effects. Specifically, the mechanisms of conscious processing suggest 
that performance will be impaired when athletes utilize part-process goals that are laden with 
explicit information in pressured situations. Thus, the CPH was adopted as the conceptual 
basis for this thesis, rather than other mechanistic theories as discussed above. Within this 
conceptual framework, process goals were adopted as a way of invoking conscious 
processing in isolation from other potentially confounding effects. Furthermore, the adoption 
of more sophisticated psychophysiological measures of mental effort, as used in earlier 
studies that examined the CPH (e.g., Mullen, Hardy, & Tattersall, 2005), may add to our 
understanding by indexing the shift from automatic to the more effortful conscious 
processing implicated by the CPH (Mullen et al, 2005).
Summary
In summary this review chapter has attempted to clarify issues surrounding some of 
the key definitions within the performance anxiety literature. In addition, this chapter 
reviewed some of the early performance anxiety theories, including unidimensional arousal 
theories (Hull, 1943; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), the multidimensional theory (Martens, 
Vcaley, & Burton, 1990) and the catastrophe model (Hardy & Fazey, 1987). A review of 
mechanistic theories included, cognitive interference theory (Sarason, 1984; 1988), 
processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), the attentional control theory 
(Eyscnck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), and Wcgner's theory of ironic processes of 
mental control (1989; 1994). Finally, the review detailed the conscious processing hypothesis 
(Masters, 1992) and the literature surrounding this model, concluding with a discussion of the
process goal paradox and the research that has compared part process goals with holistic
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process goals (Mullen & Hardy, 2010). This review has highlighted a number of issues within 
the literature. Most prominent is the issue surrounding the process goal paradox (Mullen & 
Hardy, 2010) and the conscious processing hypothesis (CPH; Masters, 1992). Crucially, 
despite claims to the contrary (Mullcn & Hardy, 2010), there is still no evidence that 




The process goal paradox: More evidence for the effectiveness 
of holistic process goals for learning and performance under pressure.
(Study 1 and 2)
Abstract
Mullen and Hardy (2010) recently reported the benefits of using holistic process goals (HPG) 
over part process goals (PPG) to avoid effects associated with the conscious processing of 
task relevant information by skilled but anxious athletes. Study 1 investigated the efficacy of 
HPG relative to PPG for novices in a learning paradigm. Sixteen male undergraduate students 
between 19 and 23 years of age (A/= 19.58, SD = 1.89) completed a race driving simulation 
task and were randomly assigned to a HPG group, a PPG group or a control group. 
Participants completed 8 learning blocks and transfer and retention tests. The results revealed 
that HPG group outperformed the PPG group at both retention and transfer. Study 2 also 
examined the relative efficacy of HPG versus PPG for skilled but anxious individuals, with 
the addition of two psychophysiological measures. Thirty male and female students between 
the ages of 18 and 50 (M = 27.77, SD = 7.80) completed a race driving simulation. 
Participants learned the driving task by "discovery" and then were randomly assigned to a 
HPG group or a PPG group. On day two, participants completed a baseline and competitive 
condition. The HPG group outperformed the PPG group in the competition condition. 
Psychophysiological measures indicated that this superior performance was achieved by 
investing compensatory effort.
Keywords: anxiety, holistic, process, goal, learning, psychophysiology
39
Introduction
Research examining the effect of anxiety upon motor performance has continued to 
play a major role in the sport psychology literature. Yet, despite this focus, the mechanisms 
through which anxiety exerts its influence upon performance remain unclear. One popular 
approach has focused on the disruptive influence of self-focus on motor skills that are 
performed in pressurized situations (Baumcister, 1984). Essentially, self-focus models 
suggest that increased anxiety can cause individuals to turn their attention inwards and focus 
on the processes supporting skilled performance. A number of self-focus theories have 
received support in the literature, including the conscious processing hypothesis (CPH; 
Masters, 1992) and the explicit monitoring hypothesis (Beilock & Carr, 2001). Of these, the 
CPH has received the most attention in the sport psychology literature. Masters hypothesized 
that highly skilled but anxious individuals might attempt to ensure task success by adopting a 
mode of conscious control primarily associated with the early stages of learning. This 
conscious control is based upon explicit knowledge, which is accessed in a step-by-step 
manner, resulting in movements that are typically slow and effortful, and in contrast with the 
more typical automatic functioning of experts, which is more efficient, fluid and less effortful 
(Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).
Despite the accruing support for the CPH (e.g., Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996; 
Mullen, Hardy, & Oldham, 2007), several authors have also noted that the performance 
deficits credited to conscious processing effects could also be caused by a competing 
attcntional explanation (Mullen, Hardy, & Tattersall, 2005; Wilson, Smith, & Holmes, 
2007a). Specifically, the attentional hypothesis posits that the explicit knowledge used to 
guide performance combines with cognitive anxiety to effectively overload attcntional 
capacity, in contrast to the more active role in performance impairment attributed to explicit 
knowledge in the CPH. As a result, several studies have attempted to clarify the competing
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conscious processing and attentional explanations; however, these studies have produced a 
mixed pattern of findings, with some authors supporting conscious processing effects 
(Gucciardi & Dimmock, 2008), others supporting an attentional explanation (Mullen et al., 
2005; Wilson et al., 2007b) and still others producing equivocal results (Mullen & Hardy, 
2000). Mullen et al. (2005) suggested an alternative point of view; in that anxiety-related 
performance decrements might be caused by both attentional and conscious processing 
effects, in line with Eysenck's (1988) suggestion that anxiety-related performance failure 
might be attributable to multiple causes. Consequently, from a conscious processing 
perspective, Mullen and Hardy (2010) claimed that it is important to establish whether skilled 
but anxious performers' use of explicit knowledge does actually cause lapses into conscious 
processing. In order to do so, Mullen and Hardy suggested that researchers needed to design 
studies that isolate conscious processing effects without invoking alternative attentional 
explanations, proposing that one way of so doing was to examine the effect of process goals 
upon the performance of anxious individuals.
First proposed by Hardy and Nelson (1988), process goals specify the behaviours, 
skills and strategies that are essential for effective task execution (Kingston & Hardy, 1997); 
for example, a basketball player might focus on extending their knees on a free-throw shot. 
Sport psychologists have recommended process goals as a means of helping skilled 
performers deal with high anxiety by providing them with a means of focusing their attention 
on important aspects of performance (Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996; Kingston & Hardy, 
1997). By their very nature, process goals encourage performers to focus on specific aspects 
of a task using explicit knowledge about the task, thus creating something of a paradox 
(Mullen & Hardy, 2010). More specifically, the CPH predicts that a focus on part of a 
movement using a process goal underpinned by explicit knowledge might disrupt the normal 
automatic task processing of experts, leading to lapses into conscious processing. Kingston
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and Hardy (1997) suggested that one way of dealing with this apparent confound is to tailor 
the goals according to the skill level of the performer, with less able performers using process 
goals that focus on key elements of performance, while more skilled individuals might use 
more holistic or globally-focused cues to conceptualize the whole of a movement. Mullen and 
Hardy suggested the holistically focused goals might avoid conscious processing effects by 
encouraging chunking, a concept used to describe the automatization of cognitive skills. 
According to Neves and Anderson (1981), chunking incorporates individual elements of a 
task into single representations, allowing much smoother performance. MacMahon and 
Masters (1998) used a serial reaction time task to produce evidence that supported the 
chunking effect. In addition, MacMahon and Masters also found that increases in pressure 
resulted in a reversal of this process, with the skill effectively "de-chunking".
The notion of holistic process goals or "swing thoughts" has been well documented 
anecdotally and empirically in the applied golf psychology literature. Owens and 
Kirschenbaum (1998) noted that some golfers use a mechanical thought to get through a 
swing confidently. They add, "the best mechanical thoughts are whole swing thoughts" (p. 
23), and that partial swing thoughts on specific swing mechanics can create difficulties and 
interrupt the smooth flow of the stroke. Such advice is not new and Sarazen (1950) noted that 
players should avoid disrupting their concentration before a shot by wondering if "thirty-three 
anatomical parts" would perform their appointed functions. Such advice has some empirical 
foundation as a number of researchers have provided support for the use of process-oriented 
goals (Filby, Maynard, & Graydon, 1999; Jackson & Willson, 1999; Kingston & Hardy, 
1997; Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1996). More recent evidence has been provided by Jackson, 
Ashford, and Norsworthy (2006) who used a soccer dribbling task to examine whether 
process goals impaired performance under pressure. All of the participants used a single part 
process goal and those goals that were movement related had a negative effect on the
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dribbling task, regardless of pressure levels. Gucciardi and Dimmock (2008) asked 
participants in their study to putt golf balls using three part process goals (coaching points), 
three task-irrelevant cues (colours), or a single, globally focused cue in low and high anxiety 
conditions. Performance was better in the global swing thought condition, irrespective of the 
level of anxiety. Mullen and Hardy (2010) claimed that the mixed results reported in the 
literature did little to clarify the part process goal paradox. Consequently, they conducted 
three experiments to directly compare the effectiveness of part and holistically focused 
process goals, predicting that skilled but anxious performers who used holistic process goals 
would outperform those who used part process goals. In addition and in line with the CPH, 
they also predicted that performers who used part process goals would experience 
performance impairment in a high anxiety condition. The three experiments utilized a number 
of different motor tasks; golf putting, long jumping, and basketball free throws, which 
participants performed using either a part or holistic process goal in a low and a high anxiety 
condition. The results were consistent across all three experiments; a single holistic process 
goal helped maintain or improve performance in high anxiety conditions. The prediction that 
part process goals would disrupt task execution under pressure was less clear as performance 
did not significantly deteriorate from baseline, low anxiety levels, but was significantly lower 
than that recorded by participants who used holistic process goals in all three experiments. 
Based on the evidence that participants who used part process goals did not experience the 
same performance benefits as those who used holistic process goals in the competitive 
condition, Mullen and Hardy argued that this relative impairment was evidence that 
conscious processing was activated.
Holistic process goals would appear to serve much the same function as Wulf s 
external focus of attention (sec Wulf, 2007, for a review). An external focus of attention 
involves directing a learner's attention to the effect of an action, as opposed to an internal
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focus that involves focusing on the movements or body parts used to produce an action. Wulf 
and associates have produced a large body of evidence supporting external focus instructions 
as being more effective for performance and learning than instructions that are internally 
focused. According to Mullcn and Hardy (2010) it is important to distinguish between 
holistic process goals and an external focus in that, "the former involves a focus on the 
general feeling of the movement itself, in effect an internal focus, while the latter involves a 
focus on the environmental effect produced by a movement" (p. 277).
To summarize, outside the work of Mullen and Hardy (2010), there is little evidence 
to support the use of holistic process goals by skilled but anxious performers. The two studies 
reported here set out to establish further support for the efficacy of holistic process goals. Our 
first study addressed Mullen and Hardy's suggestion that one way of strengthening their 
findings would be to use a learning paradigm to examine the effect of different types of 
process goals on motor skill acquisition. There arc at least two possibilities in this context. It 
could be argued that part and holistic process goals serve different purposes for individuals 
with different levels of expertise. For example, novices might benefit from using part process 
goals that focus attention on key aspects of performance. As expertise develops, holistic 
process goals might become more important as more skilled performers are able to use the 
holistic representation of the movement to avoid lapsing into conscious processing (Kingston 
& Wilson, 2009). Alternatively, holistic process goals used early in learning might accelerate 
the acquisition of a skill by encouraging chunking. We predicted that the latter position 
would be supported. The first study reported here also set out to address one of the limitations 
evident in previous work by including a control condition to examine how effective part and 
holistic goals arc relative to discovery learning. Previous work has also focused primarily on 
discrete motor skills such as golf putting or basketball free throwing. The present study 




Participants. Sixteen male undergraduate students between 19 and 23 years of age 
(M = 19.58, SD = 1.89) from a university in the United Kingdom were recruited for the 
study. Participants reported no experience of the driving game used in the study, had been in 
possession of a full UK driving license for at least one year (M = 2.04 years, SD = 0.70), and 
provided informed consent. Ethical clearance was obtained from the university ethics 
committee.
Apparatus and Measures. Race simulator. Participants completed a driving 
simulation task using the Gran Turismo  video game (Sony Computer Entertainment 
America; Foster City, CA) presented on an 81cm screen. Participants controlled the simulator 
using an analogue force feedback steering wheel and pedals and manoeuvred the car around 
the "High Speed Ring" track option in a Mazda MX5 with automatic gear changes. 
Participants, who all used the driver's perspective to perform the task, drove in time trial 
mode to avoid any confounding effects of other cars that appeared on track in other race 
modes. Driving performance was assessed using lap times recorded by the simulator. 
Participants were not informed that lap times were being recorded. Performance was also 
measured using the number of driving errors made. An error was made if two or more wheels 
left the track, if the car hit a wall or barrier, or if the car spun.
Cognitive state anxiety. State anxiety was measured using the cognitive anxiety subscalc 
of the revised Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2R; Cox, Martens, & Russell, 
2003). The CSA1-2R is a sport-specific, self-report inventory that has been shown to be a 
valid and reliable measure of cognitive and somatic anxiety and self-confidence by Cox et al., 
who subjected the scale to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and reported a good fit of the
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data to the hypothesized model (CFI = .95, NNFI = .94, RMSEA = .05). Participants rated 
their cognitive anxiety on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so). The 
cognitive anxiety subscale was scored according to the directions provided by Cox et al.; item 
responses were summed, divided by 5 and multiplied by 10, resulting in a score range of 10 
to 40.
Manipulation check. Participants in the holistic and part process goal groups were 
also asked a single question to determine whether they had maintained their assigned focus, 
requiring a yes or no response.
Design. Participants were tested on three consecutive days. The first two days 
comprised the practice phase of the study, during which participants completed eight blocks 
of two trials (1 trial = 2 laps). Four blocks were completed on day one and four on day two. 
The third day consisted of two blocks of two trials completed in a retention condition, 
followed by a further two blocks in a high anxiety transfer condition. In total, each participant 
completed eight blocks of two trials (32 laps) during the practice phase, and two blocks of 
two trials (8 laps) in both the retention and transfer conditions. Each trial consisted of 24 
corners, so in total, participants completed 384 repetitions of the steering task during practice, 
prior to retention and transfer tests.
Experimental conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two process 
goal conditions and received written instructions detailing the cues that they were required to 
use while steering around bends. Participants in all conditions were instructed to keep their 
vision focused on the track at all times during the task. The goals were constructed with the 
assistance of two BASES accredited sport psychologists in line with driving instruction 
literature (Bcntlcy & Langford, 2000; Senna & Howcll, 1993).
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Holistic process goal (HPG) group. Participants were instructed to focus on using the 
hands to turn the steering wheel smoothly when negotiating bends using the cue "smooth 
turns". Importantly, the focus here was on steering using hand movements and not on the 
steering wheel to avoid the potentially confounding effect of an internal versus external focus 
of attention (cf. Wulf, 2007).
Part process goal (PPG) group. Group members were instructed to focus on using the 
outside hand to turn into the corner in the most efficient way. For a left hand bend, this meant 
that the right hand (outside hand) primarily turned the steering wheel, while the left (inside) 
hand merely followed the movement. Participants were asked to use the cue outside hand to 
guide their hand movements. The focus in this condition was on the hand movement and not 
the steering wheel, which would constitute a proximal external focus.
Control group. Aside from being instructed to keep their visual focus on the track, 
participants in the control group were given no specific guidance as to how they should steer 
around bends.
Procedure. Participants were asked to refrain from practicing similar tasks between 
testing sessions. Participants attended the driving simulator individually and were told that 
the researcher was interested in the effects of concentration on a simulated driving task.
Day one. Participants completed five warm up laps, and then read instructions about 
their assigned goal, which they used for the duration of the study. Participants then completed 
two warm up laps of the track using their goal before completing the practice trials. 
Participants were reminded to use their goal before each practice block. On completion of the 
second acquisition block, participants received a three-minute break. When four acquisition 
blocks were completed, participants completed the manipulation check.
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Day two. Participants repeated the procedure from day one but did not complete the 
familiarization session. During the three-minute break following the second block, 
participants completed the cognitive anxiety subscale of the CSAI-2R to establish state 
anxiety levels in a non-threatening condition.
Day three: Retention. Preliminary procedures were the same as day 2. Following two 
warm up laps, participants then completed the cognitive anxiety measure to provide an 
indication of state anxiety levels in non-threatening conditions, followed by two blocks of 
driving.
Transfer. After a three-minute break, participants received instructions informing 
them that they were involved in a competition and that they had been assigned to a team. 
Participants were told that the winning team would be the team who produced the fastest 
aggregate lap time and that each member of the winning team would win £10. Individual 
target times were assigned to participants, giving them a "false" time that they were told they 
had to achieve in order for their team to have a chance of winning the task. The target times 
were calculated by taking the participant's fastest lap time from practice minus 1.5 seconds. 
Pilot testing had indicated that participants perceived this target as challenging but realistic. 
In sum, participants perceived the target time as being of both personal and team importance, 
creating an ego-threatening situation that was likely to increase cognitive state anxiety levels. 
Following two warm up laps, participants again completed the CSA1-2R, and completed two 
blocks of driving. At the end of the last block, participants were thanked for their 
participation and debriefed about the true objectives of the experiment.
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Results
Practice lap times and the number of driving errors were analyzed using two-factor 
mixed model analyses of variance (ANOVA; 3x8; Group x Block). Significant effects were 
followed up using Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons and polynomial contrasts to model the 
pattern of learning. We predicted that here would be significant linear and quadratic 
components; therefore, alpha for these contrasts was maintained at .05 for both lap times and 
driving errors. We had no specific predictions about the cubic trend; consequently, we 
adjusted alpha for these contrasts using a Bonferroni correction (.05 72 = .025). Retention 
and transfer data were analyzed using one-way ANOVA and significant effects were 
followed up using Tukey HSD tests. Cognitive state anxiety was analyzed using two-factor 
mixed ANOVA (3 x 2; Group x Anxiety Condition, with repeated measures on the second 
factor). Partial eta squared was also calculated, effect sizes of .02 are considered small, . 15 
















































Figure 2. Mean number of driving errors for the acquisition, retention and transfer blocks
Manipulation check. Three participants, one from the PPG group and two from the 
HPG group, indicated that they did not use their assigned cue on one or more days of the 
study. The analyses were run with and without the problem participants. The results were 
identical and the full data set is reported here.
Practice. The equivalency of initial performance was assessed using a one-way 
ANOVA, with time to complete the first lap as the dependent measure. No group differences 
were found, F(2, 21) = 2.14, p > .05, indicating that the groups were equivalent at the start of 
the learning trials. Mean values for practice, retention and transfer phases are shown in 
Figures 1 and 2. For the analysis of the practice phase, Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted degrees 
of freedom were used to test within-subject F ratios as the sphericity assumption was violated 
for both lap times and number of driving errors. For lap times there was no significant main 
effect for group, F(2, 21) = 3.01, p = .07, n p 2 = .22, or Group x Block interaction F(5.08, 
53.30) < 1, rip2 - .08. The main effect for block was significant, F(2.54, 53.30) - 30.18, /> <-
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.001, r|p = .59, indicating that there were significant differences in performance across the 
learning blocks. These significant differences were explored using polynomial contrast 
analyses, which revealed significant linear, quadratic and cubic components, F(l, 21) = 
58.32, p < .001, np2 - .73; F(l, 21) = 10.26, p < .01, np 2 = .33; and F(l, 21) = 5.17, p < .025, 
rip2 = .20, respectively. This pattern was reproduced for the number of driving errors. The 
significant main effect for block, F(l, 147) = 30.18, p < .001, n p 2 = .59, was also 
accompanied by significant linear, F(l, 21) = 30.93, p < .001, np2 = 0.60; quadratic, F(l, 21) 
= 5.59, p < .05, rip2 = .21; and cubic, F(l, 21) = 18.22,;? < .001, n p 2 = .47, components. The 
significant linear and quadratic components represent the typical path of learning, with an 
initial large increase (linear trend), followed by a levelling off as performance increments 
became too difficult to achieve (quadratic trend). The significant cubic component indicated 
that the improvement in performance in the initial 4 blocks, levelled off between blocks 4 and 
5 and subsequently increased again from block 5 until the end of the practice phase. Partial 
eta squared values were all considered either large or medium, indicating that these effects 
were all of practical significance.
Retention. For lap times, the ANOVA was significant, F(2, 21) = 4.50, p < .05, n p 2 = 
.30. Tukcy HSD pairwise comparisons revealed that the HPG group recorded faster lap times 
than the PPG group. No other comparisons were significant. There was no significant 
difference between the groups for the number of driving errors, F(2, 21) = 2.32, p > .05, n p = 
. 18, indicating that the faster lap times were not achieved at the expense of accuracy.
Transfer. Cronbach's alpha coefficients indicated adequate internal consistency for 
the cognitive anxiety subscale of the CSAI-2R (r = .76). Analysis of variance revealed no 
significant Group x Anxiety Condition interaction or main effect for group, both Fs < I. 
There was a significant main effect for anxiety condition, F(2, 21) = 3.01, p ==- .07, n p ~ - .22,
which confirmed that the anxiety intervention successfully increased cognitive anxiety.
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Means, with standard deviations in parentheses, were as follows: the holistic process goal 
group increased from 19 (4.14) to 20.75 (5.44); the part process goal group increased from 17 
(3.85) to 20.75 (4.27); and the control group increased from 18 (6.14) to 21.75 (5.50). The 
ANOVA on lap times yielded a significant difference between the groups, F(2, 21) = 3.57, p 
< .05, np2 = .20. Post hoc tests indicated that the HPG group was faster than the PPG group, 
with no other differences significant. The medium effect size indicated that the performance 
difference of 8.73 sees was of practical significance. There were no significant differences 
between the groups for the number of driving errors, F(2, 21) < 1, r| p 2 = .08, duplicating the 
effect found in the retention phase and confirming that improvements in performance, i.e., 
speed, were not achieved at the expense of accuracy.
Discussion
The purpose of this experiment was to establish, relative to part process goals, 
whether holistic process goals would enhance performance during acquisition of a simulated 
race-driving task and also at retention and transfer. We also included a control group to 
examine the impact of discovery learning on acquisition of the driving task. As predicted, the 
HPG group outperformed the PPG group at both retention and transfer. The results for 
discovery learning were less clear as performance in the control group was no different from 
cither the HPG or PPG groups at retention and transfer. There was no evidence for the 
strength of this effect during the practice phase as all three groups improved equivalently. 
Although there was no pre-test to confirm that the groups were equivalent, the analysis of 
times for the first lap did confirm that the groups did not differ significantly at the start of 
practice. The polynomial contrast analyses helped reveal the pattern of learning across 
practice for all three groups. The significant cubic component is best interpreted as a 
reflection of the structure of the practice phase. Specifically, the large improvement made
during initial practice slowed somewhat over the course of day 1. Performance levels off
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between blocks 4 and 5, which consist of the final block of day 1 and the first block of day 2. 
The levelling off of scores represents the effect of warm-up decrement, or in this case, 
plateau (Schmidt & Lee, 2011). Subsequently, performance begins to gradually improve 
again across blocks 6 to 8.
The absence of any acquisition benefits for the HPG supports findings elicited with 
similar tasks in the related field of external and internal attcntional focus. For example, Wulf, 
HoB, and Prinz (1998) found that an external attentional focus did not impact on participants 
performing a stabilometer balancing task until retention. More importantly, in this experiment 
there was a clear advantage at retention and transfer, which supports the utility of HPG over 
PPG for both learning and performance under pressure. All of the previous research 
examining the utility of holistic process goals has adopted performance paradigms to 
compare holistic and part process goals in low and high anxiety conditions (Gucciardi & 
Dimmock, 2008; Jackson, Ashford, & Norsworthy, 2006; Mullen & Hardy, 2010), with no 
attention paid to how effective these goals might be for motor learning. The advantage 
demonstrated by the HPG group over the PPG at retention is the first evidence to show that 
HPG may be more effective than PPG for the acquisition of motor skills. The superior 
performance of the HPG over the PPG group at transfer adds further support to the work of 
Mullen and Hardy (2010) and Gucciardi and Dimmock (2008), who also provided evidence 
that HPG or global task cues are superior to PPG in conditions where anxiety is elevated. 
Despite the clear advantage proffered by the use of HPG over PPG, the control condition was 
no different from cither process goal condition during practice, at retention, and at transfer. 
Further research is required to clarify this effect.
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Experiment 2
Despite the positive effects reported in Experiment 1, the advantage enjoyed by the HPG 
group over the PPG group at transfer requires closer inspection. The adoption of the learning 
paradigm incorporating retention and transfer conditions enabled us to establish evidence 
supporting the efficacy of HPG; however, the design of the experiment tells us nothing about 
possible conscious processing effects hypothesized to be associated with part process goals. 
This is because the transfer analysis involved a single betwecn-subjects comparison. To 
examine conscious processing effects, in addition to between-subjects comparisons, a within- 
subject comparison is required to establish whether the use of part process goals is associated 
with performance impairment in high relative to low anxiety conditions. Experiment 2 was 
designed to address this shortcoming using the same design adopted by Mullen and Hardy 
(2010) in their third experiment. Participants, who were assigned to either a holistic or part 
process goal group, learned the same simulated race-driving task as Experiment 1 using 
discovery learning and subsequently performed the task in a baseline condition and a 
competitive condition designed to elevate state anxiety. We predicted that a movement- 
focused HPG would be more effective than using a single movement-focused part process 
goal at preventing performance impairment under pressure. We also predicted that part 
process goals would lead anxious participants to begin to consciously process task-relevant 
information with resultant negative effects on task execution.
Furthermore, Mullen and Hardy (2010) failed to include some of the 
psychophysiological indices used in other studies examining Masters' CPH. For example, 
Mullen ct al. (2005) proposed heart rate variability (HRV), estimated by spectral analysis of 
the cardiac signal, as a measure of the intensity of attcntional processing associated with the 
shifts from automatic to controlled processing predicted by the CPH. Mullen and Hardy's
findings would have been strengthened by the inclusion of such a measure in order to provide
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some additional insight into the psychophysiological processes underpinning conscious 
processing effects.
Heart rate variability is typically examined by spectral decomposition of the heart rate 
signal, which produces periodic components of HRV aggregated within three main frequency 
bands, each of which is associated with different functional influences in the modulation of 
heart rate. The first of these, the very low frequency band (.02 - .06 Hz), reflects 
thermoregulatory control (Grossman, 1992); the low-frequency band (LF; .07 - .14 Hz) is 
hypothesized to represent the cognitive loading associated with controlled processing 
(Fairclough & Mulder, 2011); finally, the high-frequency band (HF; .15 - .40 Hz) is related to 
momentary respiratory influences or respiratory sinus-arrhythmia (Grossman, 1992). Of these 
three bands, the LF band has more consistently responded to a range of manipulations that 
cause major changes in task structure and induce changes in the mode of operation, as in the 
shift from automatic to controlled processing (Jorna, 1992; Veltman, 2002). Evidence 
supporting this suggestion has been demonstrated in several studies that examined mental 
workload demands (Neumann, 2002; Veltman & Gaillard, 1998). Neumann and Thomas 
(2009) found additional support for the sensitivity of the LF band by comparing the HRV 
response of expert and novice golfers. Neumann and Thomas hypothesized that expert 
performance would be directed using automatic processes that are not resource-intensive, 
while that of novices would be under the direction of more resource-intensive controlled 
processing. The lower HRVLF response of the experts appeared to support this prediction, 
indicating that they expended less mental effort. In addition, the experts also had lower 
overall HR than the novices, indicative of lower overall effort expenditure. However, 
Neumann and Thomas's results should be interpreted with caution as they failed to include 
resting baseline measures of the cardiac variables. Research in this area is typically conducted 
using change scores from resting baselines (Mullcn et al., 2005), or by including the resting
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baseline as an additional level in the statistical analysis (Veltman & Gaillard, 1996; Wilson et 
al., 2007b). The absence of any comparative baseline measure makes the interpretation of the 
HR power spectrum problematic.
While HRV has not been used to examine the cardiac activation states underpinning 
the use of holistic and part process goals, it has been used in research examining conscious 
processing effects. Mullen et al. (2005) found no effects of anxiety upon HRVLF in their 
study that examined whether conscious processing or attentional explanations could best 
account for anxiety effects upon the skill of golf putting. While there were no effects of 
anxiety on HRVLF, anxiety-related performance impairment was associated with changes in 
the HRVHF band, which the authors suggested might be related to changes in breathing- 
based relaxation strategies. Also using a golf-putting task, Wilson et al. (2007b) used HRV in 
a study to examine psychophysiological responses related to attention and anxiety. They also 
found that anxiety had no effect upon HRVLF but did report that self reported mental effort 
was sensitive to anxiety effects. Taken together, the results reported by Mullen et al. and 
Wilson et al. arc inconclusive on the effect of attention and anxiety on HRV, although direct 
comparisons arc difficult due to the different ways in which the cardiac data were collected, 
pre-processed and analyzed. Evidently, more research is required to establish how anxiety 
and goal focus interact to affect the cardiac activation states that underpin performance.
Part of the problem in using HRV to examine changes in mental effort related to 
increased anxiety, lies in the physiological origins of fluctuations in the LF band of the HRV 
power spectrum, which are thought to be reflective of both sympathetic and vagal activity 
(Bcrntson et al., 1997). Mullen ct al. (2005) suggested that the lack of clarity might be 
because the hypothesized effort-related reductions in the HRVLF band may have been
Reductions in HRVLF power from baseline conditions arc representative of increased effort
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masked by the impact of physiological responses to increased cognitive anxiety. Specifically, 
the sympathetic response to increased state anxiety may have "flooded" the LF band, 
resulting in large increases in spectral power from baseline, and in so doing, obscured the 
impact of mental effort in this band. Measures of sympathetic activity would help examine 
this suggestion. Typically, sympathetic activity is measured using impedance cardiography of 
the cardiac pre-ejection period (Sherwood, Alien, Obrist, & Langer, 1986), or plasma-borne 
catecholamine response (Nater et al., 2005). Unfortunately, the measurement of both PEP and 
plasma catecholamines are fairly invasive and the procedures themselves might lead to 
increases in state anxiety, confounding the effects of experimental manipulations. As such, a 
non-invasive marker of sympathetic activity would be preferable. Salivary alpha amylase 
(sAA) has emerged as a promising candidate to index stress-induced activity of the 
sympathetic nervous system (Wolf, Nicholls, & Chen, 2008). More specifically, Rohleder, 
Nater, Wolf, Ehlert, and Kirschbaum (2004) suggested that sAA could be used as an index of 
sympathetic activity based on the hypothesis that sympathetic and parasympathetic branches 
of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) innervate salivary glands. Nater et al. (2005) 
indicated that a significant increase in sAA, with heightened levels immediately after the 
stressor. Nater et al. also found that HRVLF and HRVHF increased in response to the 
psychosocial stressor utilized in their study. Chatterton, Vogelsong, Lu, Ellman, & Hudgens 
(1996) also highlighted that sAA could be an indicator for the activity of the sympathetic 
system. They revealed a significant correlation between alpha amylase and catecholamines in 
a physiological stress paradigm.
A measure of sympathetic activity would strengthen our understanding of the 
autonomic activity related to the HRVLF band. Therefore the second purpose of the present 
study is to extend previous research by employing both HRV and sAA to explore the 
psychophysiological activity of participants. Examination of HRV could provide some
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support for the suggestion that HPG encourage more efficient automatic processing, while 
PPG arc associated with more effortful controlled processing. Using a PPG should result in 
greater reductions in LF spectral power from baseline relative to those associated with HPG 
use, reflecting the extra mental effort associated with controlled processing. To date, no 
previous studies have examined HRV or sAA as indices of the attcntional processing 
associated with holistic and part process goals. We measured inter beat intervals and saliva in 
resting baseline, task baseline, and competitive conditions. In the competitive condition, we 
predicted that cognitive state anxiety would increase and that a HPG would enable 
participants to maintain performance, levels of HRV and self-reported effort close to those 
observed in the neutral condition, while a PPG would be associated with impairment of 
performance and increased mental effort.
Method
Participants. Thirty male and female students between the ages of 18 and 50 (M = 
27.77, SD = 7.80) were recruited from a university in Wales to take part in the study. All 
participants had held a full UK driving licence for at least one year, and had minimal or no 
experience of race driving video games. The institutional ethics committee approved the 
study. Full informed consent was obtained from each participant.
Apparatus and measures. Race simulator. The apparatus for the driving task was as 
specified in Experiment 1, with the exception of the simulation game. In this experiment, 
participants completed the driving simulation using Colin McRac 2 race software 
(Codcmasters, Warwickshire). A 3km tarmac track was selected that included 32 bends and 
the car was a Ford Focus. All other settings were as in Experiment 1. Performance was 
assessed using lap times recorded by the computer software. Performance was also measured 
using the number of driving errors committed and an index of error severity. An error was
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recorded if, (a) the car spun, changed direction, or crashed completely, (b) if the entire car 
came off the track, or (c) the car bumped or scraped the wall causing the fluidity of the car to 
be hindered but not resulting in a full crash. Error (a) was classed as the most severe and 
received a penalty of 3 points, error (b) resulted in a 2-point penalty, while error (c) was 
classed as the least severe and incurred 1 penalty point.
Cardiac variables. Heart rate was recorded by telemetry using a Polar S810s monitor 
(Polar Kempele, Finland). An elastic band fitted with a transmitter was worn around the chest 
and a Polar S810s watch was placed next to the participant, but out of their line of sight, to 
receive the signal. The Polar 810s has been shown to be a reliable and valid measure of R-R 
intervals (Gamelin, Berthoin, & Bosquet, 2006; Kingsley, Lewis, & Mason, 2005). Heart rate 
was recorded throughout the resting baseline, task baseline and competitive conditions. To 
standardize the epoch for spectral analysis, the middle 3 min of each measurement period was 
used. Artefact correction was conducted according to procedures set out by Mulder (1992) 
and used in previous research examining attention and anxiety (Mullen et al., 2005). The 
artefact-free data were detrcnded using a smoothness priors based approach (Tarvainen, 
Ranta-Aho, & Karjalainen, 2002).
Power spectrum densities (PSD) were estimated using autoregressive methods 
(Kubios HRV program, Biosignal Analysis and Medical Imaging Group, University of 
Kuopio, Finland). Compared to fast Fourier transforms, autoregressive algorithms produce a 
superior resolution, especially in short samples such as those used in the present study. Heart 
rate variability was estimated in the LF (07 - .14 Hz) and HF (.15 .40 Hz) spectral bands. 
The PSD for the frequency band is reported in normalized units (ms2 ). Previous research 
examining HRV and attention has largely used baseline-condition difference scores as 
dependent variables in subsequent statistical analyses. In this study, raw condition scores
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were used and the resting baseline condition is included as an additional repeated measure to 
ensure statistical analyses were consistent for all psychophysiological dependent variables.
Salivary alpha amylase. Using the passive drooling technique (Navazesh, 1993), 
unstimulated whole saliva samples were collected over a 4-minute period at three different 
time points using preweighted universal containers. Participants were given a familiarization 
session on day 1, prior to any testing. On day 2, a baseline measure of saliva was taken, 
followed by further samples immediately after the low and high anxiety conditions. Saliva 
flow is expressed as mg of saliva per min (mg/min) and was calculated by dividing the 
volume of saliva with collection time. Following completion of the experiment the samples 
will then be transferred into eppcndorfs and stored at -20°C until analysed. Following 
thawing of samples, sAA was measured by enzyme kinetic method. Samples were diluted 
with double distilled water, a substrate reagent (a Amylase Assay Kit, Salimetrics, State 
College, Pennsylvania) was added and the microplate warmed to 37°. The first interference 
measurement was taken at 60 seconds using a standard ELISA reader (Anthos Labtcch HT2, 
Anthos, Krefcld, Germany) the plate was incubated for another 2 minutes and then a second 
reading taken. The increases of absorbance were transformed in to amylase concentrations by 
using a linear regression calculated for the standard curve on each microplate (Curve Expert 
1.34, Hyams D.G., Starkville, MS, USA).
Self-reported effort. Perceived mental effort was assessed using the Rating Scale of 
Mental Effort (RSME; Zijlstra, 1996), which has demonstrated acceptable reliability in 
laboratory (r = 0.88) and real-life work settings (r = 0.78). This retrospective one- 
dimensional visual analogue scale requires participants to rate how much mental effort they 
perceived they invested into a task on a vertical scale ranging from 0 (not at all effortful], 
through 115 (tremendously effortful), to 150 (no anchor). Participants arc required to mark
the scale at the point that best reflects the amount of mental effort invested in task
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performance. The RSME was administered following the task baseline and competition 
conditions.
General health. The General Health Questionnaire-12 (GHQ-12; Goldberg, 1992) 
was used to assess participants' psychological health (Rohleder et al., 2006). The 
questionnaire consists of 12 items that arc rated on a 4-point Likcrt scale. A total score was 
calculated, with scores ranging from 0 to 36. Typical scores range from 11-12, scores over 15 
show signs of some distress and scores of 20 plus, suggest severe problems and psychological 
distress. If participants reported scores of 20 plus they were excluded from the research.
Cognitive state anxiety. As in Experiment 1, the CSAI-2R was used to measure 
cognitive state anxiety.
Post-experimental questionnaire. The post-experimental questionnaire consisted of 
six statements answered on a 9-point Likert scale anchored by 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much 
so). The statements were: (a) I think I have completed the task as the instructions outlined; 
(b) I found it easy to use the goals; (c) The goal was relevant to my driving performance; (d) 
It was difficult to focus all my attention on my goal; (e) I feel that the use of goals helped my 
performance; and (I) Did you perceive your goal to be highly kinaesthetic in nature? (Feel of 
the movement).
Design. The experiment took place on two consecutive days. On the first day, 
participants were provided with no instructions or feedback on the driving task, and learned 
the driving task "by discovery", which allowed participants to explore the dynamics of the 
task (Vercijkcn & Whiting, 1990). Participants completed 14 double laps of the track, with 
each double lap consisting of 64 corners. So, in total, participants completed 896 repetitions 
of the steering task, more than double the amount of practice used in previous studies 
examining the CPH (Hardy ct al., 1996; Masters, 1992; Mullcn & Hardy, 2010).
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On day 2, participants completed 5 double practice laps using their designated process 
goal. The practice laps were followed by two double laps in a task baseline condition and two 
double laps in the competition condition. The conditions were not counterbalanced due to 
concerns over the sAA measurement. Research demonstrates that levels of alpha amylase do 
not return to normal for up to 30 minutes post stress (Chatterton et al., 1996; Rholeder, 2006; 
Rohleder et al., 2004), hence in order to prevent confounding, a fixed order was used.
Procedure. Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the institutional ethics 
committee. Demographic and responses to the GHQ were collected before arrival at the 
driving simulator. The experiment consisted of six phases conducted over two days and 
modelled upon the design of Mullen and Hardy (2010). Phase 1 took place on day 1 and 
phases 2-6 took place on the second day.
Day L Phase 1: Skill Acquisition. During Phase 1, participants learned the driving 
task by "discovery" (Vereijken & Whiting, 1990). Participants completed 14 double laps of 
the track with a five-minute rest after laps 5 and 10. Participants then received a brief 
explanation of the next day's session and the experimenter's intention to pay them £10. 
Participants were also fully briefed on the procedure for collection of HR and saliva samples 
and practiced the saliva sampling. Participants were told that the practice sample would not 
be used for analysis but would simply allow them to become comfortable with the procedure. 
Participants were asked to sit unrestrained in a comfortable chair, and then asked to rinse out 
their mouths using de-ionized water. Participants then leaned over and held the universal 
container against their lips, as to allow a flow from the mouth into the container. The 
participants were then asked to swallow any saliva that was in their mouth and then began a 
4-minutc collection period where the saliva was passively transferred into the container 
without stimulation. Participants were asked to not brush their teeth or chew and to restrict
eating to 3 hours before and drinking to 1 hour before attending the laboratory.
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Day 2. Phase 2: Saliva and HR sampling and process goal training. The second day 
began with a 5-minute rest period to allow HR to stabilize, followed by a 5-minute recording 
of HR as a resting baseline. Participants were then asked to provide a saliva sample, which 
was also used as a resting baseline. Participants were then reminded about the structure of the 
second part of the experiment and provided with information about the nature and efficacy of 
process goals. The information served two purposes; the first was instructional and the 
second was to enhance participants' commitment and motivation to use the goals as 
requested. Participants self-selected their respective goals from master lists that were created 
using the procedures outlined in Experiment 1. In both process goal conditions, participants 
were instructed to keep their vision focused on the track at all times during the driving task. 
The three HPG all focused on the movement that participants used to manipulate the steering 
wheel when negotiating bends. Participants self-selected a single goal to use throughout the 
experiment. The goals were designed to so that they emphasized the feeling of the entire 
steering movement. The goals, "smooth", "glide", and "easy", were reinforced with 
instructions that reminded participants that the goal referred to the feeling of turning the 
steering wheel with their hands. Participants in the PPG group also selected a single goal, the 
first of which was "9.15 grip", which focused on maintaining a relaxed grip on the steering 
wheel, with hands in the 9 and 3 o'clock positions on the wheel throughout the turn. The 
second goal asked participants to use the goal "outside hand", which focused on using the 
outside hand to turn the steering wheel, so, for a left hand bend, this meant that the right hand 
(outside hand) primarily turned the steering wheel, while the left hand (inside hand) merely 
followed the movement. The final goal was "small", which required the participants to focus 
on making small adjustments to the steering wheel. The steering ratio was low enough to 
ensure that participants did not have to alter their grip in order to complete any of the turns, 
ensuring that both "9.15 grip" and "small" were realistic and achievable goals.
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Phase 3: Warm-up. All of the participants were provided with the opportunity to 
practice using their selected process goal over one double lap.
Phase 4: Task baseline. Following the warm up, participants rested for 5-min. At the 
beginning of the fifth minute, participants were provided with neutral instructions about the 
next two double laps. Immediately following the rest period, the participants completed the 
CSAI-2R, and then drove two double laps, followed immediately by provision of a saliva 
sample. Participants then completed the RSME. There was then a 10-min rest period between 
the task baseline and competitive conditions, in which participants remained seated. This 10- 
minute rest period allowed any task-related psychophysiological changes to return to their 
baseline levels (Nater et al, 2006).
Phase 5: Anxiety intervention. During the final 5-min of the 10-min rest period, 
participants were provided with an instructional set informing them that they were about to 
take part in a race challenge and that the £10 they had been offered to participate in the study 
could change depending on how well they performed in the challenge. The anxiety 
intervention was structured in the same way as Experiment 1, with the exception that the task 
baseline time was used as the measure against which the "false" target time was anchored.
Phase 6: Competition phase. After reading the instructions, the participants filled in 
the cognitive anxiety subscale of the CSAI-2R, completed two double laps, provided a final 
saliva sample and then completed the RSME and the post-experimental questionnaire. 
Participants then received their competition prize money, were thanked for their participation 
and debriefed about the objectives of the experiment.
Results
Performance, CSAI-2R, and RSME scores were analyzed using mixed two-factor 
analysis of variance (ANOVA; 2x2, Group x Competition, with repeated measures on the
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second factor). Normal distribution of HRV and sAA scores was obtained using logarithmic 
transformations and main analyses were conducted using two-factor mixed ANOVA (2x3, 
Group x Time, with repeated measures on the time factor). The addition of the third repeated 
measure on the time factor was to accommodate the resting baseline measures of HR, HRV 
and sAA. Significant effects were investigated using Tukey's HSD tests.
Before examining the performance and cardiac variables, the post experimental 
questionnaire scores were examined to confirm that the participants had adhered to the 
treatment conditions, see Table 1. Mann Whitney U tests revealed that there were no 
significant differences between the part and holistic process goal groups (all/? > .05).
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For cognitive anxiety, there was a significant main effect for competition, F(\, 28) = 
21.50, p < .001, T| P = .22, which indicated that both groups recorded higher scores in the 
competitive condition, sec Table 2. Neither the Group x Competition, F(l, 28) < 1, r| p2 - .01, 
or the main effect for group were significant, F(l, 28) = 1.70, n p2 = .06. In terms of driving 
performance, ANOVA yielded a significant Group x Competition interaction for lap times, 
F(l, 28) = 7.83,p < .01, np2 = .22. Post hoc analysis revealed the PPG group posted quicker 
times than the HPG group in the task baseline, while the HPG recorded faster lap times in the 
competition condition compared to the task baseline. Main effects were not examined in light 
of the significant interaction. For the error scores, the multivariate test statistics for the Group 
x Competition interaction and the main effect for competition were not significant, F(2, 27) < 
1, r|p2 = 0.02 and F(2, 27) < 1, n p2 = .02. There was a significant multivariate main effect for 
group, F(2, 27) = 4.10, p < .05, n p2 = .23. Univariate follow-up ANOVA indicated that for 
both number of driving errors and error severity, participants in the PPG scored worse than 
those in the HPG, F( 1,28) = 5.02, p < .05, n p2 = . 15 and F( 1,28) = 6.47, p < .05, n p2 = . 19, 
respectively. The results indicate that the HPG group were faster in the competition that at 
task baseline, while the performance of the PPG group did not change. In addition the HPG 
made significantly less errors that the PPG group during both the task baseline and 
competition condition, indicating that the quicker lap times in the competition, were not 
achieved at the expense of driving accuracy. Effect sizes were all in the medium range, 
indicating the performance improvements, coupled with the fewer and less severe errors 
recorded by the HPG, were practically meaningful.
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Table 2. Means (SD) for cognitive anxiety, lap times (seconds), number of errors, and error 
severity for task baseline and competition conditions
Task baseline Competition 
Variable
Cognitive anxiety
Part process 13.69(4.3) 16.46(3.28)
Holistic process 15.33(4.11) 18.66(5.05)
Lap times
Part process 235.06(32.18) 237.13(30.32)
Holistic process 269.20(52.65) 236.40(25.91)
Number of errors
Part process 3.33 (4.15) 4.13 (2.97)
Holistic process 1.73 (2.21) 1.73 (2.05)
Error severity
Part process 5.73(7.36) 6.86(4.79)
Holistic process 2.53(3.24) 2.46(3.13)
Turning to the psychophysiological variables, descriptive statistics can be found in 
Table 3. Due to equipment failure, heart rate data were not recorded for two participants, one 
in each group. Analysis of the HR data revealed a significant main effect for time, F(1.51, 
39.15) = 24.55, p < .001, r|p 2 = .49; but no Time x Group interaction or main effect for group, 
F( 1.51, 39.15) < 1, T]p2 = .00 and F( 1, 26) < 1, n p2 = .02, respectively. For HRVLF, there was 
no significant interaction, F(2, 52) < 1, r| p2 = .04, or main effect for group, F(l, 26) = 2.37, p 
> .05, r| p2 = .01. The main effect for time was significant, F(2, 52) = 11.20, p < .001, r|p = 
.30. For HRVHF, there were no significant effects. Analysis of sAA revealed no significant 
Group x Time interaction, F(2, 56) < l,p> .05, r| p 2 = 0.02, or main effect for group, F( 1, 28) 
- 1.13, p > .05, r| p2 - .04. There was a significant main effect for time for sAA, F(2, 56) ^ 
13.20, p < .001, r| p 2 = .32. Post hoc analyses on the significant main effect for time for HR 
and sAA indicated that for both variables there was a significant increase from resting
67
baseline to task baseline and further still from task baseline to the competition condition. For 
HRVLF, there were also changes across all three conditions, but in each case, these 
differences were reductions in LF spectral power. Analysis of the RSME scores yielded a 
significant main effect for competition, F(l, 28) = 28.32, p < .001, r| p 2 ^ .50, with mental 
effort perceived to be higher in the competition condition. There were no other significant 
effects (both Fs < 1). In summary, the anxiety intervention caused increases in HR, sAA and 
RSME, and a significant reduction in the patterning of HRVLF, and these meaningfully large 
effects (all n, p2 > .30) were evident in both the part and holistic process goal groups.
Table 3. Mean (SD) HRV, HR, sAA, and RSME for the resting baseline, task baseline, and 
competitive conditions
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Note: HRV values are raw values for ease of interpretation.
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Discussion
Our prediction regarding the utility of holistic process goals was supported, as the 
HPG group outperformed the PPG group in the competition condition. There was a different 
pattern of effects from those found in Experiment 1 and other process goal studies (Mullen & 
Hardy, 2010). In this study the HPG group were significantly slower than the PPG group in 
the task baseline, while in the competitive condition, the HPG group improved their 
performance to a level equivalent to the PPG group; however, this improvement must be 
viewed in the context of the error scores. Participants in the HPG group made significantly 
fewer and less severe errors than the PPG across both task baseline and competitive 
conditions. Taken together, this pattern of results suggests that performance was equivalent at 
baseline, while the improvements in lap times made by the HPG in the competitive condition 
combined with fewer and less severe errors indicates that, overall, this group outperformed 
the PPG group. As such, the pattern of results for the performance variables supports the 
existing literature in this area (Gucciardi & Dimmock, 2008; Mullen & Hardy, 2010). The 
process goal instructions and the differential performance at task baseline suggest that the 
participants in the HPG and PPG groups may have achieved their performance scores using 
radically different strategies. In the low anxiety, baseline condition, the slower times recorded 
by the HPG suggest that they were focused more on driving smoothly and this resulted in less 
errors, but a slower time than the PPG group. In the competition, however, it appears that the 
strategy adopted by the HPG group enabled them to improve their lap times, while 
maintaining the error rate recorded at task baseline. Clearly the different process goals 
resulted in a different approach to the speed-accuracy trade off and a more detailed 
examination of how this was achieved would enable us to say more about the how strategics 
employed affected car control. For example, Wilson, Chattington, Marplc-Horvat, & Smith
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(2007a) used a potentiometer to measure the displacement of the steering wheel, which could 
help reveal how the process goal conditions affected the "smoothness" of the steering.
While it appears that HPG do offer a performance advantage over PPG when 
performers are anxious, there is no evidence that PPG cause lapses into conscious processing 
that impairs performance. This is in line with the series of experiments reported by Mullen 
and Hardy (2010) who suggested that the most parsimonious explanation for their findings 
was that conscious processing was activated. They argued that the relative impairment of the 
PPG group compared to the HPG group provided the basis for drawing the inference that 
such goals do cause conscious processing. Despite this position, there is still no evidence of 
direct conscious processing impairment in any of the experiments that have examined the 
process goal paradox.
Unlike previous studies that have reported no significant effects for the HRVLF band 
(Mullen ct al., 2005; Wilson ct al., 2007b), the results reported here indicate that HRVLF 
power decreased from the resting baseline to the task baseline and further still from the task 
baseline to the competitive condition. The increases in HR and sAA mirrored those of 
HRVLF across conditions, and are in line with our prediction that these variables would 
increase from rest to task and further still from task to the competitive condition as a result of 
increases in sympathetic activity. The dissociation between HRVLF and sAA and HR is in 
contrast to research that has examined HRV response to stressors (Nater ct al., 2005; 
Wiethof, 1986, cited in Mulder, 1992). Wiethof recorded large increases in HRVLF in 
response to stressors and concluded that the achievement of optimal task performance was 
not associated with increased compensatory effort as reflected by reductions in power in the 
HRVLF band. In contrast, the results reported here suggest that the maintenance of optimal 
task performance is associated with decreases in HRVLF power. However, it is unclear
whether this effort is related to changes in task processing (Fairclough & Mulder, 2011;
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Veltman & Gaillard, 1998), or whether the effect is associated with compensatory mental 
effort (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). As the decreases in HRVLF power were evident in both 
groups, we argue that the effect was more in line with Eysenck and Calvo's notion of 
compensatory effort. This explanation becomes more compelling when examined in light of 
the performance scores, which revealed that the HPG group improved their performance, 
while the PPG group maintained theirs in the competition condition; thus, performance 
effectiveness was maintained or improved but at the expense of processing efficiency in both 
groups. The RSME scores also add weight to this suggestion as they mirrored the increase 
from task baseline to competition condition HRVLF.
The inclusion of sAA gives us new insight into the competitive state anxiety response. 
The increases in sAA in both groups from resting baseline to task baseline and from task 
baseline to the competitive condition are in line with research that has examined the sAA 
response to psychosocial stress (Chatterton et al., 1996; Nater et al.; Rohleder ct al, 2005). As 
a result of these studies, sAA has been supported as a measure of sympathetic activity. As 
such, the pattern of sAA in this experiment appears to support the contention that the 
decreases in HRVLF power represent increases in compensatory effort as participants appear 
to have mobilized resources to help deal with the perceived threat indicated by the increase in 
cognitive anxiety (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). 
Although activity in the HRVLF band is mediated by both sympathetic and parasympathetic 
activity (Berntson et al., 1997), the absence of any differences in the HRVHF response, 
which is reflective of RSA, an established measure of parasympathetic activity (Berntson et 
al., 1997; Grossman, 1992), suggests that the changes in HRVLF activity in response to the 
competition strcssor were primarily associated with sympathetic reactivity. The HRVLF 
response contrasts with that found in previous studies examining conscious processing effects 
(Mullcn ct al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2007b).
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The absence of any clear conscious processing effects in the present study do not 
allow us to draw conclusions about the role of HRV in shifts from automatic to controlled 
processing. One solution to this problem may be to use stronger anxiety interventions, as 
although there were significant increases in cognitive anxiety in both of the experiments 
reported here, absolute levels of anxiety were lower than those typically reported by athletes 
in competition (Mullen et al, 2005). Alternatively, it is possible that the CSAI-2R, although a 
valid and reliable self-report tool, may be insensitive to the full complexity of the anxiety 
response, which has often been shown to be adaptive in nature (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). The 
CSAI-2R, like the CSA1-2, is founded upon the traditional worry-emotionality conceptual 
framework (Liebert & Morris, 1967). Recent developments in the anxiety literature have 
suggested that this model is unable to fully capture the anxiety response and have extended 
the conceptual boundaries of anxiety measurement (Cheng, Hardy, & Markland, 2009). 
Measures derived from the work of Chcng et al. may prove more fruitful in successfully 
capturing the full influence of anxiety upon performance.
The post-experimental questionnaire (PEQ) indicated that there were no significant 
differences between the process goal groups in their experience of using their assigned goals. 
The questionnaire gave detailed feedback on participants' perceptions about their adherence 
to their assigned goal and the extent to which the goal helped or hindered their performance. 
The PEQ was more extensive than the manipulation check used in Experiment 1 and similar 
studies (Mullen & Hardy, 2010; Wilson ct al., 2007b; Wulf, 2007). Manipulation checks arc 
essential to be confident about adherence to treatment conditions and the PEQ indicates that 
this was adequate in both goal groups. However, the PEQ still only sheds limited light on the 
issue of participants' experiences and more sensitive open-ended questions need to be 
employed in future research.
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Experiment 2 was not without limitations. The absence of counterbalancing is an 
issue; however, the rationale for the fixed ordering of conditions was based on pilot work for 
earlier studies (Mullen & Hardy, 2010), which indicated that where the competitive condition 
preceded the baseline condition, participants believed that the baseline was in fact a further 
competitive condition, despite instructions assuring them otherwise. In addition, the fixed 
order was partially determined by the sAA response to strcssors, which can take up to 30-min 
to return to baseline, while recovery from tasks completed in neutral conditions is much 
quicker (Nater et al., 2006). One further suggestion made by the supervisory team was to use 
a within-subjects treatment of the process goal conditions. The author thought that repeated 
measures on the process goals might confuse participants and where such multiple treatment 
interference was a possibility, random assignment to separate goal conditions was preferred 
(cf. Mullen & Hardy, 2010). It is clear that HRV alone provides limited information about the 
mechanisms underlying changes in mental effort. Measures of sympathetic and 
parasympathetic activity are necessary to get a more complete picture of the mechanisms 
underlying changes in HRV. The innovative use of sAA in this experiment goes some way to 
achieving this.
Whilst both studies provide support for the efficacy of HPG, future research would 
benefit from considering the methodological differences and results reported in study 1 and 2. 
Firstly, a control group was included in study 1 to demonstrate differences in learning relative 
to the HPG and PPG groups and to address the suggestion made by Mullen and Hardy (2010) 
that future research should include a control group. Study 1 demonstrated that participants in 
control conditions behave no differently to those in either part or holistic process goal 
conditions. Having addressed this limitation in study 1, no control group was included in the 
second study for two reasons. Firstly, study 1 revealed that the results surrounding the control 
group were equivocal. This is unsurprising, as the goal setting literature has highlighted
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potential problems with using control groups in research in sport. Specifically, the literature 
has suggested that those in control groups will set spontaneous goals (Lockc, 1991); as such 
these groups have the potential to produce a confounding effect on the results. Where study 1 
was a learning paradigm, the inclusion of a control was essential in attempting to demonstrate 
the learning effects of HPG and PPG. Study 2 adopted a performance paradigm in which the 
focus was to establish how the HPG and PPG groups performed under stress. Due to the 
equivocal effects found in the first study and the issues surrounding control groups discussed 
in the goal setting literature, a decision was made to return to a design in which only the 
relative effectiveness of part and holistic process goals was examined. Future research might 
consider including control groups and examining the focus of participants performing in these 
conditions.
There were also differences between studies 1 and 2 in terms of how participants used 
their assigned process goals. In study 1 participants used an imposed holistic or part process 
goal, while in study 2 participants were able to select from a choice of three holistic or part 
process goals. Self-selected process goals are the preferred option as Jackson and Willson 
(1999) demonstrated that participants who use such goals outperform those who use assigned 
goals. However, in the first study of this thesis, the participants were novices and assigned 
goals were used as participants would not have possessed sufficient explicit knowledge of the 
task to formulate meaningful and relevant process goals at the beginning of the learning 
phase. Study 2 was designed so that after an initial phase of discovery learning participants 
would be able to select an appropriate goal that was meaningful for them. Finally, differences 
were also reported in the performance of the HPG groups in study 1 and study 2. Specifically, 
in study 2 the HPG group was outperformed by the PPG group in the low anxiety condition, 
while in study 1 the HPG group performed better than the PPG group in the retention 
condition. This discrepancy can be explained by the suggestion that the HPG group in study 2
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were unfamiliar with the concept of a holistic focus, while those in study 1 had used their 
HPG as they acquired the skill in the practice phase.
Conclusion
In summary, the two experiments reported here provide more evidence for the 
efficacy of holistic process goals. In addition to extending the literature that indicates that 
holistic process goals are more effective than part process goals for skilled but anxious 
performers, experiment 1 indicates that holistic process goals are more effective for learning. 
Therefore, where process goals form part of a strategy to deal with competitive state anxiety, 
competitors should be encouraged to use holistic rather than part process goals. Similarly, 
where pre-pcrformance routines form part of the preparation for task execution, such routines 
typically have process goals as a central feature (Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996). The results 
presented here suggest that the routines should incorporate HPG. In addition, although it 
appears that HPG proffer no advantage to performance during practice, the benefits realized 
at retention in Experiment 1 indicate that such goals should be preferred to PPG, which result 





The first two chapters of this thesis offered more promising support for the use of 
holistic process goals as a means of ameliorating the potentially negative effects of 
performance anxiety. There are several ways in which the first two experiments could be 
followed up in subsequent studies. One issue that requires exploration is the role of mental 
effort, which clearly plays an important role in performance anxiety effects; however, it is 
unclear whether this role is one of moderation or mediation. One possible avenue for the next 
study would be to design an experiment to differentiate between possible moderation and 
mediation effects. Alternatively, or in addition, the psychophysiological measures used in 
experiment 2 could be expanded to provide a more complete picture of the activation states 
underpinning performance anxiety effects. For example, respiratory measures would provide 
a more complete picture of the respiratory effects in the HRVHF spectral band. Similarly, 
measures of blood pressure and/or the cardiac pre-ejection period would bolster the use of 
sAA as an indicator of sympathetic activity. There also remain doubts about several aspects 
of the research paradigm used to examine the effects of process goals. The first of these 
involves the use of laboratory experiments to examine the effects of competitive state anxiety 
upon performance (Finder, Davids, Renshaw, & Araujo, 2011). Field-based studies and 
qualitative exploration of athletes' goal setting strategies during stressful competitions would 
complement the experimental research conducted to date. The second, and perhaps more 
pressing issue involves the measurement of anxiety. The first two studies in this research 
programme relied upon the manipulation of state anxiety as the basis for the experimental 
designs. As such, the measurement of performers' anxiety responses is an important issue. 
The programme has thus far relied upon the revised Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 
(CSAI-2R; Cox, Martens, & Russell, 2003) to measure participants' response to the anxiety 
interventions. However, several researchers have questioned the validity of the CSA1-2, 
issues that have not necessarily been addressed in Cox ct al.'s revision. For example, research
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addressing performers' directional interpretations of their affective state using a modified 
version of the CSAI-2 has provided empirical evidence that performers can interpret 
statements in the CSAI-2 quite differently (Jones & Hanton, 1996; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 
1993). Furthermore, the items included in the CSAI-2R may not have represented the most 
important aspects of performance anxiety for the novice drivers recruited for studies 1 and 2.
Despite the developments outlined above, the absence of an equivocal conscious 
processing effect in the first two studies of this thesis may be due to the manner in which the 
performance anxiety response is measured. Whilst the participants in both studies reported 
significant increase in anxiety, as indicated by the CSAI-2R, there remains a serious question 
over the integrity of this measurement method. In particular, recent developments have 
highlighted some important issues with the CSAI-2R and the earlier CSAI-2. Specifically, the 
integrity of the model on which the CSAI-2 is based on has been criticised (Cheng, Hardy, & 
Markland, 2009). The CSAI-2 and the CSAI-2r are both derived from a traditional 
conceptualisation of anxiety based upon worry and emotionality (Liebert & Morris, 1967), 
which describes a rather simplistic approach to the anxiety response. More specifically, the 
suggestion that cognitive anxiety is represented by a worry component alone is questionable. 
Recently, Cheng, Hardy and Markland (2009) have suggested that an alternative model of 
performance anxiety is needed, a model that may better reflect our current understanding of 
the complex anxiety-performance relationship. Clearly, measurement of anxiety remains a 
critical issue within the sport psychology literature, particularly as much of the research relics 
heavily on the CSAI-2 and CSAI-2R as measurement tools. Addressing this issue is crucial in 
order to ensure the integrity of experimental research. Therefore, to elaborate on this issue, a 
more detailed review of issues associated with the measurement of performance anxiety will 
follow.
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Due to its prominence in sport psychology, it is not surprising that the measurement 
of performance anxiety has received considerable attention (Burton, 1998). However, despite 
this importance, in a recent publication reviewing measurement in sport and exercise 
psychology (Tenenbaum, Eklund, & Kamata, 2012) there is no specific section that examines 
the measurement of performance anxiety. It would seem rather counterintuitive that such an 
important concept would be absent, especially as anxiety remains to be such a prominent 
concept in recently developed theories such as attcntional control theory (Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). The author is of the opinion that the measurement of 
anxiety does require further attention to ensure an appropriate measurement instrument is 
available for sport psychology researchers and practitioners.
As discussed earlier, the CSAI-2 (Martens et al., 1990), was developed from 
multidimensional anxiety theory (MAT; Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990) and had become 
the gold-standard measure of state anxiety in sport. The CSAI-2 has three subscales; 
cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety and self confidence. Items on the cognitive subscale 
include: "I am worried about performing poorly" and "I am concerned about losing", and 
items on the somatic subscale include: "I feel jittery" and "My heart is racing". Items for the 
self-confidence subscale include: "I feel self-confident" and "I am confident I can meet the 
challenge". Typically, the CSAI-2 is administered an hour before a competitive event and 
produces a score for each of the subscales as an indication of state anxiety. Participants 
complete the questionnaire by rating the intensity the symptoms they experience, thus the 
score represents the amount of competitive anxiety. However, a number of researchers have 
recognised that the score of the CSAI-2 is only indicative of the intensity of symptoms and 
not the meaning of those symptoms to the individual (Burton, 1990; Edwards & Hardy, 
1996). Crucially, in relation to the CSAI-2, many of the symptoms listed arc worded 
relatively neutrally, and as such could be characteristic of positive affective states. For
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example, the cognitive anxiety item "I am concerned about this competition" or the somatic 
item "1 feel nervous", may be both be interpreted by some individuals as negative and 
detrimental to performance, but some individuals may view the same symptom as positive 
and facilitative to performance (Jones & Hanton, 1996; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993). Thus, 
using the intensity only scale, if individuals report a high rating on these symptoms, they are 
viewed as a reflection of high cognitive or somatic anxiety, and assumed to be a negative 
response, even though they may actually reflect positive emotional states.
The notion that anxiety can be viewed as a positive emotion with the potential for 
facilitative effects was first reported by Mahoney and Avencr (1977) who revealed that 
Olympians used their anxiety as a stimulant to better performance. Researchers confirmed the 
potential positive response, and suggested that anxiety-related symptoms could be perceived 
as facilitating in mental preparation and performance (Hardy, 1990; Burton, 1990). 
Moreover, Swain and Jones (1996) revealed that direction of competitive anxiety was a better 
predictor of basketball performance than intensity. The recognition of interpretations has led 
researchers to include a directional rating in the CSAI-2, to account for the facilitative and 
dcbilitative potential of anxiety (Jones & Swain, 1992). Therefore, the intensity portion 
reflects the strength of the anxiety symptom, whilst the direction portion reflects whether 
athletes perceive the symptom to either facilitate or debilitate performance. Despite these 
developments, several limitations have been noted in the construction of the direction 
dimension of competitive anxiety symptoms. Firstly, neither intensity, nor direction 
dimensions have accounted for much variance in performance (Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 
1993). In addition, Edwards and Hardy (1996) suggested that the length of the modified 
CSAI-2 may be excessive with the addition of the direction scale. Finally, from a conceptual 
perspective, some have questioned whether facilitative anxiety is really a form of anxiety.
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Rather, the positive interpretation of anxiety symptoms may be more appropriately labelled 
as "excitement" or "motivation" (Jones, 1995; Jones & Swain, 1992).
While Jones and colleagues have focused upon developing the directional component 
of the CSAI-2, others have concentrated upon examining the factor structure of the original 
inventory. Lane et al. (1999) performed Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) on a sample of 
1,213 CSAI-2 questionnaires. The results revealed unacceptable fit indices for the original 
CSAI-2 model. These results have been attributed to a number of issues; specifically, 
researchers have debated the inclusion of self-confidence due to its fortuitous emergence 
during the initial exploratory analysis of the CSAI-2. Martens et al. (1990) retained the self- 
confidence component within the CSAI-2; however, a number of researchers have argued 
that there is substantial evidence to suggest that self-confidence is an independent construct 
(Hardy, 1996a; Woodman, & Hardy, 2003). Furthermore, Woodman and Hardy also 
suggested that the terminology used in the cognitive anxiety subscalc may have contributed 
to the poor validity of the CSAI-2. Woodman and Hardy reported that eight of the nine 
cognitive anxiety items in the measures used the initial phrase of "I am concerned". The use 
of the term "concern" was viewed as ambiguous and it was suggested that it may represent a 
perception of the importance of an upcoming event, rather than worry or cognitive anxiety. 
One suggestion would be to begin the initial phrase of items with "I am worried" in order to 
present a more suitable representation of cognitive anxiety.
In an attempt to improve on the factor structure of the CSAI-2, Cox, Martens and 
Russell (2003) produced the CSAI-2R. Using CFA and a calibration and validation sample, 
Cox et al. set out to improve the fit of the CSAI-2. The calibration analysis on a sample of 
503 participants' revealed a poor factor structure. However, when 10 items from the CSAI-2 
were removed, fit was greatly improved. The remaining items were administered to a
validation sample of 331 participants, and this revised CSAI-2 revealed a good fit to the data.
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Cox et al. concluded that the CSAI-2R had stronger psychometric properties than the CSAI- 
2, and should be used in future sport psychology research.
Despite these revisions, fundamental problems still remain with multidimensional 
models of performance anxiety founded upon the worry emotionality distinction (Liebert & 
Morris, 1967). Even though the cognitive and physiological responses incorporated in the 
model appear sound, its suitability to reflect the adaptive nature now acknowledged as a key 
component of anxiety must be questioned. In response to these issues Chcng, Hardy, and 
Markland (2009) attempted to address some of the limitations inherent in the CSAI-2 and its 
derivatives by proposing a new three-dimensional model of performance anxiety. The model 
was developed in order to account for the advancements in the literature and the potentially 
adaptive nature of performance anxiety. In addition to the retention of a traditional cognitive 
and physiological dimension, Cheng et al.'s proposed three-dimensional model included a 
regulatory dimension to account for the adaptive nature of the anxiety response.
The regulatory dimension included in Cheng ct al.'s (2009) model was characterized 
by perceived control. The idea of control has proven a crucial component in a number of 
anxiety theories (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1988; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Most recently, 
attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) included a control system, which serves to 
monitor and evaluate performance and consequently plan and regulate processing resources. 
In addition, Cheng et al. examined the control function from an evolutionary perspective. In 
that the anxiety response is suggested to stem from a defence mechanism against potential 
danger (Ohman, 2000), and anxiety achieves this defence by detecting threat and mobilising 
resources for action (Calvo, Avero, Castillo, & Miguel-Tobal, 2003). Consequently, Chcng ct 
al. claimed that their proposed model was representative of a more balanced and neutral 
viewpoint that reflects the maladaptive and adaptive nature of the anxiety construct.
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Within sport psychology, some attempts have been made to represent this adaptive 
capacity within integrated models of anxiety. Hardy and Whitehead (1984) included an 
"activation" dimension in their measure of rock climbing anxiety. Specifically, the activation 
dimension referred to cognitive and physiological activity geared towards preparing a 
planned response to an anticipated situation (cf. Pribram & McGuiness, 1975). In addition, 
Jones' (1995) control model of competitive sport anxiety, adapted from Carver and Schcier's 
(1986, 1988) theory of self-regulation, included a directional interpretation of anxiety 
symptoms, which is representative of the adaptive feature. Despite empirical evidence 
supporting Jones' model, the regulatory dimension outlined by Cheng ct al. differs in two 
fundamental respects. Firstly, the directional interpretation proposed by Jones was not 
integrated into a model of anxiety. Moreover, some researchers have suggested that the 
notion of "facilitative" anxiety is a mislabelling of positive affective states (Jones, Hanton & 
Swain, 1994; Jones & Hanton, 2001). In Cheng et al.'s model, anxiety was viewed as being 
potentially adaptive, which may lead to positive effects. Secondly, Jones' model is 
characterized by the athlete's interpretation of their anxiety symptoms. Crucially, athletes 
may be incapable of interpreting their symptoms in certain circumstances, for instance 
athletes may repress or deny their anxiety symptoms as a form of coping (Hippel ct al., 2005) 
and/or may simply be unable to detect their current psychological state due to poor insight 
(Egloff & Schmukle, 2002). Thus, the model proposed by Chcng et al. differs as it represents 
the regulatory dimension through perceived control, rather than indirectly via symptom 
interpretation.
In addition to the inclusion of a regulatory dimension, Cheng et al. (2009) also wished 
to expand the traditional worry-emotionality model on which the cognitive and physiological 
dimensions arc based (Licbcrt & Morris, 1967). Chcng et al. included more components to 
better reflect the performance anxiety construct. In the physiological dimension, Cheng et al.
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adopted the criteria used for generalized anxiety disorder in the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987). The 
criteria are characterized by a distinction between the voluntary and involuntary muscle 
structures of the anatomical structure and Cheng et al. suggested that the physiological 
dimension should reflect this distinction. As a result, Cheng et al.'s physiological dimension 
comprised autonomic hyperactivity to reflect the involuntary response, and somatic tension to 
reflect the voluntary response. This differentiated approach fits with longstanding suggestions 
that different arousal states may impact different aspects of performance (Hockey & 
Hamilton, 1983; Neiss, 1988). In terms of the cognitive response, Cheng et al. suggested that 
the cognitive dimension should be reflected by a worry component and a self-focus 
component. Again, this is in line with much of the performance anxiety literature, which 
suggests that different cognitive responses may impact on different aspects of performance. 
Specifically, worry is acknowledged as a major component of processing efficiency theory 
(Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), while self-focused attention is central to Carver and Scheier's 
(1988) anxiety perspective.
Cheng et al.'s (2009) model of performance anxiety consisted of three dimensions and 
five subcomponents; cognitive anxiety, reflected by worry and self-focused attention; 
physiological anxiety, reflected by autonomic hyperactivity and somatic tension and a 
regulatory dimension, reflected by the single subcomponent of perceived control. Cheng et al. 
developed their Three Factor Anxiety Inventory (TFAI) to test the proposed hierarchical 
model. Initial testing with two independent sample groups attempted to support this five- 
factor model. Although the authors provided a strong conceptual argument for the five 
distinct components of performance anxiety, CFA did not support the hypothesized model; 
hence, worry and self focus, and somatic tension and autonomic hyperactivity were merged 
in to two respective single factors. This final parceled three-dimensional model exhibited an 
excellent fit to the data, with Robust f (32) - 47.9, p - .01; RMSEA - .04, NNFI -.99, ell
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.99 and SRMR = .05. As such, the hierarchical relationships between the second and first 
order factors were not supported. Instead, the results supported a first-order three- 
dimensional model of performance anxiety.
In addition to the favourable CFA results, the three-dimensional model has 
demonstrated promising predictive validity (Cheng, Hardy, & Woodman, 2011). Cheng et al. 
used a sample of 99 tae-kwon-do competitors and administered the TFAI 30 minutes prior to 
competition, and a subjective measure of performance within 30 minutes following 
competition. The results of a moderated hierarchical regression analysis revealed initial 
support for the predictive validity of the three factor model as a measure of performance 
anxiety. The regulatory dimension accounted for a large proportion of performance variance. 
Performance was best under high perceived control, which supports Cheng et al.'s (2009) 
proposition that the regulatory dimension of anxiety would have a crucial impact on 
performance. In addition, the results provide some support for the suggestion that cognitive 
anxiety may positively predict performance. This effect was only significant once the 
interaction of perceived control and physiological anxiety was included, suggesting that the 
importance of cognitive anxiety was enhanced by the other predictor variables. The 
interactive effects of the anxiety variables made a significant contribution to performance 
variance once the main effect had been accounted for. Interestingly, the interaction between 
perceived control and physiological arousal was a significant predictor of performance.
In addition to the theoretical issues associated with the accurate measurement of 
performance anxiety, there has been little focus on the specification of measurement models. 
Specifically, the issue of causality has received little attention. Traditionally, behavioural 
researchers have typically studied latent factors thought to cause measured variables (Hair, 
Black, Babin, & Andcrson, 2010); however, in certain constructs the causality can be 
reversed. These two approaches arc known as reflective measurement models and formative
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measurement models. Reflective measurement models are based on the assumption that latent 
constructs cause the measured variables. Formative measurement models are based on the 
assumptions that the measured variables cause the construct (Bollen, 1984).
Typically, in measurement and conceptual development researchers have focused on 
the structural elements of models rather than on the relationship between measures and their 
relevant latent constructs (Jarvis, Mackenzie, & Podsakoff, 2003). This has resulted in many 
constructs being treated alike, regardless of whether a construct was inherently formative or 
reflective. This is an issue that has been overlooked in sport psychology measurement. Often 
measurement models are tested using CFA, which specifics models as reflective (Chin, 
1998). Whilst, it is appropriate to model some conceptual measures like this, reflectivity does 
not apply to all constructs (Bollen & Lennox, 1991). This potential misspecification in 
measurement models results in researchers making inaccurate conclusions between the 
structural relationships linking constructs. In terms of performance anxiety measurement, the 
correct specification of future models may prove a necessary method in accurately 
representing performance anxiety. This issue will be revisited in more depth in the 
introduction to Chapter 6.
Summary
In summary, the measurement of performance anxiety has remained a challenge, and 
this review has presented some of the developments and issues discussed in the more recent 
literature. The CSAI-2 and the CSAI-2R have continued to be the gold-standard measures of 
performance anxiety, despite the limitations highlighted in the literature (Cheng, Hardy & 
Woodman, 2009; Woodman & Hardy, 2001), and up until recently research has not 
challenged the dominance of this measurement method. Specifically, the CSAI-2 is based on 
an outdated and simplistic conceptual model, thus, it is unclear if researchers are accurately
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measuring the whole anxiety experience manifested in research studies. Cheng ct al. (2009) 
model is the first to challenge the CSAI-2 and presents an alternative three-dimensional 
conceptualization to represent performance anxiety. The model proposed by Chcng et al., is 
the first to account for the adaptive nature of performance anxiety and to extend the 
traditional worry-emotionality dimensions, in an attempt to reflect a more accurate picture of 
performance anxiety. Although Cheng et al. make considerable advancements in the 
representation of performance anxiety, further research is required. Cheng et al.'s originally 
proposed a five dimensional hierarchical model, which was not supported statistically; 
however, a more detailed examination of these dimensions may produce more satisfactory 
statistical results. Furthermore, the establishment of construct validity is an ongoing process 
(Smith & McCarthy, 1995), warranting continued research into the conceptual representation 
and measurement of the performance anxiety construct.
Therefore, the purpose of the second half of this thesis is to re-examine the model of 
performance anxiety presented by Cheng et al. Thus the focus of the thesis shifts from an 
examination of process goals to validation of a new measurement model of performance 
anxiety. As noted above (p.77) in order to extend the research presented in study 1 and 2, the 
author feels that this validation process is required to ensure the inclusion of a strong 
measurement tool in future experimental and field-based research. There are already too 
many studies that criticize the measurement of anxiety and then continue to use these tools in 
subsequent research (e.g. Mullen, Hardy, & Tattersall, 2005). The following two studies will 
use both qualitative and quantitative methods to re-cxaminc the measurement model 
presented by Chcng et al.
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Chapter 5




Cheng, Hardy and Markland (2009) proposed a three-dimensional model of performance 
anxiety, consisting of cognitive, physiological and regulatory dimensions. The cognitive 
dimension was hypothesized to consist of two subcomponents; worry and self-focus. 
Confirmatory factor analysis revealed weak discriminant validity between worry and self- 
focus and the two components became part of an overall cognitive dimension within the 
model. In pursuit of a clearer understanding of the cognitive component of anxiety and its 
impact on performance, a qualitative analysis of athletes' thoughts and feelings regarding a 
highly anxious competitive event, aimed to further explore this area. Worry, private self- 
focus and public self-focus were predicted to account for the cognitive anxiety response of 
the athletes. Eleven elite athletes, who reported experiencing high state cognitive anxiety 
before competing, took part in semi-structured interviews. Modified analytic induction was 
adopted to explore athletes' thoughts and feelings in regards to a competitive event, in which 
they experienced high levels of anxiety. Results revealed support for three subcomponents of 
cognitive anxiety; worry, private self-focus and public self-focus. These three factors suggest 
that Chcng et al.'s original conceptualization of the cognitive component of anxiety may have 
been too narrow.
Keywords: anxiety, worry, private self-focus, public self-focus.
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Introduction
The study of performance anxiety has been a consistent feature of the last 20 years of 
sport psychology research. Despite this attention, the nature of the performance anxiety 
response is still a contentious issue (Cheng, Hardy, & Markland, 2009; Woodman & Hardy, 
2001). Typically, anxiety is conceptualized as a multidimensional construct consisting of 
worry and emotionality subcomponents (Liebert & Morris, 1967) that are measured using the 
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2; Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990) and its 
derivative, the revised CSAI-2 (CSAI-2R, Cox, Martens, & Russell, 2003), which have 
become the gold standard measures. Recently, Cheng et al. (2009) proposed a three- 
dimensional model of performance anxiety that set out to account for some of the limitations 
inherent in the conceptualizations of anxiety underpinning traditional measurement tools such 
as the CSAI-2. In addition, Cheng et al. also set out to construct a model that was able to 
account for the mixture of positive and negative consequences of increased anxiety for sports 
performance consistently reported in the sport psychology literature but outside the 
explanatory scope of measurement tools built around traditional worry-emotionality models.
To underpin their model, Cheng et al. (2009) defined anxiety as "an unpleasant 
psychological state in reaction to perceived threat concerning the performance of a task under 
pressure" (p. 271). Cheng et al.'s model of performance anxiety consisted of three 
dimensions and five subcomponents; cognitive anxiety, reflected by the subcomponents of 
worry and self-focused attention; physiological anxiety, reflected by autonomic hyperactivity 
and somatic tension and a regulatory dimension, reflected by the single subcomponent of 
perceived control. The inclusion of the regulatory dimension reflected the adaptive nature of 
the anxiety response, which is potentially mediated through mechanisms such as 
compensatory effort (Eyscnck & Calvo, 1992) and energizing and focusing effects (Carver &
Schcicr, 1986). In addition, Cheng ct al. argued that the inclusion of the regulatory dimension
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is more in line with the evolutionary perspective, which views anxiety as a defense 
mechanism (Ohman, 2000). Furthermore, the mobilization of resources to provide energy for 
action, has become a key feature of other contemporary anxiety theories (e.g., attentional 
control theory, Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007).
In addition to the regulatory dimension, Cheng et al.'s (2009) framework also 
included a multidimensional approach to both physiological and cognitive anxiety, built on 
the premise that a conventional model based upon worry and emotionality would fail to fully 
capture the complexities of the anxiety response. Indeed, many researchers have identified 
other important variables and argued that the complexity of the anxiety response may be 
better reflected by the inclusion of more components (e.g., Hatgvct & Benson, 1997; 
Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1992). To differentiate the subcomponents of physiological anxiety, 
Cheng et al. applied the criteria used for generalized anxiety disorder in the DSM-I1I-R (APA, 
1987). The two physiological subcomponents of autonomic hypcractivity and somatic tension 
were defined in accordance with the anatomical structure of voluntary versus involuntary 
muscle structure. This differentiated model of physiological anxiety is also in line with 
suggestions that different arousal states may impact different aspects of performance in 
dissimilar ways (Hockey & Hamilton, 1983; Neiss, 1988). In terms of the cognitive anxiety 
dimension, Cheng et al. also provided a strong conceptual argument for the separation of 
worry and self-focus as distinct subcomponents of cognitive anxiety, contending that 
individuals manifest anxiety differently in different performance contexts. For example, 
increases in self-focus might lead highly-skilled but anxious individuals to attempt to 
consciously control movements, interfering with normal task automatic processing (Masters, 
1992), an effect not obviously implicated in the content of worry. Thus, Cheng ct al.'s 
cognitive dimension contained worry and self-focused attention, which was defined as an 
attentional shift to a self-evaluative state with an increased awareness of self-shortcomings
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concerning performance of a task under pressure.
Initial testing, with two independent sample groups, attempted to support this 
hierarchical model. The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) results did not support the 
hypothesized dissociation, between the cognitive subcomponents (worry and self-focus) or 
the physiological subcomponents (somatic tension and autonomic hypcractivity), which 
resulted in the authors presenting a three dimensional model of performance anxiety. Somatic 
tension and autonomic hyperactivity were merged in to a single factor to represent the 
physiological dimension. Similarly, worry and self-focus were merged into a single factor to 
represent the cognitive dimension. While this merged model provided further support for the 
importance of the cognitive dimension in models of performance anxiety, it lends little 
support to a two-subcomponent (worry and self-focus) approach. A multidimensional 
approach to the cognitive dimension appears to be worthy of further investigation, as not all 
cognitions that are experienced by athletes in competitive events arc manifested as worries 
(Dunn & Syrotuik, 2003).
The conceptual development of cognitive anxiety is particularly important, as it is 
commonly perceived to be one of the most significant influences on performance (Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992; Woodman & Hardy, 2003). For example, a central assumption in Eysenck and 
Calvo's (1992) processing efficiency theory is that individuals in an anxious state regularly 
worry about the threat to current goals. As a result, these "worrisome" thoughts have the 
potential to interfere with performance as they use up attentional resources ordinarily 
allocated for the demands of the performance. These performance effects have received 
significant support and evidence for the inclusion of worry within a cognitive anxiety 
dimension is clear; however, researchers have argued that more components arc needed to 
better reflect the complex nature of the cognitive dimension of anxiety (Sarason, 1984;
Schwarzcr & Jerusalem, 1992). For example, Sarason proposed an empirically derived model
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of anxiety that included four components, worry, test-irrelevant thinking, tension and bodily 
symptoms.
Self-focused attention has also been reported as an important component in 
understanding anxiety (Gibbons, 1990), and its inclusion alongside worry in Chcng et al.'s 
(2009) model would appear to be conceptually sound. Cheng et al. suggested that self- 
evaluation provides the theoretical link between self-focus and anxiety. Specifically, the 
theory of objective self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) suggests that self-focus leads 
to a self-evaluative state, which researchers suggested might be one of the main processes of 
anxiety (Gibbons, 1990). In addition, self-related cognitions have been viewed as an integral 
part of the anxiety process (Gibbons, 1990; Sarason, 1984), with research suggesting that 
anxious individuals scan the environment for cues related to the self (Schwarzcr & Jerusalem, 
1992) and often become self-preoccupied with weaknesses and shortcomings (Wicklund, 
1991). Furthermore, Carver and Scheier (1986) proposed that self-focus rather than worry 
was the main component of cognitive anxiety. This is evident in their anxiety control model, 
which indicated that anxiety is determined by an excessive focus on the self (Carver & 
Scheier, 1988). This excessive self-focus may indeed cause an athlete to worry, but it is also 
possible that self-focus can lead to additional effects that could not be ascribed to worry, such 
as a critical self-awareness or as a preoccupation with significant others (Wicklund, 1991). 
Reflecting these differential effects, self-focus has been categorised into two discrete aspects; 
private self-focus and public self-focus (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Fenigstein et al. 
defined private self-focus as a factor that is "concerned with attending to one's inner thoughts 
and feelings" (p. 523) and public self-focus as "a general awareness of the self as a social 
object that has an effect on others" (p.523). Cheng et al.'s (2009) model appears to reflect 
these two distinct aspects of self-focus as both private and public facets arc represented 
within the items that comprise the cognitive dimension of their Three-Factor Anxiety
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Inventory. For example, "I find myself evaluating myself more critically than usual" is 
indicative of a private self focus, whilst "I am very aware of the possibility of disappointing 
important others" is indicative of a public self-focus. Despite using items derived from 
conceptually distinct sources of self-focus, Cheng et al. made no formal distinction between 
private and public self-focus within their model, rather the two aspects were combined in a 
unidimensional self-focus factor.
The distinction between private and public self-focus could be especially pertinent as 
the psychological underpinnings and behavioural effects of these two states are unique. 
Private self-focus serves to clarify and intensify the affect, motives, or personal standards that 
are currently salient to that individual (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Thus, individuals 
who experience high levels of private self-focus may experience heightened awareness of 
behaviours and movements in an attempt to maintain the aspect of a movement that is most 
salient to the individual (Masters, 1992). In contrast, Fenigstein ct al. suggest that those who 
experience high levels of public self-focus generally feel a level of discomfort, and evaluation 
apprehension because they see themselves as the subject of appraisal. These individuals may 
experience a broadening of focus, as they may be scanning the environment to focus on those 
who are watching them (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1992). In addition, they may attempt to 
modify their behaviour to meet the perceived expectations of others. Consequently, a model 
that fully captures the distinct differences between private and public self-focus should yield 
a more robust cognitive dimension of performance anxiety.
Worry and self-focus are undeniably two distinct constructs, and the evidence for 
their inclusion in a model of cognitive anxiety is compelling. However, these two constructs 
alone may fail to fully represent the complex nature of the cognitive anxiety response. In 
pursuit of strengthening the cognitive dimension in Cheng et al.'s (2009) model, a worry 
component should be retained, but a more differentiated approach to self-focus should be
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adopted. Therefore, future models may benefit from including both public and private 
aspects of self-focus. As such, it does appear that more work is required to fully delineate the 
construct of performance anxiety, and in particular, the cognitive dimension, which research 
suggests plays a significant role in the performance anxiety relationship (Hardy, Jones, & 
Gould, 1996; Mullen & Hardy, 2010). The purpose of the present study was to explore 
athletes' experiences of the cognitive dimension of performance anxiety more fully. In line 
with the rationale presented above, we predicted that the cognitive dimension would consist 
of worry and private and public self-focus, extending Cheng et al.'s conceptualization. The 
investigation also had an exploratory element as it set out to examine whether any further 
aspects of the cognitive anxiety dimension would emerge. In order to achieve these aims and 
to fully capture the dynamic nature of the cognitive anxiety response, we used qualitative 
interviews and a combination of deductive and inductive analysis.
Method 
Design
The methodology used in this study, modified analytic induction (MA1; Bogdan & 
Bilkcn, 1992; Gilgun, 1995), incorporates deductive and inductive analysis strategies. Based 
on the original principles of analytic induction (Bogdan & Bilken, 1992), MAI is a flexible 
qualitative approach that allows researchers to challenge, develop and refine existing 
conceptual models against the reality of individual's experiences. Crucially, the method also 
accounts for researchers' existing knowledge and experience in an area of study, avoiding the 
common pretence of the researcher as tabula rasa (Patton, 2002). Participants arc 
purposefully sampled to challenge the validity of existing conceptual models (Gilgun, 1995). 
Inductive analysis is used to label concepts that emerge from the data. These emergent data
arc then fitted to a hypothesized model this fit is assessed using deductive analysis. Where
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data do not fit the model, due in part to the presence of negative cases, inductive analysis is 
used to further explore information that has been unaccounted for by the original model 
(Patton, 2002). On the strength of this additional information the hypothesis or model is 
refined to provide greater meaning (Gilgun, 1995). We used MAI to test our prediction that 
the cognitive dimension would be comprised of worry and private and public self-focus. 
While this theoretical framework guided our research; we assumed that through the process 
of emergence, we would uncover constructs not accounted for in the proposed model.
Participants
Participants (male, n = 4; female, n = 7) were aged between 19 and 29 years (M = 
22.3, SD = 3.6), had been participating competitively in their sport for a number of years (M 
- 7.1, SD — 3.4), and all were, or had participated, at an international or professional 
standard. In addition, athletes were purposefully sampled based on two criteria; (i) they were 
regularly competing or had competed in the last 6 months, and (ii) they reported experiencing 
high levels of cognitive anxiety. This information was ascertained through the initial email 
contact, in which participants were asked questions exploring the criteria.
The sample represented a range of sports, including netball and shooting (both n = 2); 
and football, rugby, basketball, badminton, table tennis, golf, and judo (all n = 1). A 
heterogeneous sample was used in order to achieve a broad exploration of key themes 
relating to cognitive anxiety (Mellalieu, Neil, Hanton, & Fletcher, 2009). The participants 
provided written informed consent and ethical approval for the study was obtained from the 
institution's ethics committee. Data collection ceased after 11 interviews as theoretical 




A semi-structured interview guide was developed specifically for the study with the 
aid of two experienced sport psychology researchers who were trained in qualitative methods. 
A semi-structured interview was preferred as it allowed for an athlete driven process, 
facilitated by open-ended questions. A pilot interview (n = \) was conducted, following 
which the interview guide was refined and adjustments made to the interviewer's technique. 
Prior to the interview, to allow a clear expression of thoughts and feelings regarding 
cognitive anxiety, the athletes were asked to recall a stressful competition that they felt they 
would be happy to use as a focus for discussion during the interview. Allowing the athletes to 
choose a self-selected event encouraged athletes to choose an event they wanted to recall and 
could remember vividly and accurately. Event recall is an established form of eliciting 
information regarding competitive events (Thatcher & May, 2008), with the aim not to "test" 
athletes but rather to collaborate and better understand the in-depth information they provide. 
Participants were also encouraged to recall an event that had occurred in the last 12 months to 
ensure that recall was as accurate as possible.
The interview guide had 3 sections. The first section included questions regarding the 
athlete's sporting background, providing demographic information and easing the athletes 
into the interview. Subsequently, the athletes were asked to describe the event they had 
chosen to recall. The interview then followed the event in a chronological order, and asked 
athletes to recount their thoughts and feelings at several points leading up to and during, the 
event (a week before, the night before, the day of the event, immediately before and, finally, 
during the event). In accordance with the competitive anxiety research, these time points 
were chosen to reflect the presence of elevated cognitive anxiety up to 7 days before a 
competitive event (Martens, Vcaley, & Burton, 1990), and would allow participants to
discuss the full range of cognitive anxiety experiences associated with the build up to their
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chosen stressful event. Evaluative questions were predominantly used, in order to gain an 
insight into athletes' thoughts and feelings regarding the event (Patton, 2002). For example, 
"what were your thoughts at this point?" and "how were you feeling at that time?". To 
support this process, specific clarification and elaboration probes were also used to enable 
athletes to expand on their initial responses (Patton, 2002). For example, "were your feelings 
different to the night before?" and "can you elaborate on your thoughts?". The final section 
allowed participants the opportunity to discuss their interview experience and any other 
important information that might have been overlooked during the interview process.
Procedure
Participants were contacted in person, and were provided with details of the study, 
including the interview format and how the data would be collected. Before attending the 
interview, athletes were sent a copy of instructions that outlined the structure of the interview. 
These instructions asked athletes to recall a recent stressful sporting competition that had 
occurred in the last 12 months. In addition, the interviewer ensured that the participants were 
comfortable talking about the event that they had chosen. The interviews were conducted at a 
time and location convenient to the athletes. On arrival, full informed consent was obtained; 
athletes were assured of confidentiality and were provided with contact details if they wished 
to obtain the results of the study. Athletes were informed that the interview would be 
recorded and that the recordings would be confidential.
Data Analysis
Interviews lasted between 38 and 115 minutes, were tape-recorded, transcribed 
verbatim, checked for accuracy of transcription and subsequently sent to the interviewee for 
the purpose of member checking (Patton, 2002). The transcribed interviews yielded a total of 
292 pages of 1.5-spaccd text. The initial phase of analysis proceeded inductively and
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involved the author immersing herself in the transcripts and extracting raw-data quotes 
relating to cognitive anxiety. The raw data was then grouped together around common 
threads to form themes. The next stage of the analysis was deductive and consisted of a 
process of pattern matching, which involved using the three main components in the 
hypothesized conceptual model of cognitive anxiety; worry and private and public self-focus, 
as a theoretical screen that was placed over the data. The pattern matching enabled the 
comparison of the themes that emerged from the data with the three main components. Where 
themes did not appear to fit with one of the 3 main components, they were set-aside for the 
next phase of the analysis, which proceeded inductively. A frequency analysis was conducted 
to illustrate how often each theme was mentioned. Finally, manual handling of the data was 
preferred to computer-assisted analysis as the latter can distance the researcher from the data 
(Davis & Meyer, 2009). Peer debriefing was employed at each stage of the study to test and 
refine working hypotheses and to protect against researcher bias. Peer debriefing was 
conducted with the author's main supervisor, who fulfilled a protagonist role (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). In addition, the author and supervisor independently analysed the data and 
discussion ensued until full agreement was reached on the interpretation of the findings.
Results and Discussion
The purpose of this study was to determine if the predicted model of cognitive 
anxiety, consisting of worry, private and public self-focus could be used to define athletes' 
thoughts and feelings surrounding a competitive event that they perceived to be stressful. 
Preliminary inductive analysis of the raw data revealed 12 themes. The subsequent deductive 
phase of the analysis, which consisted of pattern matching, successfully placed all of the 
emergent themes within one of the three main components, sec Table 1. Worry comprised of 
7 themes; performance failure, making mistakes, consequence of mistakes, uncertainty,
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component; self awareness, weaknesses and explicit monitoring. Public self-focus consisted 
of two themes; evaluation and self-presentation. The number of participants providing 
instances of each theme is presented in table 1.
The following sections address the salient features of the cognitive anxiety dimension 
under the headings of the predicted model; worry, private self-focus and public self-focus. 
The results and discussion of this chapter arc presented together, to allow discussion 
following each theme (cf. Thatcher & Day, 2008).
Worry
Deductive analysis supported worry as a prominent component of the cognitive 
anxiety dimension. Athletes consistently used the term "worry" and the 7 themes listed in 
table 1 indicate that worry related to a wide range of situations and circumstances. The results 
of the current study suggest that Cheng et al.'s (2009) unidimensional conceptualization of 
worry may be too narrow. There is some evidence of a multidimensional approach within the 
literature (Dunn, 1999, 2003), which is consistent with our findings. In order to provide more 
detail, each of the underlying themes is discussed in turn.
Performance Failure. Eight athletes reported experiencing worries relating to poor 
performance, not playing to the best of their ability, and the possibility of failure. For 
example, athlete 4 reported worrying about performing poorly; "I wanted to be beaten 
playing my best, so that's the only thing I always worry about is, is the fact that I don't want 
to play badly". These findings are consistent with research that revealed that one of the most 
typical worries experienced by wrestlers related to performance failure (Gould & Weinbcrg, 
1985). More recently, Dunn et al. (1999, 2003) highlighted performance failure as one of four 
specified situational anxiety dimensions proposed as a framework for worry in ice hockey.
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Crucially, this theme was reflective of a global worry about performance failure, rather than a 
more specific form of performance failure as indicated in the themes below.
Making mistakes. Athletes consistently reported worrying about making mistakes. 
For example, participant 7 reported worrying about making mistakes during their 
performance: "it's only when it is towards the end and its quite level (the score), that's when 
I'm nervous and I start worrying about making a mistake". Some parallels can be drawn with 
the theme of performance failure; however, this theme is focused on the specific act of 
making a mistake, for example, "the worry, if the ball comes over and you drop it, and drop it 
straight to the centre forward, and he puts it in, in the last minute of the game to make it one 
nil..." (Participant 3). This theme depicts a worry relating to making a specific mistake, such 
as dropping the ball. These worrisome thoughts differ from the global worry of performance 
failure indicated in the previous theme, which is concerned with a more generalised worry of 
performing poorly. Indeed, this form of worry may have different behavioural consequences, 
such as ironic effects (Toner, Moran, & Jackson, 2013; Wegner, 1994), compared to a global 
worry of performance failure. Specifically, the heightened awareness surrounding the worry 
of making a mistake may result in athletes thinking about the behaviours they are ironically 
trying to avoid, causing counter-intentional states to be triggered.
Consequence of making mistakes. Athletes also reported worrying about the 
consequences associated with making a mistake. For example, participant 3 reported, "just a 
sort of worry I'm not going to get a new contract. I've lost my clean sheet bonus, money 
wise, you know what I mean" when talking about making a mistake. These worries varied 
from how a mistake would affect subsequent performance to how a mistake would affect 
teammates and coaches and, as the above example denotes, potential financial implications. 
Similar properties have been revealed in a framework of failure identified by Conroy,
Poc/wardowski, and Hcnschen, (2001). The framework included experiencing tangible
101
losses, important others losing interest, and upsetting important others, which is consistent 
with our athletes reports of worry in this theme. Moreover, the measure of fear of failure 
developed from Conroy et al.'s (2001) findings was associated with high levels of worry and 
cognitive disruption (Conroy, Willow, & Metzlcr, 2002). In contrast to the previous theme of 
making a mistake, these worries focused on how the athlete perceives the potential 
consequence associated with making a mistake. Nine athletes reported this theme, of which 5 
also reported the theme of worry of making a mistake. Therefore, the data suggests that 
worries about the consequences of making a mistake do not always follow worries about 
making a mistake.
Situational uncertainty. Another category of worry focused upon uncertainty 
surrounding the athlete's performance or situation. It seems that when athletes had no prior 
knowledge of their opposition or playing environment this elicited worry for 7 out of the 11 
athletes. Participant 11 consistently reported feeling worried because of her lack of 
knowledge:
just nerves, worry, I don't know, I didn't know what was coming next so I was a bit, I 
don't know, apprehension...like I didn't know what was to come, I didn't know 
anything about the opposition and things, so I was thinking, are they going to be easy? 
Am 1 going to be ok?
Situational uncertainty was also a feature of Dunn et al.'s, (1999) framework of competitive 
worry. Anxiety of the unknown has been reported as a factor in early measures of trait 
anxiety (Endler, Edwards, & Vitelli, 1989), and more recently in a study of stressful 
appraisals in sport (Thatchcr & Day, 2008). Using Lazarus and Folkman's (1984) stress 
framework, Thatchcr and Day deductively analysed their results and reported that novelty 
was a frequent occurrence in their participant's reports of a stressful competitive situations. In
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this study participants reported that they worried about novel situations or changes to 
established routines or environments, which matches the findings of Thatcher and Day's 
research.
Outcome. Athletes also reported worries related to the competition outcome. For 
instance, athlete 4 reported worrying about the outcome of the badminton event they were 
taking part in; "it was just all on the outcome, all I was thinking about like my score, where I 
was placed and just like really worried". Within the early sources of stress literature, the 
outcome of an event was cited as a source of worry (Weinberg & Gould, 1985). Consistent 
with research examining outcome goals, the transcripts suggested that a focus on the outcome 
of competitive performance is associated with increases in performance anxiety (Burton, 
1989; Kingston & Wilson, 2009). A focus on the outcome has been suggested to elicit 
negative effects, because it meets the three stress criteria outlined by Beggs (1990), that is, 
the outcome is important, it requires action and it may not always be achieved. Eight out of 
the eleven participants reported this type of worry, thus it would seem to be a significant 
component of the worry response.
Expectations. Finally, athletes reported being worried over the expectations of 
important others, such as, coaches, teammates and parents:
Um, worry of letting people down, worry of letting your team mates down, worry of 
letting managerial staff, fans down, you know quite a lot of expectations lying on you, 
could actually potentially let down a lot of people, do you know what I mean. 
(Participant 3)
James and Collins (1997) highlighted that the pressure to attain external standards by meeting 
others expectations was an important factor in sources of competitive stress. Moreover, 
Gould and Wcinbcrg's (1985) research also identified "expectations to perform" as a
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significant source of stress. The worry attached to expectations of significant others is clearly 
a significant factor in the worry process and is closely related to the public self-focus 
component of the cognitive dimension. This relationship will be discussed further in the 
public self-focus section below.
Re-injury. The inductive analysis also revealed worries over re-injury as a theme 
among three of the athletes. Athletes were concerned about past injuries: "depending on if I 
am injured or not. If I'm injured it would be exactly the same, but if I'm not, I would have no 
worry what so ever, it's only if I'm injured that I get nervous" (Participant 10). This theme 
draws parallels with Dunn et al.'s (1999) conceptual framework of worry, which included 
worry about injury. In contrast to Dunn et al.'s conceptualization, which included concerns 
regarding the potential of getting injured, the present results suggested that the athletes' 
concerns were related to previous injuries and the possibility of re-injury. Interestingly, this 
re-injury worry was evident in sports that required a high level of contact, or were high in 
impact and known for the prevalence of injury (Grimmer, Jones, & Williams, 2000; Fong, 
Hong, Chan, Yung, & Chan, 2007) such as judo, rugby and netball. Future research should 
seek to explore differences between worry of injury and worry of re-injury, and what place it 
has within future representations of worry.
These findings suggest that it is important to distinguish between the different types of 
worry that athletes may experience. Early research by Gould and Weinberg (1985) reported 
that athletes worried about a number of factors, including, fear of failure/feelings of 
inadequacy, external control/guilt, and social evaluation. Subsequent research revealed that 
the most typical worries experienced by wrestlers related to performance failure and negative 
social evaluations (Gould & Weinberg, 1985). Furthermore, as discussed, Dunn and 
colleagues (1999, 2003), have also attempted to determine whether specified situational
anxiety dimensions (physical danger, performance failure, negative social evaluation and
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situational uncertainty) can provide a framework for structuring worry in sport (ice hockey). 
Tallis and Eyscnck (1994) also presented a model of worry and suggested worry could serve 
a number of functions, including, alarm, prompt and preparation. Clearly, worry is a unique 
concept, and a multidimensional approach is entirely possible; however, the aforementioned 
research focuses on worry alone as the major factor in the anxiety response. Specifically, no 
consideration is made of the possible influence of other components, such as self-focus. 
Whilst this research confirms that athletes worry about a variety of aspects related to 
performance, adopting a multidimensional approach in measurement of performance anxiety 
may be conceptually inappropriate. Theoretically, worry is unified in its internal underlying 
processes (Eysenck, 1992), and diversified content does not justify representing worry as 
multidimensional. Therefore, to account for the diverse nature of worry, it would be more 
appropriate if future representations of cognitive anxiety include a variety of worry related 
items, to reflect the complexity of the worry response.
In addition, it is important to recognise that some of the themes discussed above draw 
parallels with some of the themes that will be discussed in the private and public self-focus 
sections that follow. The defining factor in distinguishing between these themes is that 
athletes reported worrying about the factors discussed above, which the author argues is 
different to the self-focus depicted in the themes below. Based on the literature we proposed 
that Cheng et al.'s (2009) unidimensional theme of self-focus was not adequately 
representative of the experiences of anxious athletes, or of current theoretical perspectives. 
Consequently, private and public aspects of self-focus (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) 
were included as two components in the hypothesized model of cognitive anxiety. In addition 
to this hypothesized separation, the preliminary inductive analysis revealed that both types of 
self-focus arc underpinned by a number of themes. Below is a detailed presentation of both 
private and public self-focus and their underlying themes.
105
Private Self Focus
Within the component of private self-focus, three themes were evident; self- 
awareness, weaknesses, and explicit monitoring of movements.
Self-awareness. Athletes reported a heightened general self-awareness, which was 
characterized by being in a self-evaluative state: "I thought you have got to up your 
performance now and then that's when I got a bit nervous about it" (Participant 10). In 
addition athletes also engaged in questioning of their own performance "I didn't do it that 
time, why didn't I do it that time? I like talk to myself in my head and I'm like why didn't I 
do it? I just don't know why I didn't do it". These findings are in line with Duval and 
Wicklund's (1972) theory of objective self-awareness, which suggests that focusing attention 
on the self induces a state of self-awareness. This then initiates an automatic comparison of 
the self against personal standards; these are referred to as mental representations of the 
correct behaviours and what a "correct" person is (Duval & Wicklund, 1972, pp. 3-4). This 
self-awareness leads to a self-evaluative state, hence, self-focus has a link to anxiety through 
its impact on emotional awareness and through the self-evaluation it causes (Gibbons, 1990). 
Self-evaluation was evident in the athletes interviewed in the present study, as they reported 
frequently engaging in evaluation of their own performance and what they perceived as the 
correct response or behaviour. This theme depicts a general self-awareness associated with 
the increased anxiety of a stressful event. In addition, the athletes also reported more specific 
elements of private self focus, which manifested themselves in two ways; (i) as a focus on 
weaknesses and (ii) as an explicit monitoring of task relevant aspects of the skill. These two 
features of private self-focus are discussed below.
Weaknesses. Athletes reported a focus on weaknesses within their performance and 
ability, "but you don't want to mess up all the hard work...it would be a lot of pressure to
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keep up the performance...! don't want to mess it up or do anything wrong" (Participant 7). 
Wicklund (1991) suggested that anxious individuals become self-preoccupied with 
weaknesses and shortcomings, this again is apparent in athlete's reports, with individuals 
often talking about failure and not performing as well as they should. This theme would seem 
to be representative of a more specific element of self-awareness that manifests as a focus on 
weaknesses. As discussed in the section on worry, performance failure is often reported as a 
source of worry within athletes (Gould & Weinberg, 1985); however, it would seem that 
participants in this study reported an awareness of these weaknesses or performance failures 
without starting to worry about them. It is entirely plausible that some worries relate to the 
self, but it is also possible that self-focused attention does not result in worry. Worry and self- 
focus are independent constructs with the potential for different manifestations and 
performance effects.
Explicit Monitoring. Athletes reported explicitly monitoring their performance: "I 
needed to think about it, in the sense that it had to be good, it had to be clinical, and I had to 
really think about the technique and stuff. So that was playing on my mind" (Participant 4). 
The term explicit monitoring refers to the allocation of attention to skill execution (Jackson, 
Ashford, & Norsworthy, 2006), which is indicated in the above quote. In addition to explicit 
monitoring of performance, athletes' also reported that this monitoring had the potential to 
lapse further into some form of conscious control (Masters, 1992);
I think I thought too much about what I was doing about my strokes. So I think I was 
just over thinking everything....yeah the natural things, I was thinking right this is how 
I play a forehand, you know going back to basics, as though I am a twelve year old 
again. (Participant 9)
The results of this section suggest firstly that athletes explicitly monitored 
performance and secondly, that this explicit monitoring may lead to conscious control of
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performance. Clearly, some debate still surrounds the specific mechanisms associated with 
this conscious processing, but a clearer distinction within models of cognitive anxiety, may 
allow researchers to more adequately manipulate this aspect to test these self-focus theories. 
Thus, explicit monitoring refers to the increased attention on skill execution, whilst conscious 
control may be the behavioural effects associated with this increased attention on skill 
execution. This is consistent with Jackson, Ashford and Nosworthy's (2006) suggestion that 
explicit monitoring and conscious control are conceptually distinct in that a focus on skill 
execution encourages explicit monitoring but docs not always lead to conscious control. 
Thus, Jackson et al., suggest that explicit monitoring might have a more general disruptive 
effect on motor performance and that additional disruption might occur when athletes attempt 
to consciously monitor their movements.
Public Self-Focus
Within the component of public self-focus, two themes were evident; significant 
others and self-presentation.
Evaluation. This theme was categorized by an athlete's awareness of significant 
others, which included; teammates, coaches, managers, and parents. Athlete 2 talked about 
this extensively; "being recognised by other coaches, I was trying to get into the GB squad, 
you need to shoot well". It appears that the athletes were focused on being evaluated, this is 
similar to findings by James and Collins (1997), which identified significant others as 
stressors in athletes reports of a stressful event. The stressors in James and Collins results 
were represented by, "teammates", "coach/manager pressure", "parental demands", 
"officials" and "evaluative others", which has similarities to the current findings. For 
example, "yeah, not being able to fullfill my team mates expectations as well, because 
obviously they had been putting pressure on me, and oh I can't let them down, got to do my
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best and things" (Participant 10), is an example of teammate as a stressor. This theme was 
reported by all 11 athletes, therefore, plays a prominent role in athletes' cognitive anxiety 
response.
Self-presentation. This category was characterized by the process of athletes 
monitoring and trying to control how other perceive them:
they are obviously all going to watch you, so it adds a little bit more pressure as well 
to think that they are actually going to a venue to watch you play, so maybe that it is 
kind of the more people that are watching, the more added pressures. (Participant 3)
Specifically, athletes reported a focus on managing the impression others had of them. These 
reports are consistent with self-presentational process suggested by Leary (1992). According 
to Leary in competitive situations, self-prcscntational concerns arise when athletes undertake 
a process in which they become aware of how they arc perceived by other people. James and 
Collins (1997) also examined the self-presentational mechanisms that underpin competitive 
stress. They reported self-presentational concerns was one of the major sources of stress 
during competition, with "pressure to attain external standards", "significant others directed 
concerns" and "implied and over criticism" as elements of this response. The findings 
reported here parallel the issues reported in the literature; for example; Participant 9's 
comment "That was the pressure I wanted to keep up with the number one, and just kind of 
keep up with him and let people sec that I am as good as him, so I think that was my extra 
pressure" is consistent a pressure to attain external standards. The critical factor that identifies 
this theme from the evaluation theme above is that athletes arc attempting to control the 
impressions others form of them, as opposed to the awareness of significant others being a 
stressor, which is evident in the evaluation theme above.
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Our results suggest a clear distinction between private self-focus and public self- 
focus. This differentiation is consistent with Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss's (1975) distinction 
of two types of self-focus; private and public. Fenigstein ct al. defined private self-focus as a 
factor that is "concerned with attending to one's inner thoughts and feelings" (p. 523), and 
public self-focus as "a general awareness of the self as a social object that has an effect on 
others" (p.523). Several studies (e.g., Liao & Masters, 2002) have supported the involvement 
of both types of self-focused attention in the anxiety process. In light of Fenigstein ct al.'s 
distinction, we suggest that future development of Cheng et al.'s model should fully 
acknowledge this distinction in self-focus.
Furthermore, the themes presented above open up the suggestion that these two 
aspects of self-focus have unique psychological and behavioural effects (Fenigstein et al., 
1975). As previously discussed the associated behavioural effects of these two components 
may differ. For example, individuals who have high levels of private self-focus may 
experience heightened awareness of movements and consequently may attempt to 
consciously control their performance (Masters, 1992), and individuals who experience high 
levels of public self-focus broaden other attcntional focus, scanning the environment to focus 
on those who are watching them (cf., Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1992).
Conclusions
This study examined the cognitive anxiety response experienced by elite athletes. 
Modified analytic induction supported worry, private self-focus and public self-focus as 
central features of this response. Crucially the results provided evidence that a differentiated 
approach should be adopted in representing self-focus, consistent with Fenigstein ct al.'s 
(1975) bipartite model. The evidence reported here suggests that Chcng ct al.'s (2009) two- 
component approach (worry and self-focus) may be too narrow and not fully representative
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of the cognitive dimension of performance anxiety. Adopting a three-component model of the 
cognitive dimension may lead to a more complete understanding of performance anxiety. 
Indeed Cheng et al., originally attempted to model performance anxiety as a five factor 
model, with two factors of worry and self-focus to represent cognitive anxiety, however poor 
CFA results did not support this hypothesized separation. The differentiated approach 
presented here may strengthen Cheng ct al.'s original model of performance anxiety.
A number of the themes identified have the potential to overlap with one and other. In 
particular, the theme "worries relating to expectations" of others is similar to aspects of 
public self-focus. Although it is possible for athletes to worry about dimensions relevant to 
the self, it is also possible that self-focused attention may not result in worry. As previously 
mentioned self-focus may have effects independent of worry, such as conscious control and 
preoccupation with others. Thus, we view worry and self focus as separate constructs with 
the possibility for different manifestations. Consequently, we deemed it important to separate 
cognitions related to worry and self-focus, in order to remain sensitive to the overall aims of 
the study. Future research should attempt to assess each component independently, in order to 
provide support for their inclusion within future models of cognitive anxiety.
The study is not without limitations. Despite the hypothesized separation of private 
and public self-focus, there is a lack of sport specific empirical literature to support this 
distinction. Participant recall must also be considered as a potential limitation of the current 
study; however, a number of procedures were put in place to help ensure accurate recall. 
Specifically, athletes recalled a competitive event that had occurred in the last 12 months, and 
were asked to think about this event prior to the interview. In addition, although the research 
purposefully set out to examine a heterogeneous sample, some further investigation is needed 
in relation to the worry of re-injury and the relationship with non-contact and contact sports,
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as our findings indicated that re-injury worries were only evident in sports with a high 
prevalence of injury.
The development of more complex anxiety measurement models with greater 
differentiation has both theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, contemporary 
models that fail to fully represent the performance anxiety response may explain the 
equivocal results found in much of the research examining the relationship between anxiety 
and performance (Wilson, Smith, & Holmes, 2007). Indeed, a more differentiated model 
would permit a greater understanding of the specific components of the cognitive anxiety 
response that may affect performance. For example, greater differentiation would allow 
researchers to make links between components of the cognitive anxiety dimension and the 
causal mechanisms through which anxiety is hypothesized to exert a negative influence on 
performance, e.g., distraction (Wine, 1971) and conscious processing (Masters, 1992), to be 
represented. From a practical perspective, practitioners would be better placed to understand 
athletes' experiences of anxiety before and during competition. Consequently, this might 
allow more focused and effective intervention programs, based on a more refined diagnosis 
of the anxiety symptoms experienced by athletes can be designed. Some athletes may only 
report high levels of private self-focus, and subsequently might try to explicitly monitor 
performance, therefore these athletes might benefit from adopting a holistic focus in skill 
execution. In contrast, athletes who express high levels of public self-focus may experience a 
broadening of focus and become pre-occupied with people in the crowd; therefore an 
attentional focus strategy may be appropriate. In conclusion, the present investigation 
emphasized the need to consider worry, private and public self-focus as separate components 
within the cognitive dimension of performance anxiety. Future model development may 
benefit from adopting such as distinction in conceptualizing performance anxiety.
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Chapter 6
Towards a hierarchical conceptualization of performance anxiety:
Rationale and measurement development
(Study 4)
Abstract
An integrated hierarchical model of performance anxiety was constructed to offer further 
support to Cheng, Hardy, and Markland's (2009) three-dimensional model. In particular the 
adaptive potential of anxiety was acknowledged and a multidimensional approach to 
cognitive and physiological anxiety was included. The proposed model here consisted of 
three second order dimensions and six first order subcomponents. The second order 
dimension was formed by three reflectively measured subcomponents of worry, private self- 
focus and public self-focus. The second order physiological dimension was formed by two 
reflectively measured subcomponents of somatic tension and autonomic hyperactivity. 
Finally, the regulatory dimension was formed by a single reflectively measured 
subcomponent of perceived control. Partial least squares (PLS) analysis was used on a 
prospective sample of 192 questionnaires, collected from participants competing in 11 
different sports. The results revealed support for a fully differentiated hierarchical model 
represented by the underlying subcomponents. Further research is required to fully explore 
the predictive power of this hierarchical model.
Keywords: hierarchical, cognitive, physiological, regulatory, formative.
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Introduction
Despite the plethora of models purporting to explain the anxiety-performance 
relationship, there remains little consensus concerning the exact nature of anxiety. For 
example, research examining performance anxiety using multidimensional anxiety theory 
(Martens, Burton, Vcaley, Bump, & Smith, 1990), catastrophe models (Hardy, 1996) and 
Jones's (1995) control model has produced inconsistent results. The majority of this research 
has used the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2; Martens et al., 1990) and its 
derivatives (Revised Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2, CSAI-2R; Cox, Martens, & 
Russell, 2003; CSAI-2 with directional scale; Jones & Swain, 1992) to index performance 
anxiety responses. Despite the evolution of the CSAI-2, more widespread developments in 
the measurement of anxiety have been less evident and consequently the CSAI-2 has 
continued to dominate the research landscape.
Recently, Cheng, Hardy, and Markland (2009) developed a new measure of 
performance anxiety that set out to address some of the limitations of the CSAI-2. The 
measure developed by Cheng et al. was based upon a three-dimensional model of 
performance anxiety, which the authors claimed more accurately reflected the complex 
phenomenon of anxiety. Within Cheng et al.'s model, the construct of performance anxiety 
was defined as an unpleasant psychological state in reaction to perceived threat concerning 
the performance of a task under pressure. The model itself consisted of three dimensions 
represented by five subcomponents; a cognitive dimension, reflected by worry and self- 
focused attention; a physiological dimension, reflected by autonomic hypcractivity and 
somatic tension and a regulatory dimension, reflected by the single subcomponent of 
perceived control. Cheng et al. retained the cognitive and physiological dimensions to reflect 
the traditional worry-emotionality model (Liebcrt & Morris, 1967), whilst the regulatory
dimension was included to account for the potential adaptive nature of anxiety. Cheng et al.'s
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performance anxiety model is the first theoretical approach that tries to fully account for the 
adaptive and maladaptive nature of anxiety. This positive adaptation is in line with both the 
evolutionary account of anxiety as a defense mechanism (Ohman, 2000) and accounts for the 
suggestion that anxiety accomplishes this protective function by mobilizing resources (cf., 
Eysenck & Calvo, 1992).
In terms of the development of the performance anxiety measure, Cheng et al. (2009) 
tested two independent sample groups in an attempt to support their proposed hierarchical 
model. Although the authors provided a strong conceptual argument for the five underlying 
subcomponents, the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) results did not support the 
hypothesized dissociation. As a result, worry and self-focus, were merged into a single 
cognitive dimension. Similarly, somatic tension and autonomic hyperactivity were merged 
into a single physiological dimension. These subcomponents were retained at a conceptual 
level until further discriminant validity was obtained. While this merged model provides 
support for the three major processes proposed activated in the dynamics of the anxiety 
experience, Cheng et al. noted that further investigation is needed to support the fully 
differentiated hierarchical model that they originally proposed. One suggestion was to 
increase the length of each subscale, although this would have a deleterious effect upon the 
applicability of the scale at a practical level. Cheng et al. also suggested that researchers 
could examine the differential impact of the performance anxiety subcomponents on different 
aspects of performance. For example, private self-focus may affect performance differently to 
worry. Specifying differential effects of the subcomponents on different aspects of 
performance suggests that an alternative measurement model might best capture the full 
complexity of the differentiated model proposed by Cheng et al.
Within the three-dimensional model proposed by Cheng ct al. (2009), the cognitive
dimension consisted of a worry and a self-focus component. The construct of self-focus
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warrants further attention due to its centrality in Cheng et al.'s model and other anxiety 
models (e.g. Carver and Scheier, 1978). Cheng ct al. defined self focus as a self-evaluative 
state with an increased awareness of self shortcomings concerning the performance of a task 
under stress and was represented as a unidimensional construct. Furthermore, self-focus is 
suggested to manifest itself as a critical self-awareness or as a preoccupation with significant 
others, which suggests two differential aspects. On closer inspection of the self-focus items 
used in Cheng et al.'s model, it is clear that these items relate to two unique factors. 
Specifically, some items focused on self-awareness, for example, "I find myself evaluating 
myself more critically than usual", while other items were concerned with significant others 
"I am very aware of the possibility of disappointing important others". This differentiation is 
consistent with Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975), who defined two aspects of self-focus 
(i) a private self-focus as a concern about one's inner thoughts and feelings, and, (ii) a public 
self-focus as an awareness of the self as a social object that has an effect on others. The 
proposed differentiation by Fenigstein et al. was supported in study 3 of this thesis. Crucially, 
it would seem that these two self-focus components are characterized by different concerns 
and have the potential for different behavioral consequences. Therefore, adopting this self- 
focus distinction in future conceptualizations of cognitive anxiety may prove fruitful.
As is evident in Cheng et al.'s (2009) model, researchers in sport psychology place 
careful emphasis on explaining causal relationships among constructs; however, according to 
Roberts and Thatcher (2009), there is often less attention paid to the nature and direction of 
relationships between constructs and indicators, resulting in less than ideal testing of theory. 
In establishing the relationship between constructs and indicators, research in psychology has 
relied upon classic test theory (Novick, 1966) and the assumptions this approach adopts 
regarding the relationships between constructs and their measures. Specifically, classic test 
theory assumes that the variation in scores on measures is a function of the true score, plus
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error. Such a specification assumes that meaning flows from the latent construct to the 
measures, and that each measure is viewed as an imperfect reflection of the underlying 
construct. Therefore, any variation in a construct is reflected in variation in its indicators 
(Bollen, 1989). This type of model is known as reflective as it represents reflections, or 
manifestations of a construct. A reflective model is based on the assumption that all indicator 
items are caused by the same latent construct. Therefore, all items would be highly correlated 
and if one item were dropped the construct would not change. Despite the pervasiveness of 
this approach to model testing, not all latent constructs can be conceived of as being reflected 
by their first-order subcomponents (Bollen & Lennox, 1991). Rather, it often makes sense to 
view meaning as emanating from the measure in a definitional sense rather than vice versa 
(MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Jarvis, 2005). Such constructs are labelled as being formative.
In order to distinguish between reflective and formative constructs, Jarvis, Mackenzie, 
and Podsakoff (2003) developed the following guidelines. Firstly, direction of causality 
between constructs and its indicators should be established. Formative measurement models, 
suggest that the direction emanates from the indicators to the construct, whilst the opposite is 
correct for reflective models. Secondly, the interchangeability of items needs to be addressed, 
for formative models, indicators should not be interchangeable as dropping an item may alter 
the conceptual domain of the construct, whilst reflective indicators are interchangeable and 
items are likely to reflect the same content, therefore, dropping one of these items will not 
alter the conceptual domain. Thirdly, covariation among indicators should be established. 
Formative models do not require items to covary as they represent unique aspects of the 
construct, whilst indicators on reflective models are expected to covary. Finally, researchers 
need to establish whether constructs have the same antecedents and/or consequences. For 
formative models, it is not necessary for items to have the same antecedents and 
consequences because formative indicators arc not necessarily interchangeable and may tap
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different aspects of the conceptual domain. In contrast, reflective models are required to have 
the same antecedents and consequences as they reflective a similar nature.
MacKenzie et al. (2005) cited the example of transformational leadership as a 
construct that is traditionally conceptualized as being reflected by charisma, idealized 
influence, inspirational leadership, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration 
(Bass, 1998). In terms of the criteria put forward by Jarvis et al. (2003), Mackenzie et al. 
argued that these forms of leadership behaviour are conceptually distinct, are likely to have 
different antecedents and/or consequences, and are not interchangeable. As a result, 
MacKenzie et al. claimed that transformational leadership would be better portrayed as a 
formative rather than a reflective construct. This potential misspecification in direction, 
results in researchers making inaccurate conclusions about the structural relationships 
between constructs. In turn, this measurement misspecification causes measurement error, 
which has a negative impact upon model testing.
The preceding discussion has focused upon the relationships between latent variables 
and their indicators or measures. MacKenzie et al. (2005) noted that the distinction between 
reflective and formative indicator models can also be generalized to more abstract higher- 
order factor structures. With hierarchical models, there is also the possibility of multiple first 
order dimensions serving as cither reflective or formative indicators of the higher order 
constructs. For example, hierarchical models that have formative second order constructs 
may have first order constructs that consist of reflective items, and vice versa. These 
hierarchical models can make both a theoretical and empirical contribution by better 
representing complex models (Fetter, Straub, & Rai, 2007).
Chcng ct al. (2009) adopted a traditional reflective approach in the construction of 
their model of performance anxiety. In their model, the first-order constructs of worry, self-
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focus, autonomic hyperactivity, somatic tension and perceived control were measured using 
reflective indicators. All of these are psychological constructs and as such, have been 
consistently suggested as being suitable for reflective measurement (Diamantopulos & 
Winklhofer, 2001). While Cheng et al.'s second-order cognitive and physiological 
dimensions are also psychological constructs; there is the possibility that these variables may 
have been miss-specified as reflective constructs.
The present study was designed to re-examine Chcng et al.'s (2009) model of 
performance anxiety using a hierarchical structure constructed using Jarvis et al.'s (2003) 
guidelines to establish a more refined foundation for measurement testing. The proposed 
model consists of five first order factors, worry, public self-focus, private self-focus, somatic 
tension, autonomic hyperactivity and perceived control, which are measured reflectively. In 
line with the approach adopted by Cheng et al., and the recommendations of Diamantopoulos 
and Winkholfer (2001), the first order latent constructs are measured by reflective indicators 
as each construct has a common theme and, therefore, items are interchangeable and 
unidimensional. Furthermore, it is likely that the reflective indicators for the first order latent 
constructs will covary with each other, as suggested by Jarvis et al. (2003). In the proposed 
model, these first order constructs serve as formative indicators for the second-order latent 
variables. The latent variables are specified as formative at the second order as the direction 
of causality flows from the first order latent constructs to the second order constructs of 
cognitive and physiological anxiety. That is, these first order constructs are defining 
characteristics of their higher order latent constructs, and changes in these constructs arc 
likely to cause changes to the second order construct. In addition, the first order variables arc 
also unlikely to have the same consequences. For example, not all athletes who score highly 
on private self-focus will score highly on public self-focus and it is entirely possible for 
athletes to have high levels of private self-focus and low levels of public self-focus and vice-
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versa. Furthermore, the associated behavioural consequences of these two components may 
differ; notably those who experience high levels of private self-focus may experience 
heightened awareness of movements in an attempt to maintain performance (Baumeister, 
1984; Masters, 1992). Similarly, those who experience high levels of public self-focus may 
experience a broadening of focus, as they may be scanning the environment to focus on those 
who are watching them (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1992). Both of the effects specified for self- 
focus differ from the hypothesized effects of increased worry, which primarily affects tasks 
that are reliant upon working memory for successful performance (Eysenck, Derakshan, 
Santos, & Calvo, 2007). Similarly, somatic tension and autonomic hyperactivity are likely to 
vary in consequences. For example, somatic tension may directly impact upon the processing 
of movements through increased muscle tension, which might potentially cause degrees of 
freedom to "freeze" (cf. Vereijken, van Emmerik, Whiting, & Newell, 1992). In contrast, 
autonomic hyperactivity may have a different effect on performance through physiological 
reactions involved with the involuntary muscles that are associated with the body's inner 
organs, such as increased breathing and heart rate. Changes to these functions might affect 
performance by impacting upon an individual's preferred activation state (Hardy, Jones, & 
Gould, 1996; Hockey & Hamilton, 1983).
In order to test measurement and structural properties, the model was placed within a 
wider nomological net with constructs from the competitive subscale of the Test of 
Performance Strategies-2 (TOPS-2; Hardy, Roberts, Thomas, & Murphy, 2010). Figure 1 
represents the conceptual model; this is followed by the opcrationalization of the constructs 
and the associated hypotheses. The structural model was constructed to examine the overall 
effect of anxiety upon some of the psychological processes supporting performance. Based 
on our prediction of separate effects for the first-order subcomponents on various aspects of 
task performance, it would be possible to specify a structural model to account for these
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hypothesized effects. However, as an initial stage of development that examined both 
measurement and structural elements of the hypothesized model of performance anxiety, 
more general effects are specified. In order to achieve this aim, the following hypotheses 
were formalized:
Hypothesis 1: The second order cognitive dimension of performance anxiety is formed by the 
three lower order reflective constructs of worry, private self-focus and public self-focus.
Hypothesis 2: The second order physiological dimension of performance anxiety is formed by 
two lower order reflective constructs of somatic tension and autonomic hyperactivity.
Hypothesis 3: The second order regulatory dimension of performance anxiety is formed by a 




































































































In addition, a number of hypotheses were generated to represent the relationships 
between the two second-order (cognitive and physiological) and the single order (regulatory) 
constructs of performance anxiety and the TOPS-2 constructs. These have been formed by a 
review of performance anxiety literature and research on the competitive dimensions of the 
TOPS-2 inventory.
Hypothesis 4: Cognitive anxiety will have a negative relationship with emotional control. 
Hypothesis 5: Cognitive anxiety will have a positive relationship with negative thinking. 
Hypothesis 6: Cognitive anxiety will have a negative relationship with automaticity. 
Hypothesis 7: Physiological anxiety will have a negative relationship with activation. 
Hypothesis 8: Physiological anxiety will have a positive relationship with distractibility.
Hypothesis 9: The regulatory dimension will have a negative relationship with negative 
thinking
Hypothesis 10: The regulatory dimension will have a positive relationship with automaticity. 
Hypothesis 11: The regulatory dimension will have a positive relationship with activation.
Method
The first step was to develop the construct of performance anxiety and generate items 
that represent the underlying dimensions of cognitive anxiety, physiological anxiety and the 
regulatory dimension. Next, using structural equation modelling, measurement and structural 
properties of the measure were tested.
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Item and scale development
An initial item pool with approximate 83 items was generated to assess worry, public 
self-focus, private self-focus, autonomic hyperactivity, somatic tension and perceived control. 
The first stage of this process involved retaining items from Cheng et al.'s (2009) final 
model, if they demonstrated a significant factor loading. Additional items were generated 
based on Cheng et al.'s definitions of worry, autonomic hyperactivity, somatic tension and 
perceived control. In addition, and in contrast to Cheng et al.'s model, self-focused attention 
was extended to include a distinction between private and public elements of self-focus 
(Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). A range of items was included for each subcomponent in 
order to fully capture the dimensions of each construct. To ensure consistency, the original 
definition of terms made by Cheng et al. were adopted here for worry, somatic tension, 
autonomic hyperactivity and perceived control. For private and public self-focus, the 
definitions proposed by Fenigstein et al. were adopted. Below, is a definition of each 
construct.
Worry: a cognitive form of apprehension associated with possible unfavourable 
outcomes.
Private Self-focus: concern with attending to one's inner thoughts and feelings.
Public Self-Focus: an awareness of the self as a social object that has an effect on 
others.
Somatic Tension: physiological reactions involved with the voluntary muscle groups 
that are motor-oriented.
Autonomic Hyperactivity: physiological reactions involved with the involuntary 
muscles that arc associated with the body's inner organs.
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Perceived Control: perception of one's capabilities (involving ability and resource) of 
being able to cope, and of goal-attainment, regarding the performance of a task under 
stress.
Each item was evaluated in terms of face validity, clarity of wording, and sentence 
structure. Items were also assessed for item difficulty (Clark & Watson, 1995), reversed- 
worded items (Gana, Martin, Canouet, et al., 2002) and item quantity (Smith & McCarthy, 
1995). Finally, these combined items were subject to extensive scrutiny by the author and 
supervisory team, which consisted of two British Psychological Society Chartered 
Psychologists. The final item pool of 25 items was agreed by all parties. The final item pool 
consisted of 11 items to represent the cognitive dimension (5 items representing worry, 3 
representing private self focus and 3 representing public self focus), 10 representing the 
physiological dimension (5 items representing somatic tension and 5 representing autonomic 
hyperactivity) and 4 representing perceived control.
Participants
In total, 192 questionnaires were collected from participants competing in 11 sports 
(Archery = 21, Badminton = 10, Basketball = 10, Cheerleading = 3, Football = 8, Hockey = 
6, Karate = 3, Netball = 109, Rugby = 15, Touch Rugby - 2, Volleyball = 5). Mean age was 
20.22 (SD = 5.72). The sample included a total of 141 females and 51 males, and was drawn 
from a wide variety of sources in the United Kingdom, including the British Universities 
Sport Association, and national governing bodies representing the sports listed above. 
Consequently, the sample consisted of a wide range of skill levels, including, international (n 
= 23), national (n = 36), regional (n = 38), county (n = 56) or club (n = 39). Participants were 
all taking part in a competitive event (university =110, regional = 40, club = 42), and had an 
average of 9.60 (SD =- 4.73) years of competitive experience. All participants were English
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speaking and informed consent was obtained before data collection. Ethical approval for the 
study was obtained from the institution's ethics committee.
Procedure
Prospective data was collected; hence, initial contact for participant recruitment took 
place before they attended competitive events. The relevant coach, athlete, team or institution 
was approached before data collection and provided with study details and a brief overview 
of the procedures. Following this initial contact, individuals were contacted again and were 
given the opportunity to ask any questions about the study and its procedures. Once 
participation was agreed, arrangements were made for the researcher to meet with athletes an 
hour before competition to complete the questionnaire pack. At this stage, informed consent 
was obtained from all participants. Participants then completed the demographic information 
and the performance anxiety measure. Following this initial data collection, all participants 
were subsequently contacted via email and asked to complete and online version of TOPS-2. 
Subsequent to the completion of the online survey, participants were thanked and debriefed 
about the true purpose of the study. Participants were also provided with contact details if 
they subsequently had any further questions.
Data Analysis
The model was examined using Partial Least Squares (PLS), which is a structural 
equation modelling approach that uses a least squares estimation procedure (Wold, 1974, 
1982). The proposed model was tested using the SmartPLS version 2.0 (M3) software 
(Ringlc, Wends, & Will, 2005). The PLS approach maximises the variance of the dependent 
variables explained by the independent variables, as opposed to reproducing the empirical 
covariancc matrix (Hacnlcin & Kaplan, 2004) and was adopted as the method of data analysis 
in the present study for three reasons. First, PLS is preferred when looking at constructs that
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are measured primarily by formative indicators (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004). The use of 
formative scales is easily accomplished with PLS, but it presents challenges in covariance- 
based models (Chin, Marcolin, & Newstcd, 2003). Secondly, PLS path modelling allows the 
specification of hierarchical models through the use of repeated manifest variables (Wctzels, 
Odekerken-Schroder, & van Oppcn, 2009). Finally, covariance-based structural equation 
models are often used to test models based upon strong theory; however, Chin (2010) notes 
that a well established baseline model, where both theory and measures have been rigorously 
developed, does not preclude the use of PLS, especially in incremental studies in which prior 
models are extended to include new measures and structural paths, as is the case with the 
present study.
The PLS analysis was conducted in two stages; the first stage estimates the 
measurement model, while the second stage focuses upon examining the structural model 
(Roberts & Thatcher, 2009). Researchers can choose to conduct a one-step analysis that joins 
the measurement and structural stages, or a two-step analysis, completing the measurement 
and structural stages separately (Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000). In the present study, the 
analysis was completed in a single step. First, the weight relations were analysed, these 
estimate the case values for the latent variables (Chin & Newstead, 1999). This is known as 
individual item reliability, and is assessed by inspecting the loading of the items on their 
respective latent variables. It has been suggested that items should be rejected if they have 
more error variance than shared variance with their latent variable (Hair, Black, Babin, & 
Andcrson, 2010), and thus items of .70 or greater should be retained. However, Chin and 
Newstcd (1999) report that PLS structural parameter estimates are more stable and converge 
on the true population values with larger numbers of indicators of the latent variables. Based 
upon Chin and Ncwstcd's recommendation, items of .40 or greater were retained if they were 
statistically significant. Secondly, analysis of how latent variables and indicators were related
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was achieved by an examination of the internal consistency, convergent validity and 
discriminant validity of the scales. Composite reliability (CR) was assessed as a measure of 
internal consistency and is considered superior to Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient, as 
it provides a better estimate of variance shared by a set of indicators because it uses item 
loadings to calculate their internal consistency. It has been suggested that a CR of .70 or 
higher represents acceptable internal consistency (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The average 
variance extracted (AVE) for scales were used to assess convergent validity. This statistic 
refers to the average amount of variance in a set of indicators explained by their latent 
variables, this should be at least .50 or greater (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The AVE statistic 
can also be used to calculate discriminant validity. Fornell and Larcker (1981), suggest that a 
latent variable should better explain the variance of its own indicators than the variance of 
other latent variables. Hence, the squared AVE should be greater than the correlations 
between the latent variable and all other latent variable constructs in the model.
The second stage was to test the structural part of the model. This stage tests the 
relationship between the latent variables. The cognitive dimension, physiological dimension 
and regulatory dimension were modelled as formative higher order latent variables. All 
TOPS-2 dimensions were modelled as reflective lower order latent variables. When assessing 
structural models with formative constructs the standardized path coefficients are assessed to 
examine their significance. This evaluates the strength of the relationship between the focal 
formative construct and related endogenous constructs (Roberts & Thatchcr, 2009). If 
structural paths were significant they were retained in the model, and further examination of 
the standardised path coefficients ((3) and the variance explained in the endogenous variables 
(R ) took place.
In order to generate a test of significance, SmartPLS implements a bootstrapping 
procedure. Estimates means and standard errors for the PLS estimates are generated and these
128
are tested for significance by the /-statistic. In this analysis a 500 bootstrap samples 
replacement was requested. SmartPLS does not generate significance tests for the variance 
explained in the dependent latent variables. Instead, effect sizes of the R1 values (Cohen's /2) 
were calculated (Ringle, Sarstcdt, & Straub, 2012). Effect sizes of .02 arc considered small, 
.15 are medium and .35 are considered large (Cohen, 1988).
Results 
Measurement Model
Analysis revealed that all factor loadings were greater than .40 and significantly 
greater than zero in all cases. Only five loadings were below .70. Table 1 shows the PLS and 
bootstrapped estimates for each factor loading.
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Table 1. Measurement model factor loadings.
Factor and Loadings PLS Bootstrap 
estimate estimate
Worry
I am worried that I may make mistakes 
I am worried about the uncertainty of what may happen 
1 am worried about the outcome of my performance 
I am worried that I may not perform to the best of my ability 
I am worried about the consequence of failure 
Private Self-Focus
I tend to dwell on shortcomings in my performance 
I am aware that I will scrutinise my performance 
1 am aware that I will be conscious of every movement I make 
Public Self-Focus
I am conscious about the way I will look to others 
I am conscious that others will be judging my performance 
I am worried that I may not meet the expectations 
important others 
Somatic Tension
1 feel physically nervous
I find myself trembling
I have a slight tension headache
I feel lethargic
My body feels tense 
Autonomic Hyperactivity
My chest feels tight
I feel tense in my stomach
My heart is racing
I feel a lump in my throat
My hands are clammy 
Perceived Control
I believe in my ability to perform
I am prepared for my upcoming performance
I am confident that I will be able to reach my target

















































Acceptable convergent validity was achieved as all lower order constructs within the 
measurement model had CR values greater than .70. All lower order constructs had AVE's 
greater than .50, see Table 2.














































Discriminant validity was checked by looking at the squared AVE'S for each latent 
variable against the bivariate correlations of all other variables, see Table 3. All latent 
variables demonstrated adequate discriminant validity, apart from autonomic hyperactivity, 
with somatic tension. However, on further inspection of the item cross loadings, there was no 
violation across items. The Fornell-Earcker approach is a very conservative test of 
discriminant validity, therefore, on the basis of inspection of the item cross loadings, all latent 
variables demonstrate adequate discriminant validity. With this in consideration, and in view 
of the results as a whole, these findings suggest that the measurement model was acceptable. 
The measurement model of TOPS-2 was also assessed in order to examine the statistical 
properties of the competitive subscales within the measure (see Appendix I). Two of the item 
loadings were not significant and 8 were below .70, and the automaticity and distractibility 
sub-scales reported AVE's lower than .50.
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(i.e., weak - 0.20, moderate 0.50, and strong 0.80)
Structural Model
Our results show that all path coefficients were significant in the proposed 
performance anxiety model (see figure 2). All of the first order reflectively measured latent 
constructs were positively related to the cognitive, physiological and regulatory formative 
second order latent constructs. Therefore, hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 were all supported. In the 
larger nomological net, the anxiety constructs were significantly related to a number of the 
TOPS-2 dimensions. Specifically, hypothesis 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11 were supported. There was 
no support for hypotheses 6, and 7, therefore, there was no significant relationship between 
the cognitive dimension and automaticity, the physiological dimension and activation2 . The 
model explained between 6% and 31% of the variance in the endogenous dependent 
variables. Effect sizes were large for negative thinking (f = .47), and medium for 
automaticity (.20), activation (.12), resistance to disruption (.09), and emotional control (.07).
2 In accordance with suggestion made by Gefen et al. (2011) a saturated model is included within the 
appendices (Appendix J) to allow comparisons between the theoretical model and an alternative 
model. All pathways are specified, even those assumed to be unrelated in the model. This allows the 





















































































































































The purpose of this study was to re-examine Chcng ct al.'s (2009) model of 
performance anxiety using a hierarchical structure. Employing Jarvis et al.'s (2003) 
guidelines, the proposed model consisted of six first order subcomponents (worry, 
private self-focus, public self-focus, somatic tension, autonomic hyperactivity, and 
perceived control), which were measured reflectively, and three second-order 
formative dimensions (cognitive anxiety, physiological anxiety and the regulatory 
dimension). The results of the PLS analysis revealed support for a fully differentiated 
hierarchical model represented by the underlying subcomponents. The findings will 
be discussed in relation to each of the stated hypotheses.
In relation to hypothesis 1, the results revealed that the second order cognitive 
dimension was formed by the three lower order reflectively measured constructs of 
worry, private self-focus and public self-focus; supporting the suggestion that 
meaning emanates from the lower order constructs to the higher order construct of 
cognitive anxiety. More specifically, cognitive anxiety is formed by its three lower 
order constructs. The model presented here is in line with Cheng et al.'s (2009) 
originally proposed five factor hierarchical model, rather than the final merged model 
presented by Cheng et al. that contained 3 dimensions. Thus, the results support the 
multidimensionality of the cognitive dimension. This may allow researchers to 
explore the possibility that these conceptually distinct subcomponents can have 
differential effects on performance. For example, researchers may hypothesis that the 
worry subcomponent may affect tasks that rely heavily on working memory (Eysenck, 
Dcrakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). Whilst high levels of private self-focus may 
heighten awareness of skill execution in order to maintain performance (Baumeistcr, 
1984; Masters, 1992). Alternatively, high levels of public self-focus may cause a 
broadening of focus directed at important others (Schwar/cr & Jerusalem, 1992). The
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inclusion of a private and public component of self-focus demonstrated good 
discriminant validity; including both types of self-focus in models of performance 
anxiety may be crucial to understanding the whole anxiety response. Taken together 
the findings support the representation of cognitive anxiety as a hierarchical structure 
with three first order factors of worry, private self-focus and public self-focus.
In relation to hypothesis 2, the results supported the hierarchical structure of 
physiological anxiety, underpinned by two lower order reflectively measured 
constructs of somatic tension and autonomic hyperactivity. Like the cognitive 
dimension, the results suggest that physiological anxiety is formed by its two lower 
components. The differentiation this model presents allows somatic tension and 
autonomic hyperactivity to be viewed as conceptually distinct with the potential for 
different behavioural effects upon performance. Specifically, somatic tension may 
have an effect through increased muscle tension, which has the potential to cause 
degrees of freedom to "freeze" (cf. Vereijken, van Emmerik, Whiting, & Newell, 
1992). Whilst, an increase in autonomic hyperactivity may affect an individual's 
activation state, due to increases in breathing and/or heart rate (Hardy, Jones, & 
Gould, 1996; Hockey & Hamilton, 1983). Similar to the cognitive dimension, a 
hierarchical structure with two first order components of somatic tension and 
autonomic hyperactivity should be adopted in future conceptualizations.
The results also support hypothesis 3 in that the single factor of perceived 
control was supported as a formative subcomponent of the regulatory dimension. 
Although only one subcomponent was specified for the regulatory dimension, the 
same procedures were used as the cognitive and physiological dimensions. The results 
provide further support for the integration of a regulatory dimension in a model of 
performance anxiety. The inclusion of a regulatory dimension highlights the adaptive
potential of anxiety and adds weight to Chcng ct al.'s original suggestion.
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With regard to the hypothesis generated to test the performance anxiety 
structure alongside the competitive subscales of TOPS-2, hypotheses 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 
11 were supported. Furthermore, the performance anxiety model was able to explain 
and predict some of the variance in the TOPS-2 constructs. The consideration of the 
relationship between the focal concept and other constructs in the context of a 
theoretical structure is an important step in establishing construct validity (Bagozzi, 
1980). These results indicate that the performance anxiety model has demonstrated 
sound structural properties within the larger nomological network. Despite support for 
the majority of the predictions, hypotheses 6 and 7 were not supported. Hypothesis 6 
predicted that cognitive anxiety would have a negative relationship with automaticity, 
that is, the more cognitive anxiety experienced the less automaticity would be 
experienced. In addition, hypothesis 7, predicted that physiological anxiety will have 
a negative relationship with activation, i.e., the more physiological anxiety 
experienced the less an athlete will report being in the appropriate activation state. 
Both of these predictions are theoretically appropriate; however, the predicted 
relationships have not been produced in this instance. On closer inspection of the 
statistical properties of TOPS-2, it would seem that both the activation and 
automaticity competitive subscales have been problematic in both versions of the 
instrument (Thomas, Murphy, & Hardy, 1999; Hardy et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
Hardy et al. refer to the measure as a fairly "blunt" instrument, which may explain the 
findings in our structural predictions. Inspection of the measurement properties of the 
TOPS-2 sub-scales confirms our suspicions (see Appendix H and J). It is therefore 
unsurprising that some of the hypothesised relationships have failed to reach 
significance. The TOPS-2 questionnaire was used so that the nomological validity of 
the performance anxiety model could be established (Chin, 1998), and although the
136
hypotheses are theoretically driven, the fact that TOPS-2 is relatively unstable may 
explain the lack of significance.
Turning to theoretical issues, in terms of the performance anxiety model, the 
results support the adoption of a hierarchical structure, with five lower order reflective 
constructs and three higher order formative constructs. In contrast to Cheng et al.'s 
(2009) analysis, the results of the current study were able to support a hierarchical 
structure. Thus, the results add support to the re-conceptualization of performance 
anxiety suggested by Cheng ct al., whilst also providing support for the 
multidimensionality associated with both the cognitive and physiological dimensions. 
Theoretically, this allows for greater differentiation in our understanding of each 
dimension of performance anxiety, which will allow more meaningful testing of 
theories. Whilst the greater differentiation may prove useful in theoretical terms, there 
is also a practical significance in these findings. Specifically, if more defined 
diagnosis of anxiety can be made; sport psychologists can adopt more precise 
intervention strategies to facilitate task success in pressure situations.
From a measurement perspective, the results of this analysis suggest that 
modelling performance anxiety using a mix of reflective and formative methods may 
provide a more accurate reflection of the factors associated with the performance 
anxiety response. Moreover, the results provide clear support for modelling the 
relationship between the lower order and higher order constructs as formative. This is 
crucial as the lower order constructs of worry, private self-focus, public self-focus and 
of somatic tension and autonomic hyperactivity are conceptually distinct, are likely to 
have different antecedents/consequences, and are not interchangeable. Therefore, 
adopting a formative approach will reduce the potential for misspccification of 
relationships between constructs and the associated measurement error. This will
result in researchers specifying appropriate relationships and making accurate
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conclusions about the structural relationships between constructs.
The current study is not without limitations, and most notable are the issues 
surrounding the physiological dimension. As reported, the measurement results 
revealed a violation of inter-item correlation between somatic tension and autonomic 
hyperactivity. Although a marginal violation, the predicted relationship between the 
second order physiological dimension and the activation sub scale of TOPS-2 were 
also not supported. Taken together, these results, indicate a potential issue with the 
physiological dimension. The approach of measuring perceptions of physiological 
anxiety in performance contexts has previously received criticism (e.g., Woodman & 
Hardy, 2001) and research has demonstrated that individuals are fairly poor at 
accurately reading their own physiological symptoms, unless trained to do so (e.g., 
Yamaji, Yokota, & Shephard, 1992). Therefore, measuring physiological symptoms 
via self-report instruments may not be most effective method, which may go some 
way to explain the issues reported here. Consequently, further validation of the 
physiological dimension is required.
A further limitation relates to the method employed to test the hierarchical 
model. The guidelines for establishing hierarchical models have not been fully 
established, thus information is sparse (Ringle ct al., 2012). Although the indicator 
reuse approach is suitable for hierarchical component models (Wetzels et al., 2009), 
this method works best when all lower order components have the same number of 
indicators. In the proposed model, the worry, somatic tension and autonomic 
hyperactivity subcomponents have 5 items each, perceived control has 4 and private 
and public self-focus have 3 each. Although every effort was made by the author to 
follow the literature as closely as possible, it would seem that the lack of clear 
guidance has hindered the process. Ringle ct al. highlighted the problem of unequal
indicators and reported that in their analysis of hierarchical models, live of the seven
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studies examined, had an unbalanced number of indicators. This is clearly something 
that needs to be addressed in future testing. In addition, the sample used within the 
current study features predominately female athletes. While no analysis was 
conducted on gender within this sample, future research should seek to explore gender 
differences. Some gender differences have been reported within the literature (e.g. 
Jones, Swain, & Cale, 1991); however, the majority of these studies have relied on the 
CSA1-2 to explore these differences. Thus, future research should seek to explore 
gender differences adopting the hierarchical model proposed here.
Future research should also seek to establish the predictive power of the 
proposed hierarchical measure of performance anxiety. Specifically, in terms of the 
relationship with performance, research should seek to establish if specific 
components of the model can predict performance. This is an important element of 
establishing validity of the proposed model (Cheng et al., 2011). Cheng et al. tested 
the predictive validity of their three-dimensional model in a sample of elite tae-kwon- 
do competitors. Using a self-report measure of subjective performance, Cheng et al. 
examined the interactive influence of anxiety subcomponents upon performance. A 
similar design could be adopted to test the predictive validity of the hierarchical 
model proposed in the current thesis. Whilst Cheng et al. examined the three 
dimensions of performance anxiety, the model proposed here allows for a more 
detailed examination of the three second order dimensions as well as the first order 
subcomponents of performance anxiety. Further to this, more tests using field and 
laboratory-based designs should be developed to fully examine the model. Gefen ct al. 
(2011) suggest that an important step in model development is exploring the 
constructs using experimental manipulations. For further validation, scores on sub- 
scales should correlate with the aspect of the model that is being manipulated. In 
crms of the current performance anxiety model, manipulation of the lower order
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constructs of cognitive anxiety would be one method of achieving this validation. For 
example, manipulation of public self-focus using audiences or film clips, should 
produce an increase in scores on the public self-focus subcomponent, while the use of 
a mirror should result in increased private self-focus.
Finally, some may question the integrity of the regulatory dimension and its 
first order factor of perceived control. The term perceived control was adopted by 
Cheng et al. to reflect the control system proposed in a number of anxiety theories 
(e.g., Eysenck et al., 2007). Conventionally, the notion of perceived control has been 
reflected as a coping related factor that is an unrelated to anxiety; however, Matthews 
(1992) argued that a voluntary stage regarding coping is involved in the final process 
of the anxiety response. Moreover, perceived control is also involved with self- 
evaluation, a key process underlying anxiety dynamics (Gibbons, 1990; Izard, 1972). 
Specifically, anxious individuals may evaluate not only environmental and internal 
threats (including cognitive/physiological anxiety) but also their capabilities for 
coping with them and meeting the task demands in reaction to perceived stress. As 
such, perceived control is hypothesized to be a characteristic of anxiety. Thus, in this 
model of performance anxiety it is proposed that the factor that differentiates 
perceived control form coping and conventional theories of control (Skinner, 1996), is 
the integrated nature within anxiety, which is concerned with the response to stress.
In summary, both the measurement and structural results provide support for 
hierarchical model of performance anxiety, represented by fiver lower order 
reflectively measured constructs and three second order formative constructs. This 
lends further support to modelling of constructs such as performance anxiety as a 




Summary and concluding comments
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The purpose of this final chapter is to synthesise the findings of the thesis. The 
chapter is divided into five sections; (1) a synopsis of the aims and major findings of 
the research programme (2) a discussion of the major theoretical issues, (3) an 
examination of the applied implications generated by the research, (4) identification 
of the strengths and limitations of the research programme, and (5) recommendations 
for future research.
Synopsis of the aims and major findings of the thesis
The aim of this research programme was to address two issues within the 
performance anxiety literature. The first issue surrounded the process goal paradox 
(Mullen & Hardy, 2010) and the conscious processing hypothesis (CPH; Masters, 
1992). The second aim was to revisit the debate concerning the measurement of 
anxiety. Thus, this thesis was split into two sections; the first section included a 
review of the anxiety-performance literature and two studies that added to the 
knowledge base supporting the use of holistic process goals by anxious athletes. The 
second section began with a short review of the current state of the performance 
anxiety measurement literature. The review is followed by two studies that examine 
the recent re-conceptualization of performance anxiety proposed by Cheng, Hardy, 
and Markland (2009). The two studies aimed to: (i) revisit the cognitive dimension of 
Cheng et al.'s proposed model, and (ii) attempted to situate a revised version of the 
cognitive dimension within a hierarchical model of performance anxiety. All four 
empirical studies will be discussed in more detail below. 
Study 1 and 2
The first two studies of this thesis set out to examine the effectiveness of 
holistic process goals (HPG), relative to part process goals (PPG). Research has 
highlighted the potentially negative effect that PPG, which arc laden with explicit
knowledge, can have on skilled but anxious athletes (Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996;
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impairment, HPG have been reported as an alternative strategy to PPG (Mullen & 
Hardy, 2010); however, there is relatively little evidence to support this proposal. 
Experiment 1 addressed Mullen and Hardy's suggestion that research examining the 
relative efficacy of HPG and PPG could be strengthened by using a learning paradigm 
to examine the effect of both types of process goals upon skill acquisition. The author 
predicted that HPG used early in learning would aid skill acquisition. Therefore, the 
purpose of this study was to establish if, relative to PPG, HPG would enhance 
performance at retention and transfer. In addition, a control group was included to 
examine how effective part and holistic goals are relative to discovery learning.
The results of experiment 1 supported the use of HPG over PPG for both 
learning and performance under pressure, as the HPG group significantly 
outperformed the PPG group at retention and transfer. In terms of discovery learning, 
the findings were not as clear, as the control group did not differ from the HPG group 
or the PPG group at retention or transfer. There was also no evidence of differential 
performance during the practice phase as all three groups improved cquivalently. The 
absence of any differences between the groups in practice is similar to findings 
presented in the attentional focus literature (Wulf, HoB, & Prinz, 1998). The 
superiority of the HPG group compared to the PPG group at retention is the first 
evidence that HPG allow novices to learn motor skills more effectively. In addition, 
the HPG group outperformed the PPG group in the transfer condition in which state 
anxiety was elevated, providing further support for the efficacy of HPG in competitive 
situations.
Despite the positive effects reported here, the single betwecn-subjccts 
comparison used in experiment 1 to examine performance at transfer was not able to 
tell us anything about the possible conscious processing effects hypothesized to be
143
establish whether the use of PPG is associated with performance impairment in high 
relative to low anxiety conditions.
Experiment 2 set out to address this limitation and extend the research 
conducted by Mullen and Hardy (2010). Specifically, Mullen and Hardy produced 
consistent evidence supporting the use of HPG over PPG for skilled but anxious 
athletes; however, they failed to include some of the more sophisticated 
psychophysiological measures adopted in previous studies examining CPH (e.g., 
Mullen, Hardy, & Tattcrsall, 2005; Wilson, Smith, & Holmes, 2007). 
Psychophysiological measures such as heart rate variability (HRV) have previously 
been used to examine the intensity of attentional processing associated with shifts 
from automatic to controlled processing related to the CPH (Mullen, et al., 2005). 
Experiment 2 replicated the design of Mullen and Hardy's third experiment and also 
included HRV and salivary alpha amylase (sAA) as psychophysiological measures. 
Salivary alpha amylase was collected as Mullen et al. suggested that the hypothesized 
reductions in the HRV low frequency (HRVLF) band might be masked by the 
physiological responses associated with increased anxiety. The increases in 
sympathetic activity associated with state anxiety may "flood" the HRVLF band, 
resulting in large increases in spectral power from baseline. This increase in spectral 
power potentially obscures the impact of mental effort, which is reflected as a 
reduction in power in this frequency band.
The results of experiment 2 provided further support for the efficacy of HPG 
for skilled but anxious individuals; however, the pattern of results differed from those 
reported in other process goal studies (Mullen & Hardy, 2010). In the baseline 
condition the HPG was significantly slower than the PPG, but in the competition 
condition, the HPG improved performance so that they were at an equivalent level to
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than the PPG group across both baseline and competitive conditions. Taken together, 
the combination of improved lap times and fewer and less severe errors suggest that 
the HPG outperformed the PPG as reported in similar studies (Gucciardi & Dimmock, 
2008; Mullen & Hardy, 2010). Although the results provide further support for the 
efficacy of HPG, there is no evidence that the PPG caused lapses into conscious 
processing. The fact that no direct evidence was found for the impairment of 
performance through the application of PPG is consistent with the findings of Mullen 
and Hardy.
The results of the HRV analysis also differed from those reported in previous 
studies (Mullen et al., 2005; Wilson, Smith, & Holmes, 2007). Mullen ct al. reported 
significant differences in the HRV high frequency band (HRVHF), whilst the results 
of experiment 2 in this thesis revealed differences in the HRVLF band. The reductions 
in LF spectral power were hypothesized to accompany shifts in task processing from 
automatic to controlled processing that were predicted to occur in the HPG group. 
However, the HRV changes were evident in both the HPG and PPG. Two 
explanations could account for these differences. The first explanation is that the 
effects could be due to changes in task processing (cf. Fairclough & Mulder, 2011; 
Veltman & Gaillard, 1998); however, as the reductions in HRVLF power occurred in 
both process goal groups, the author argued that a second explanation is more likely; 
the effect is more likely to be associated with compensatory mental effort (cf. 
Eyscnck & Calvo, 1992). The performance results revealed that the HPG group 
improved, while the PPG group maintained task baseline levels in the competitive 
condition. The increased compensatory mental effort in both process goal groups may 
have allowed them to maintain and improve performance effectiveness but at the 
expense of processing efficiency. In addition, sAA reflected the changes evident in
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sympathetic activity. The patterning of sAA further supports the contention that 
decreases in HRVLF power represent increases in compensatory effort as participants 
mobilized resources to help deal with the perceived threat indicated by the increase in 
cognitive anxiety (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 
2007). In summary, the two studies presented here provide further support for the 
efficacy of adopting HPG for skilled but anxious individuals. In addition, experiment 
1 indicates that a holistic focus is more effective for learning than a part process 
focus. 
Study 3
The third study in this research programme examined issues associated with 
the measurement of performance anxiety identified in the literature discussed in 
chapter 4. Cheng et al. (2009) proposed a three-dimensional model of performance 
anxiety, which included cognitive, physiological anxiety dimension, and regulatory 
dimensions. Cheng et al. hypothesised that each of the three dimensions was 
represented by lower order sub-components. The cognitive dimension included a 
worry and self-focus component, the physiological dimension was represented by 
somatic tension and autonomic hyperactivity and the regulatory dimension was 
characterized by perceived control. In an attempt to confirm their hypothesized model, 
Cheng ct al.'s results did not support the predicted separation of these subcomponents; 
consequently, somatic tension and autonomic hyperactivity were merged in to one 
overall physiological dimension. Worry and self-focus were also merged in to one 
factor that represented cognitive anxiety. Cognitive anxiety is often reported as having 
the most significant influence on performance (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Woodman & 
Hardy, 2001), thus a comprehensive representation of the cognitive response is crucial 
for model development. With this importance in mind, study 3 aimed to re-examine
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dimension. It was predicted that the single self-focus dimension proposed by Cheng ct 
al. would be better represented by two subcomponents of private and public self-focus 
(Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Qualitative interviews were utilised to test the 
prediction
The findings of study 3 supported the inclusion of worry and self-focus as 
subcomponents of cognitive anxiety, as suggested by Cheng ct al. (2009). However, 
the qualitative data indicated that Fenigstein et al.'s (2009) bipartite model of self- 
focus, including private and public components better represented the athletes' 
experiences. There has been some recognition of this distinction in the sport 
psychology literature. For example, Ashford, Karageorghis, and Jackson (2005) 
modelled the relationship between self-consciousness and competition anxiety using 
Fenigstein et al.'s model. Despite being concerned with trait measures of competition 
anxiety, the inclusion of a private-public differentiation by Ashford et al. highlights 
the importance of both elements within athletic samples. In addition, Wang, 
Marchant, Morris, and Gibbs (2004) reported that those with high levels of private 
self-focus were more susceptible to poor performance under pressure. Clearly, private 
and public self-focus would seem to be relevant in a sporting context; however, 
further research is required to justify this distinction within models of performance 
anxiety.
The results also suggest that each of these subcomponents is represented by a 
number of themes and so a unidimensional approach to worry, private self-focus and 
public self-focus may be an over-simplification. The data from the worry dimension 
supported this suggestion, as seven themes emerged from the data. Although there is 
some evidence for the multidimensional nature of worry in sport (Dunn, 1993, 2003),
research has generally not adopted this approach in contemporary models of
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performance anxiety. Despite the evidence suggesting that worry might be 
multidimensional, the author argues that while it may be important to distinguish 
between the different types of worry that athletes may experience, it remains 
debatable whether this diversified content is sufficient to represent 
multidimensionality from a theoretical perspective. A multidimensional approach is 
justified when the multiple dimensions of a construct differ in their internal 
underlying psychological processes (Eysenck, 1992). So, while it is appropriate to 
specify the cognitive dimension as multidimensional; as worry, private self-focus and 
public self-focus differ in their underlying psychological processes, it would be 
conceptually inappropriate to model worry as multidimensional in models of 
performance anxiety. The author argues that the psychological process of worry is 
conceptually unified; therefore it would be more appropriate to recognise the 
diversified content of worry reported by athletes within measurement models.
Study 4
The fourth study aimed to re-examine Cheng et al.'s (2009) model of 
performance anxiety using the extended cognitive dimension highlighted in study 3. A 
hierarchical model of performance anxiety was presented that retained the three prime 
dimensions of cognitive anxiety, physiological anxiety and the regulatory dimension. 
These second order dimensions were represented by six reflectively measured first 
order subcomponents: cognitive anxiety; formed by worry, private self-focus and 
public self-focus; physiological anxiety, formed by somatic tension and autonomic 
hyperactivity; and a regulatory dimension, formed by a single subcomponent of 
perceived control. Guidelines proposed by Jarvis, Mackenzie, & Podsakoff (2003) 
were adopted to specify the relationship between the first order subcomponents and 
the second order dimensions, whereby the first order subcomponents were measured
reflectively, while the second order dimension were modelled as formative constructs.
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The results of Partial Least Squares structural equation modelling fully 
supported the predicted hierarchical model of three second order dimensions and six 
first order subcomponents. Furthermore, this performance anxiety model was 
supported within a larger nomological network and was able to predict some of the 
variance in the Test of Performance Strategies-2 constructs (TOPS-2; Hardy, Roberts, 
Thomas, & Murphy, 2010). This lends further support to the structural properties of a 
three dimensional performance anxiety model. In summary, the hierarchical model 
presented in study 4 was fully supported, and extends the reconceptualization of 
performance anxiety suggested by Cheng et al. (2009).
Theoretical Issues
The following section will discuss the main theoretical issues that emerged 
from the research programme, which include; (1) the use of HPG for learning and 
performance in competitive situations, (2) the lack of support for conscious 
processing effects, (3) the use of interdisciplinary research in this thesis, and (4) the 
hierarchical model of performance anxiety.
Process goals
As discussed in study 1 and 2, the results of the research programme offer 
further evidence for the use of HPG in competitive situations, adding support to the 
findings of Mullen and Hardy (2010), Gucciardi and Dimmock (2008), and Jackson 
and Wilson (1999). Clearly there is growing evidence for the efficacy of HPG; 
therefore, the mechanisms that underpin these goals are worthy of further 
examination. Mullen and Hardy suggested that the concept of "chunking" 
(MacMahon & Masters, 1998) might help explain the mechanisms that underpin 
HPG. Chunking has been used to describe the automatization of cognitive skills, in 
which individual elements of a task arc gradually incorporated into a single
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representation (Neves & Anderson, 1981). Therefore, HPG may function by allowing 
the appropriate sub-actions of a movement to be generated automatically (Mullcn & 
Hardy, 2010). This in turn may promote smoother, more automated performance. 
MacMahon and Masters (1998) supported the concept of chunking in motor skills 
using a serial reaction time task. They also demonstrated that under pressure, the 
process of chunking was reversed and the skill effectively "de-chunked", which is in 
line with the CPH explanations of performance impairment. Therefore, the global 
focus that HPG encourages might allow skilled but anxious individuals to avoid de- 
chunking effects. In addition the global representation that HPG promotes should not 
induce conscious processing, given that conscious control can only be exerted over 
parts of a movement, and not the movement in its entirety (Hardy et al. 1996). This 
chunking explanation may also explain why the HPG group in experiment 1 learnt 
more effectively. The promotion of a global movement representation early in 
learning may have encouraged more automatic processing. Despite the strength of this 
explanation, there is currently no evidence to confirm that HPG encourages more 
automatic processing. One way of examining this would be to utilise measures that 
index automatic functioning. Kinematics may provide researchers with such insight, 
by indexing the fluency of movement. It would be predicted that those who are 
functioning automatically using HPG would retain a higher degree of fluency than 
those who employed PPG and lapse into conscious control. Electroencephalography 
would also enable researchers to examine the brain activity associated with the 
automatic processing of motor skills and the predicted lapses into conscious 
processes. Similarly, electromyography (EMG) would provide further insight into 
how motor control is organized by the nervous system when individuals use holistic 
and part process goals, with HPG possibly resulting in more efficient muscle 
activation patterns.
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The current findings can also be viewed in the context of the internal and 
external attentional focus literature (Wulf, 2007). Mullen and Hardy (2010) suggested 
that holistic goals might operate in the same way as an external focus, in that they 
prevent a specific focus on the mechanics of movement. However, Mullen and Hardy 
argued that the holistic focus represented in their research is innately different to an 
external focus. Participants in Mullen and Hardy's studies were encouraged to focus 
on the general feeling of the whole movement, rather than the effect of the movement, 
as would be the case for an external focus. The same consideration was taken in 
development of the holistic goals for the current research programme. In addition, a 
number of strategies were employed, such as the post experimental questionnaires, to 
ensure that participants continued to use their assigned / selected goal throughout the 
testing and did not make use of alternative strategies.
With regards to the lack of performance impairment in the PPG group, the 
results reported in this thesis are consistent with similar research investigating the 
process goal paradox (Mullen & Hardy, 2010). Part process goals were predicted to 
impair performance, as they contain explicit knowledge that should encourage athletes 
to consciously control movements (Masters, 1992). However, no performance 
impairment was reported in either of the PPG groups. An alternative explanation for 
the results of this study situates itself within the explicit monitoring literature. 
Jackson, Ashford, and Norsworthy (2006) addressed the conceptual distinction 
between explicit monitoring and conscious control and suggested that while 
instructions to monitor and report a particular feature of performance encourage 
explicit monitoring they may not specifically encourage conscious control. In 
addition, Jackson et al. suggested that there could be varying degrees to which 
performers explicitly monitor performance, which can result in varying degrees of 
performance disruption. In the context of the results of this research programme, it
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might be argued that the PPG caused participants to explicitly monitor movement, 
rather than consciously control performance. This may explain why there was no 
impairment of performance in the PPG group. It is unclear whether consciously 
controlling performance is more disruptive to performance than explicit monitoring, 
but researchers need to be sensitive to the subtleties of the different subtypes of self- 
focus. Crucially, research needs to examine whether explicit knowledge causes a 
conscious control of performance or if it simply causes an athlete to explicitly monitor 
movement, with less severe consequences. Isolating the effects of individual theories 
has become increasingly problematic for researchers, and authors often conclude that 
a number of theories can be used to explain the mechanisms of performance failure. 
Using more than one mechanistic theory to explain performance impairment may be 
justified on some occasions, however, researchers should continue to establish 
methods that allow the isolated predictions of each theory to be examined. In order to 
ensure that experimental designs and manipulations are effective, researchers also 
need to consider the strength of the anxiety interventions used. These need to be 
strong enough to replicate the demands placed upon athletes in competitive situations. 
Another issue to consider is the measurement of performance anxiety, which is dealt 
with in some depth below. 
Interdisciplinary research
Turning to the psychophysiological measures used in this study, it would seem 
that the inclusion of both HRV and sAA provide an insight into the 
psychophysiological responses associated with anxiety. Whilst the results in this 
thesis arc different to those reported elsewhere (Mullen et al., 2005) the decrease 
reported in the HRVLF here are indicative of an increase in mental effort. The 
dissociation reported between HRVLF and sAA was something of a new finding. The 
author argues that these effects reflect the increased compensatory mental effort and
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provide us with some insight into the mechanisms that might underpin performance. 
As this is only the first empirical evidence of such a dissociation, further research 
should seek to confirm these findings.
Activity in the HRVLF band is mediated by both sympathetic and 
parasympathetic activity (Berntson et al., 1997). As such, the author suggests that the 
absence of significant differences in the HRVHF band, which is an established 
indicator of parasympathetic activity (Berntson et al., 1997; Grossman, 1992), when 
viewed in combination with the sAA results, indicate that the changes in HRVLF 
activity in response to the competition stressor were primarily associated with 
sympathetic reactivity. To confirm these suggestions, research should seek to include 
further measures of both parasympathetic activity, such as respiration, and more direct 
measures of sympathetic activity, including plasma catecholamines and the cardiac 
pre-ejection period. These psychophysiological measures, in tandem with the EEC, 
EMG and kinematic measures outlined above, would provide researchers with a 
comprehensive interdisciplinary picture of the processes underlying the superiority of 
HPG. 
Hierarchical model of performance anxiety
The findings of this thesis provide further support for the reconceptualization 
of performance anxiety. The results support a hierarchical model, with three second 
order dimensions and six first order subcomponents. Cheng et al. (2009) originally 
attempted to support a hierarchical five-factor structure; therefore the results of this 
thesis support the differentiated approach originally predicted by Cheng et al. In 
addition, the results provide support for the multidimensionality associated with both 
the cognitive and physiological dimension, as represented by the first order 
subcomponents. The present thesis extends the model presented by Cheng et al. by 
including a private and a public self-focus component alongside worry in the
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cognitive dimension. The multidimensional nature of cognitive anxiety is consistent 
with several lines of conceptual argument (Carver & Schcier, 1988; Schwarzer & 
Jerusalem, 1992) and empirical evidence (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2001; Liao & 
Masters, 2002). Similarly, the adoption of a multidimensional approach to 
physiological anxiety is consistent with the criteria used for generalized anxiety 
disorder in the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987). The results suggest that the worry- 
emotionality model (Liebert & Morris, 1967) on which the Competitive State Anxiety 
Inventory-2 (CSAI-2; Martens, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1990) is based fails to 
account for the multidimensional nature of the cognitive and physiological response. 
Clearly a cognitive and physiological distinction is critical in representing the anxiety 
response; however, the author argues that there is a need to recognise the 
multidimensional nature of the dimensions within models of performance anxiety.
The results of this thesis also support the inclusion of a regulatory dimension 
within the performance anxiety model, providing further support for importance of a 
dimension that recognises the adaptive potential of anxiety. Whereas the predictions 
of multidimensional anxiety theory for the effects of anxiety upon performance are 
additive, the proposed model affords the examination of both singular and interactive 
effects of the different components of the anxiety model on performance. Cheng, 
Hardy, & Woodman (2011) have examined such effects using Cheng et al.'s (2009) 
three-dimensional model. Cheng et al. were limited to examining effects of a three- 
dimensional model, whereas the fully differentiated model presented in this thesis 
allows for an examination of both the separate and interactive effects of the 
underlying subcomponents.
The appeal of the regulatory dimension is clear, however, it is likely that some 
researchers may also question the inclusion of such a feature within models of 
performance anxiety. It could be argued that perceived control is actually part of a
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separate concept of coping. However, the author argues that although perceived 
control may be viewed as a positively toned, coping-related construct, it remains 
appropriate to integrate it within a model of performance anxiety. Specifically, much 
has been established on the importance of a control component in the anxiety 
response. For example, the explanatory power of perceived control has aided our 
understanding of variations in the effects of anxiety (Jones & Swain, 1995; Swain & 
Jones, 1996). Moreover, the notion of control is reported as a key factor in some 
anxiety theories, such as processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) and 
attentional control theory (Eysenck, Dcrakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). A control 
system in these theories monitors and evaluates performance and consequently plans 
and regulates the use of processing resources. Therefore, the author argues that the 
inclusion of perceived control as an indicator of the regulatory dimension is entirely 
appropriate and consistent with the literature.
Despite the attraction of the three second order dimensions (cognitive, 
physiological and regulatory) presented here, some may question the integrity of the 
proposed hierarchical model. Specifically, one might challenge the similarity to 
factors measured in the CSA1-2 and CSAI-2R (cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety and 
self-confidence). However, the model presented in this study differs from the CSAI-2 
for two fundamental reasons. Firstly, the cognitive anxiety dimension and the 
physiological dimension have been extended to represent a wider scope of the anxiety 
response. The cognitive anxiety dimension was extended to represent a private and 
public self-focus alongside worry, and the physiological anxiety dimension included 
the two subcomponents of somatic tension and autonomic hypcractivity to represent 
the involuntary and voluntary responses associated with anxiety. Secondly, the current 
model integrates a regulatory dimension to highlight the adaptive nature of anxiety. 
The CSAI-2 and the CSAI-2R are based on two components (worry-emotionality) and
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does not make reference to a coping capacity. However, it could be argued that the 
self-confidence factor included in the CSAI-2 is similar to the perceived control factor 
presented in the new model. The self-confidence sub scale within the CSAI-2 differs 
from the perceived control component in this model in several ways. Firstly, self- 
confidence was not included to represent the adaptive capacity; rather it was included 
due to fortuitous emergence in measurement development (Martens, Vealey, Bump, & 
Smith, 1990). Secondly, factor analysis of the CSAI-2 operationalized self-confidence 
as having two themes; positive performance expectations and a sense of calmness (cf, 
Lane, Sewell, Terry, Bartram, & Nesti, 1999). Positive performance expectations 
share some similarities with perceived control, as they both focus on goal attainment; 
however, the suggestion that a sense of calmness is similar to perceived control is far 
less conceivable. Specifically, the emotional calmness depicted in the self-confidence 
factor contradicts the anxiety response depicted within the current model. What is 
more, Cheng et al. (2009) suggest that it is unlikely that an individual could feel 
anxious and mentally relaxed simultaneously when under pressure. Therefore, the 
inclusion of a regulatory (coping) dimension in the current model is considered 
inherently different and superior to that contained within multidimensional models 
built upon the worry-emotionality distinction.
From a measurement perspective, the results of the structural analysis suggest 
that modelling performance anxiety using a mix of reflective and formative methods 
may provide a more realistic representation of the anxiety response. This approach 
may be crucial in understanding complex psychological concepts such as performance 
anxiety. Traditionally, structural analysis specifies models as reflective (Chin, 1998), 
and suggests that all indicator items are caused by the same latent construct. This 
approach is not always appropriate for the construct under investigation, rather it is 
more appropriate to model constructs with the meaning emanating from indicators to
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the construct. The author thought it was particularly important to model performance 
anxiety as formative at the second order level, as the sub-components of each 
dimension are clearly unique. For example, worry, private self-focus and public self- 
focus are conceptually distinct and should therefore be represented in a way that 
reflects this in models of performance anxiety. Likewise, the somatic tension and 
autonomic hyperactivity components of the physiological dimension are conceptually 
unique. It was hoped that this approach would provide a more conceptually 
appropriate reflection of the complex dimensions inherent in the anxiety response. To 
date, PLS and formative models have been notable by their absence from the sport 
psychology literature. This research represents the first empirical study that adopts 
such innovative measurement models and methods. Future research should seek to 
adopt such methods in development of similar measurement models.
Applied Implications
The eclectic empirical approach adopted in this research programme has 
highlighted a number of practical implications for sport psychologists, athletes and 
coaches. Firstly, the current findings support the use of HPG for skilled but anxious 
athletes in competition. Process goals are often used within pre-performance routines 
in preparation for skill execution (Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996). Often these routines 
include part-process oriented information, and although there is no evidence that these 
goals might impair performance, there is evidence that adopting HPG may enhance 
performance in competitive situations. Thus, athletes may benefit from more globally 
focused information in their pre-performance routine. Holistic process goals arc not 
the only solution to the process goal paradox. Hardy et al. (1996) suggested that the 
process goals used in prc-performancc routines might not always be task focused. For 
example, some athletes may include emotion-focused goals, such as being relaxed, 
which serve to keep an athlete's focus away from task execution. Applied
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practitioners should remain sensitive to the variety of process goals available to 
performers within prc-performance routines and be especially vigilant where athletes 
use routines that contain task-focused goals. In such circumstances, the goals should 
be holistically focused.
In addition, the evidence presented here suggests that holistic process goals 
can be beneficial for the acquisition of motor skills in addition to the promotion of 
greater resilience under pressure. Researchers have demonstrated similar effects using 
analogy learning in comparison to more traditional learning reliant upon explicit 
knowledge (Lam, Maxwell, & Masters, 2009). Lam et al. suggested that movement 
analogies are intended to reduce multiple task-relevant "rules" into a single "all 
encompassing biomechanical metaphor" (Masters, 2000, p. 538). In a similar way to 
HPG, analogy leaning may be successful as it helps to "chunk" or consolidate 
knowledge into a single rule. In addition, HPG also appear to be similar to metaphors 
(Butler, 1996). Both analogies and metaphors have been used as triggers and cues in 
imagery routines and have been described as "the labelling of movement components 
and instructions to code movement information symbolically" (Bird & Cripe, 1986, p. 
204). Despite the similarity between HPG and analogies and metaphors, Mullcn and 
Hardy (2010) argued that a holistic focus differs from both concepts, as the latter 
approaches appear to be coded symbolically. For example, the image of the pendulum 
used by Wulf et al. and Lam et al.'s (2009) description of "Shoot as if you are trying 
to put cookies into a cookie jar on a high shelf." (p. 345), appears to promote a 
symbolic representation of the task. This differs from HPG, which focus on 
encapsulating the feeling of performing the whole movement, which is more akin to 
kinaesthetic imagery (Mullen & Hardy, 2010). Research should seek to establish 
whether promotion of an external focus via the use of metaphors and analogies is 
more effective than movement-oriented HPG.
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To date sport psychologists have relied on the CSAI-2 or the CSAI-2R when 
measuring the anxiety response. The development of a new theoretical model of 
performance anxiety creates a more appropriate measure for applied practitioners. The 
differentiated approach adopted in this model permits a greater understanding of the 
performance anxiety response. In adopting the proposed theoretical model, 
practitioners would be better placed to understand athletes' experiences before and 
during competition. Consequently, this will allow a greater diagnosis of the anxiety 
response, and for more appropriate strategies to be tailored to the athletes' individual 
anxiety response. For example, athletes who report high scores on the public self- 
focus component may benefit from an attentional focus strategy to prevent them from 
attending to significant others who are watching them, such as parents or friends. In 
contrast, athletes who report high levels of autonomic hyperactivity may benefit from 
a relaxation based strategy focused on rhythmic breathing, which could decrease an 
individual's breathing and heart rate. Therefore, the differentiated approach this 
measure allows has significant implications for the design and implementation of 
intervention strategies. In addition, applied practitioners may benefit from adopting a 
broader approach to the three subcomponents of cognitive anxiety. The results of this 
research suggest that there are a number of public and private self-focus domains 
within the response, as well as a number of sources of worry. Whilst a 
multidimensional approach is not appropriate for measurement models of 
performance anxiety, sport psychologists should remain sensitive to the underlying 
factors that an individual worries about or focuses on.
Research Strengths
This research programme exhibits several strengths. The research programme 
has engaged with a number of research methods to explore the aims and objectives,
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including quantitative and qualitative methods. The variety of methods adopted 
includes experimental design, qualitative interviews, and structural equation 
modelling, which taken together demonstrate the researcher's ability to conduct well- 
controlled laboratory and field-based studies. The willingness to engage in a number 
of innovative methods also demonstrates the researcher's desire to contribute to the 
development of high quality research. Furthermore, the research programme has made 
a number of contributions to the performance anxiety research area. The use of two 
psychophyiologoical measures highlights the benefits of adopting an interdisciplinary 
approach. These approaches may offer further insight into the processes and 
mechanisms associated with anxiety effects.
The inclusion of spectral analysis of heart rate variability provides an 
opportunity to explore links between psychological processes and physiological 
functions (e.g. Bernston et al., 1997). Salivary alpha amylase is a novel approach, and 
to the author's knowledge, it is the first time such a measure has been employed in the 
sport psychology literature. The results of study 2 suggested that sAA is a reliable and 
valid indicator of psychological stress. In addition, the sAA offers a useful insight into 
the activity of the sympathetic nervous system (Chatterton et al., 1996; Nater et al.; 
Rohleder et al, 2005). More direct measures of sympathetic activity could have been 
employed, such as plasma catecholamincs or the cardiac pre-ejection period; however, 
the invasive nature of these data collection methods is problematic. The 
interdisciplinary approach utilised in this thesis, is both novel and innovative and the 
findings clearly demonstrate the validity of including such measures in future 
research.
The theoretical strength of this thesis includes the construction of a conceptual 
model of performance anxiety that incorporates a number of developments within the
literature. Moreover, the development of the new model of performance anxiety was
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conducted on a large prospective data set. Cheng et al.'s (2009) research was based on 
retrospective data. Participants were asked to recall their state response to a 
competitive event two days to one week after the event, while in this thesis, data was 
collected an hour before competition. Furthermore, the thesis proposes an alternative 
method for specifying relationships between constructs in measurement models in 
sport psychology. This specification of formative and reflective models has been 
largely ignored in the sport psychology literature. The adoption of PLS analysis 
allows researchers to specify the relationships between variables. Not only has this 
approach made a significant impact on the way performance anxiety has been 
modelled, but it also provides other researchers a method to examine specification of 
similar constructs within sport psychology. In addition, the current research 
programme has adopted a number of recommendations for future research that have 
been identified by previous researchers, including the following:
1. Adopting post-experimental questionnaires to check for treatment adherence.
2. The use of heart rate variability as an index of mental effort.
3. Salivary alpha amylase as an indicator of sympathetic activity.
4. Modified analytic induction as an innovative deductive and inductive approach 
to qualitative data analysis.
5. Adopting formative and reflective measurement methods in model 
development.
6. Using partial least squares as an alternative to covariance based structural 
equation modelling.
Research Limitations
The research programme is not without its limitations. A number of the limitations 
have been addressed in the discussion sections of each chapter; therefore these will
only be briefly mentioned here. Limitations reported in study 1 and 2 relate to the lack
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of counterbalancing between treatment conditions. Study 3 reported limitations 
concerning participant recall, whilst study 4 reported problems with self-report as a 
measure of physiological symptoms. In addition, it is recommended that the following 
limitations should be considered in future research (1) part process goal that do not 
cause lapses into conscious processing (2) lack of clear methods for specifying 
hierarchical models.
The results of study 1 and 2 failed to find any direct evidence that performance 
is impaired when using PPG. This is consistent with the findings of Mullen and Hardy 
(2010), but does little to support the predictions of the CPH (Masters, 1992). Mullen 
and Hardy suggested that the part process goals developed in their studies might not 
actually elicit the effects associated with conscious processing; the same problem may 
have occurred in this thesis. The author developed the PPG from technical race 
driving materials; however, these specific instructions may have failed to capture the 
explicit knowledge required to complete the task. Alternatively, as discussed earlier, 
these goals may have increased explicit monitoring of movements but not conscious 
control of performance. Another suggestion would be to adopt a within-subject 
design, so participants perform using both a HPG and PPG. The author previously 
suggested that this may cause confusion for participants, so to prevent such problems, 
research designs should conduct the experimental goal conditions on separate days 
with counterbalancing of conditions.
With regards to the measurement analysis, the guidelines on specifying 
hierarchical models are relatively sparse (Ringlc, Sarstedt, & Straub, 2012). The lack 
of clarity in specific guidelines has proved problematic in this study. The model 
proposed in this thesis used a combination of reflective and formative methods; 
however, similar models in the literature often fail to provide details on how models
were specified. Although the indicator reuse approach adopted in this study is suitable
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for hierarchical component models (Wetzels, Odekerken-Schroder, & van Oppen, 
2009), there were relatively little guidelines on how to use this method. However, due 
to the growing popularity of partial least squares, more detailed information is 
currently emerging from the literature that researchers are likely to be able to use in 
the future (Hair, Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013).
Future research directions
The research on HPG is in its infancy, thus, researchers should continue to 
examine the benefits of adopting a holistic focus. Specifically, researchers should seek 
to address the problem of multiple treatment interference and ensure the 
counterbalancing of stress conditions is achieved. In addition, research should attempt 
to explore HPG across a number of different tasks and levels of practice. Further 
research should also seek to compare the effectiveness of HPG alongside an external 
focus of attention. In addition, researchers should consider potential 
moderator/mediator variables in the relationship between goals and anxiety. One such 
variable could be the notion of "learning styles". Learning styles refer to the concept 
that individuals differ in regard to what mode of instruction is most effective for them 
(Pashler, MacDaniel, Rohrer, & Bjork, 2008). Despite the potential applicability to 
the goal setting literature, some caution must be reserved as there is little to no 
empirical support for this practice (Pashler et al., 2009; Fuelscher, Ball, & 
MacMahon, 2012). Fuelscher et al. (2012) suggest that in order to explore learning 
styles in athletes, researchers need to design an assessment tool specific to motor 
skills and test the learning style hypothesis for specific sport skills. Future research 
should consider both of these suggestions before exploring learning styles in the goal 
setting literature.
Further research is required to firmly establish the validity of the proposed
model of performance anxiety. Chcng ct al. (2011) have been successful in providing
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initial support for the predictive validity of Cheng et al.'s (2009) three-dimensional 
performance anxiety model. To extend the development of the proposed model, 
research should first of all establish predictive validity using a single sport sample. In 
addition, establishment of construct validity is an on-going process (Smith & 
McCarthy, 1995); thus, research should continue to test the model proposed in this 
thesis. Further research should also seek to establish whether the construct of 
perceived control is truly unidimensional. Finally, future research should also explore 
how perceived control influences performance, that is, whether it exerts a moderating 
or mediating influence.
Conclusion
The purpose of this research programme was to address two issues within the 
performance anxiety literature. Taken together, the thesis makes a significant 
contribution to the performance anxiety literature. First, the results of this thesis 
support the superiority of HPG for the acquisition of motor skills. The results also 
provide further support for the efficacy of a holistic focus for skilled but anxious 
individuals. Secondly, the thesis supports a hierarchical model of performance 
anxiety. The testing of this measurement model is in its infancy; however, the model 
has the potential to make a significant contribution to the performance anxiety 
literature. In addition, the methods employed within this thesis also contribute 
significantly to the research area. Firstly, the use of two psychophysiological 
measures has proven a useful insight to the mechanisms that underpin the anxiety 
response. Secondly, the use of PLS analysis, which allows the specification of 
formative and reflective models has been crucial in representing the hierarchical 
model presented in this thesis. In summary, the current thesis reports both theoretical 
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Please indicate on the scale below how much effort you put into the task 
you have just completed.













.. somewhat effortful 40 ~ —— — — — -----
30 _____________ a bit effortful
hardly effortful 
10 __ 





We want to know how your health has been in general over the last few weeks. Please 
read the questions below and each of the four possible answers. Circle the response 
that best applies to you. Thank you for answering all the questions.
Have you recently:
1. been able to concentrate on what you're doing?
better than usual same as usual less than usual much less than usual 
(0) (1) (2) (3)
2. lost much sleep over worry? 
Not at all no more than usual rather more than usual much more than usual
3. felt that you are playing a useful part in things? 
more so than usual same as usual less so than usual much less than usual
4. felt capable of making decisions about things? 
more so than usual same as usual less than usual much less than usual
5. felt constantly under strain? 
Not at all no more than usual rather more than usual much more than usual
6. felt you couldn't overcome your difficulties? 
Not at all no more than usual rather more than usual much more than usual
7. been able to enjoy your normal day to day activities? 
more so than usual same as usual less so than usual much less than usual
8. been able to face up to your problems?
more so than usual same as usual less than usual much less than usu
9. been feeling unhappy or depressed? 
not at all no more than usual rather more than usual much more than usual
198
10. been losing confidence in yourself? 
not at all no more than usual rather more than usual much more than usual
11. been thinking of yourself as a worthless person? 
not at all no more than usual rather more than usual much more than usual
12. been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered? 




Date:_____ Time Began:_____ Time Ended:
SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION
Thanks for agreeing to participate in this project. As previously stated the purpose of this 
project is to gain an understanding of how athletes respond to potentially stressful, high- 
pressure competitions. Specifically, I am interested in exploring how anxious or nervous 
athletes feel in such situations and the emotions, thoughts and feelings that they experience in 
response to the pressure.
The information gained in this study will be used as part of my PhD thesis as well as 
potentially for publication in a scientific journal so that other sports scientists, coaches and 
athletes can benefit from it.
I must stress that the information you provide will remain completely confidential. We may
want to use selected quotes from the interviews in order to illustrate important themes but 
these will remain strictly anonymous, and your identity will be fully protected. I am using a 
Dictaphone to record the interview to get complete and accurate information, and to make the 
interview process more efficient.
As a participant in this study, your participation in this interview is entirely voluntary, and 
you are free to decline to answer any questions or to stop the interview at any point. There 
are no right or wrong answers to the questions that I will be asking; therefore I hope that you 
will answer the questions in a frank and straightforward way. If there are any questions you 
do not feel comfortable answering 1 would rather you declined to comment than to tell me 
what you think I or others want to hear. So if you would prefer not to answer a question, 
simply state "no comment", and no further questions related to that area will be asked.
If you have any questions as we go along please ask them. Similarly, if at any time you do 
not understand what I am asking, please do not hesitate to ask for clarification.
ORIENTING INSTRUCTIONS: As I explained earlier, I will be asking you about your 
experiences of a high pressure, competitive event. Specifically, I am interested in talking to 
you about the anxiety that you may experience in response to such situations. By anxiety, I 
mean the emotions, thoughts and feelings that you experience in response to the pressure of 
the event. Athletes often experience nervousness and anxiety, and these feelings are quire 
common. To help me understand them, I would like you to share your feelings with me 
openly.
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Hopefully, you now have an event in mind? Just to re-cap, I would like to explore your 
thoughts and feelings in the build up to, and during this event. To help you do this, I will be 
asking you about how you were feeling at specific points in time; a week before the event, the 
night before the event, the day of the event, the immediate preparation period before you 
actually competed, for example, arriving at the venue, changing and warming up, and finally, 
the event itself. I would like you to try to recall in detail what you were thinking and how you 
felt at these time points. There arc no right or wrong answers, so I would like you to be as 
open and honest as possible. Since you may have to think back in time, you might not be able 
to immediately remember some things. Take your time to recall the past. If you can't 
remember after trying to think back, then just tell me, I would prefer you don't guess.
At the end of the interview there will be an opportunity for you to add anything that you felt 
was important and not covered in the interview.
Do you have any questions now about what I have talked about so far? OK, let's get started.
SECTION 2
DEMOGRAPHICS & BACKGROUND
(1)1 would like to start by talking about the sport that you play. Can you tell me a little 
bit about your sporting history?
PROMPTS:
  How long have you taken part in this sport?
  Is this your main sport?
  How did you get in to it?
  How often do you train for this sport?
  What are your goals/what do you hope to achieve in your sporting career?
  What is the highest level that you have competed at?
SECTIONS
THE COMPETITION EXPERIENCE
Ok, let's talk about the stressful event that you have chosen to recall. Take your time to 
remember this event. With this event in mind try your best to recall in detail your feelings and 
thoughts. To begin, 1 would like you to try and recall what you were thinking and how you 
felt in the build up to the event. First of all, can you tell me about the event/competition that 
you have chosen to recall?
PROMPTS:
  What was the event?
  Where and when?
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• The outcome of the event?
(2)Ok, let's work through the event in detail now. Can you begin by talking about the week 
before the event; can you talk me through your preparation?
PROMPTS:
• Can you tell me about your thoughts related to the competition at this point?
• Ok, talk to me about how you felt at that point?
(3)Let's look closer to the event; can you talk to me about the night before the event? 
PROMPTS:
• What thoughts were running through your head at this point?
• And how were you feeling?
• Are they similar to the week before? If not, how are they different? How did your 
experience change?
(4) What about the morning of the event? 
PROMPTS:
• What are you doing?
• What are you thinking?
• How do you feel?
• How is this different to the night before?
(4) OK, let's look at closer to the event, talk to me about how you felt during the immediate 
preparation for the event, perhaps starting with when you arrived at the venue and then 
describe form this point until the start of the event? Take your time to provide details of what 
you were doing throughout.
PROMPTS:
• Warm up/Changing room/Immediately before the event?
• What were your thoughts at this point?
• And, how were you feeling at this point?
• Same/different?
(5)Plcase take your time to recall during the event now. Can you describe to me what 
happened during the event?
PROMPTS:
• What were you thinking about during the event?
• How did you feel?
• What were you focused on?
• Same/different?
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(6)Is there anything else related to your competitive experience that you would like to 
discuss?
PROMPTS:
• Other time points?
• Anything else that affects you?
(7) Ok, we have talked primarily about one event here, but competing at your level I'm sure 
you have experienced many different competitive events. If we were to discuss another event, 
would there be anything different that you would report regarding your feelings and 
thoughts?
• Same/Different?
• Why are there differences?
• Why did it feel different?
• What were you thinking differently?
Additional PROMPTS:
• Was there anything else that you were thinking about?
• I think I understand, could you elaborate on.....?
• Could you say more about how you were feeling?
• What effect did this have on you?
• Ok, I am beginning to get the picture; can you talk to me in a little more detail about 
	those thoughts?
• Could you elaborate on your thoughts here?
• Could you expand on how you felt?
• Can you talk to me exactly what you were thinking?
SECTION 4 
CONCLUSION
Thank you for your time and effort; this is nearly the end of the interview. I would just like 
to take this opportunity to ask you a few questions about the interview itself.
(1) How do you feel the interview went?
(2) Do you feel I led you in anyway in terms of your responses?
(3) Were you comfortable in the interview environment?
(4) Is there anything you feel we have failed to discuss?
Many thanks once again for your co-operation and efforts during the interview.
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APPENDIX F
TEST OF PERFORMANCE STRATEGIES ©
Name Age Gender M
Sport




Current performance level (circle one): 
International National 





measures performance strategies used by athletes in various sport situations. Because 
individual athletes are very different in their approach to their sport, we expect the responses 
to be different. We want to stress, therefore, that there are no right or wrong answers. All that 
is required is for you to be open and honest in your responses.Throughout the questionnaire, 
several terms are used which may have different meanings for different individuals. Because 
of this, these terms are defined below with specific examples to sport where appropriate. 
Please keep these definitions in mind when responding to items with these terms.
COMPETITION: a tournament/meet where individuals or teams perform against each other.
SKILL: a specific element of your sport performance. For example, free throw shooting in 
basketball or a jump in figure skating.
PERFORMANCE: your execution of specific sport skills during training and competition.
ROUTINE: a set of behaviours that is performed regularly in preparation for your performance 
in sport. An example may be going through specific stretches while listening to a song on 
your walkman prior to every performance.
WORKOUT: a structured practice session to work on various elements of your sport.
VISUALIZATION/IMAGERY/REHEARSAL: these terms refer to the act of picturing in your mind 
some aspect of your performance. An example would be seeing and feeling yourself
execute a specific skill perfectly.——————
© Developed by L. Hardy, P.R. Thomas, & S.M. Murphy (v2, 2005).
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TOPS 2
Each of the following items describes a specific situation that you may encounter in your 
training and competition. Please rate how frequently these situations apply to you on the 
following scale:
1 = Never
2 = Rarely |
3 — Sometimes >->''
4 = Often >
Q
	5 = Always £ (^ on O < 
	Please put a circle around your answer
1. I set realistic but challenging goals for practice. 12345
2. I say things to myself to help my practice performance. 12345
3. During practice I visualize successful past performances. 12345
4. My attention wanders while I am training. 12345
5. I practise using relaxation techniques at workouts. 12345
6. During competition I set specific result goals for myself. 12345
7. My self-talk during competition is negative. 12345
8. I rehearse my performance in my mind before practice. 12345
9. During competition I have thoughts of failure. 12345
10. I use practice time to work on my relaxation technique. 12345
11. I manage my self-talk effectively during practice. 12345
12. I visualize my competition going exactly the way I want it to go. 12345
13. 1 am able to control distracting thoughts when 1 am training. 12345
14. I get frustrated and emotionally upset when practice does not go well. 12345
15. I have specific cue words or phrases that I say to myself to help my 12345 
performance during competition.
16. I evaluate whether 1 achieve my competition goals. 12345
17. I set very specific goals for competition. 12345
1 8. At practice, I can allow the whole skill or movement to happen 12345 
naturally without concentrating on each part.
19. I keep my thoughts positive during competitions. 12345
20. 1 say things to myself to help my competitive performance. 12345
21. At competitions, 1 rehearse the feel of my performance in my 12345 
imagination.
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22. I manage my self-talk effectively during competition. 12345
23. I set goals to help me use practice time effectively. 12345
24. At practice, when I visualize my performance, I imagine what it 12345 
will feel like.
25. During practice I focus my attention effectively. 12345
26. I set personal performance goals for a competition. 12345
27. 1 motivate myself to train through positive self-talk. 12345
28. I have trouble maintaining my concentration during long practices. 12345
29. I talk positively to myself to get the most out of practice. 12345
30. I have very specific goals for practice. 12345
31. I imagine my competitive routine before I do it at a competition. 12345
32. I imagine screwing up during a competition. 12345
33. I talk positively to myself to get the most out of competitions. 12345
34. I don't set goals for practices, I just go out and do it. 12345
35. I rehearse my performance in my mind at competitions. 12345
36. I have trouble controlling my emotions when things are not going 12345 
well at practice.
37. My emotions keep me from performing my best at competitions. 12345
38. My emotions get out of control under the pressure of competition. 12345
39. At practice, when I visualize my performance, I imagine watching 12345 
myself as if on a video replay.
40. I can allow the whole skill or movement to happen naturally in 12345 
competition without concentrating on each part.
41. I use relaxation techniques as a coping strategy at competitions. 12345
42. I can psych myself to perform well in practice. 12345
43. 1 am able to perform skills at practice without having to consciously 12345 
think about them.
44. I can get myself ready to perform when I am at competitions. 12345
45. I have difficulty with my emotions at competitions. 12345
46. During training sessions I use relaxation techniques to improve my 12345 
performance.
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47. I need to monitor all the details of each move in order to successfully execute 12345 
skills in practice.
48. I have difficulty controlling my emotions if I make a mistake at 12345 
competitions.
49. Visual distractions during competition would affect my performance. 12345
50. My emotions keep me from performing my best during practice. 12345
51. My competition performance would be impaired by sleep loss. 12345
52. 1 have difficulty getting into an ideal performance state during training. 12345
53. I can psych myself to perform well in competitions. 12345
54. I use relaxation techniques during competitions to improve my 12345 
performance.
55. I can get myself "up" if I feel flat at practice. 12345
56. I am unable to perform skills at competition without consciously thinking 12345 
about them.
57. If I'm starting to "lose it" at a competition, I use a relaxation 
technique.
58. I can get my intensity levels just right for competition. 12345
59. During practice, I can perform automatically without having to consciously 12345 
control each movement.
60. I am able to trust my body to perform skills in competition. 12345
61. I relax myself before competition to get ready to perform. 12345
62. In competition, I am sufficiently prepared to be able to perform on automatic 12345 
pilot.
63. I can get myself "up" if I feel flat at a competition. 12345
64. Loud noises during competition would not affect my performance. 12345
65. My practice performance suffers when something upsets me at training 12345
66. 1 use workouts to practise relaxing. 12345
67. Environmental conditions like weather and temperature affect my 12345 
performance in competitions.
68. I can get my intensity levels just right for practice. 12345
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APPENDIX G
Psychological Performance States Inventory
Instructions - Complete approximately an hour before competition
The effects of highly competitive sports can be powerful and very different among athletes. 
Some very common statements that athletes have used to describe their psychological 
states when anticipating or performing sports under pressure are given below. The 
inventory you are about to complete measures how you feel at this moment. Please 
complete the inventory as honestly as you can. Read each statement and then circle the 
appropriate number. There are no right or wrong answers. Your answers will be kept 
completely confidential, and we will only be looking at group responses. Do not spend too 




1)Myheart is racing................................................... 1 2345
2) I feel I have the capacity to cope with this performance... 1 2345
3)1 am conscious that others will be judging my performance 1 2 345
4) I believe in my ability to perform................................ 1 2 345
5) I am worried that I may make mistakes............................... 1 2 345
6) I feel physically nervous.......................................... 1 2 345
I)My chest feels tight................................................. 1 2345
8) 1 am worried about the uncertainty of what may happen.... 1 2 3 4 5
9)Ifmdmyselftrcmbling............................................ 12345
10) I tend to dwell on shortcomings in my performance........ 1 2 3 4 5
11) I am worried about the outcome of my performance....... 1 2 3 4 5
12)1 feel tense in my stomach...................................... 1 2345
13)1 am prepared for my upcoming performance............... 1 2345
14) I am conscious about the way I will look to others......... 1 2345
15) I have a slight tension headache................................ 1 2345
16) lam worried that 1 may not perform to the best of my ability 1 2 345
17) I am confident that I will be able to reach my target.......... 1 2 345
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18) I am aware that I will scrutinise my performance............ 1 2345
19) I feel lethargic....................................................... 1 2345
20) My body feels tense............................................... 1 2345
21)1 feel a lump in my throat.......................................... 1 2345
22) I am aware that 1 will be conscious of every movement II 2 345
make
23) 1 am worried about the consequence of failure................ 1 2 345
24) I am worried that I may not meet the expectations of 12345 
important others.........................................................
25) My hands are clammy............................................. 1 2345
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APPENDIX H
Table 1. Measurement factor loadings for TOPS-2
Factor loadings PLS Bootsrap 
estimate estimate
Emotional Control 
My emotions keep me from performing my best at competitions.
My emotions get out of control under the pressure of competition. 
I have difficulty controlling my emotions if I make a mistake at 
competitions.
Automaticity
I can allow the whole skill or movement to happen naturally in competition 
without concentrating on each part.
I am unable to perform skills at competition without consciously thinking 
about them.
I am able to trust my body to perform skills in competition.
In competition, I am sufficiently prepared to be able to perform on 
automatic pilot.
Activation
I can get myself ready to perform when I am at competitions. 
I can psych myself to perform well in competitions. 
I can get my intensity levels just right for competition. 
I can get myself "up" if I feel flat at a competition. 
Negative Thinking
I keep my thoughts positive during competitions. 
I imagine screwing up during a competition. 
My self-talk during competition is negative. 
During competition I have thoughts of failure. 
Distractibility
Visual distractions during competition would affect my performance. 
My competition performance would be impaired by sleep loss. 
Loud noises during competition would not affect my performance.













































































Table 3. Path coefficients for saturated model
Hypothesised relationship
Cognitive -> Emotional Control
Cognitive -> Automaticity
Cognitive -> Activation
Cognitive - >Negative Thinking
Cognitive - > Distractibility
Physiological -> Emotional Control
Physiological -> Automaticity
Physiological -> Activation
Physiological -> Negative Thinking
Physiological -> Distractibility
Regulatory -> Emotional Control
Regulatory -> Automaticity
Regulatory -> Activation



































For the paths, the value is the standardised PLS estimate,*/? < .05, **p < .01, ***/? < .001
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